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ABSTRACTS

International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs

By C. LIPSON

Why should cooperative arrangements and rule systems be more prevalent in economic than in security affairs? In both, the actors are interdependent and have opportunities for joint gains. Yet security issues differ from economic issues in two fundamental ways: (1) the immediate and potentially grave losses to an actor who attempts to cooperate without reciprocation and (2) the risks associated with inadequate monitoring of others' decisions and actions. Knowing these risks and uncertainties, prudent states will decline to cooperate with adversaries unless they can monitor with confidence and can circumscribe the arrangements to minimize their vulnerability to defection. Economic issues, by contrast, are more transparent and less subject to devastating surprise. As a result, stable reciprocal expectations (grounded in ongoing transactions) can serve as a basis for international rules and conventions.

Muslim Cadres and Soviet Political Development: reflections from a comparative perspective

By S. L. BURG

This article examines the potential political problems posed by the increasing participation of native cadres in Soviet Central Asia and the prospect of their participation in increasing numbers in the central institutions of the state and party. It uses the comparative analysis of pre-1966 Yugoslavia and the contemporary Soviet Union to explore some of the options open to the central, and predominantly Russian, Soviet leadership for dealing with these problems. It defines the characteristics of and establishes the potential for what might be called an "accommodationist" response on the part of the Soviet leadership. Using Yugoslav experience for comparison, it suggests that, although accommodation of Central Asian cadres may represent a short-term solution, it is an inherently unstable one, tending to give rise in the longer term to pressures from native cadres for full incorporation as equal participants in the ruling elite; such demands may either result in political reform or give rise to simple repression.

Why Peasants Rebel: the case of peru's sendero luminoso

By C. McCLINTOCK

The author analyzes the origins of a major revolutionary movement in the Peruvian highlands (Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path). On the basis of the Peruvian experience, new light is shed on the prevailing theories of peasant revolution. The emergence of a threat to peasant subsistence is emphasized as a key factor, especially when the peasantry puts the blame in good part upon unjust or neglectful government policies. Questions of agrarian structure, geopolitics, guerrilla organization, and official repressive capacity are also analyzed. Since Sendero Luminoso is the first major rural revolutionary movement to have emerged *after* a sweeping agrarian reform, the author examines this anomalous circumstance.

Disaffection and Dissent in East Germany

By P. RAMET

Social disaffection is troubling to communist regimes not only because it may foster dissent, but also because it may engender apathy, antisocial attitudes, and social deviance. In the East German context, four chief sources of disaffection stand out: failure of resocialization (in which countercultures such as Christianity and punk rock offer normative and behavioral alternatives), specific policy shortcomings, Marxist ideology itself, and incipient economic malaise. Each of these loci of disaffection may be translated into dissent. Although the East German regime has sought to extirpate both disaffection and dissent, it has only succeeded in multiplying the sources of disaffection and deepening the potential for dissent.

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The Luther Anniversary in East Germany

By R. F. GOECKEL

Analysis of the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth indicates the dynamics of ideological and political change in the communist regime in East Germany. The long-term shift toward a more positive view of Luther in official Marxist historiography and the extensive state celebration of Luther challenged the churches, resulting in their arm's-length cooperation with the state. The regime's new stance toward Luther suggests that it seeks to adapt to, rather than transform, its political culture. The study reveals, however, that short-range factors—the improved church-state relationship and the more relaxed inter-German relationship in the Honecker era, as well as the limitations on these relationships, also had considerable impact on the Luther celebration. Comparison with other Soviet-bloc regimes confirms the uniqueness of the church-state relationship in the G.D.R.

Technology Transfer:

West-South Perspective

By K. Z. POZNANSKI

Contrary to many arguments put forward by the dependency school, there is not much quantitative evidence that the transfer of Western technology has had an adverse effect on the modernization of the South. Also, the foreign monopolies of modern technology seem to be less permanent than is suggested by the dependency literature. In fact, many developing countries (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, South Korea) have been successful in building up their domestic potential with the help of Western technology, and in advancing the capability of a large number of industries.

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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND SECURITY AFFAIRS

By CHARLES LIPSON*

THE study of international political economy is distinguished not only by its substantive focus but also by its continuing attention to cooperative, or at least rule-guided, arrangements. These cooperative arrangements are defined variously: as an open world economy by Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner, and as strong international regimes by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.[1] But in either case, the problems of cooperation and order are not approached simply as tactical alliances or as limiting cases of international anarchy. Instead, close attention is paid to the possibilities for rule making and institution building, however fragile and circumscribed they may be. By this view, the absence of a Hobbesian "common power to keep them all in awe" does not preclude the establishment of some effective joint controls over the international environment. Elaborating on this perspective, Brian Barry argues that "international affairs are not a pure anarchy in which nobody has any reason for expecting reciprocal relations to hold up. In economic matters, particularly, there is a good deal of room for stable expectations."[2]

These stable expectations, which arise in the context of repeated transactions, are critically important since they can serve as the basis for international rules and conventions. Indeed, legal theorist Lon Fuller argues that this is exactly how *all* customary law develops. It grows, he says, out of stable, complementary expectations and serves as both a "language of interaction" and a "base line for human interaction."[3] Along

* I especially wish to thank Peter Cowhey, Russell Hardin, Morton Kaplan, Robert Keohane, and Duncan Snidal for their valuable advice. A preliminary version of this paper was presented in May 1983 at a conference on International Regimes and Institutional Design, sponsored by the World Peace Foundation. This research was supported by a fellowship from the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

[1] Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28 (April 1976), 317-47; Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

[2] Brian Barry, "Do Countries Have Moral Obligations? The Case of World Poverty," in Sterling McMurrin, ed., *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, Vol. II (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1981), 30. Barry's use of the term "anarchy" obviously differs from its more typically circumscribed meaning in international relations: "the absence of an international sovereign."

[3] Lon L. Fuller, "Law and Human Interaction," in Harry M. Johnson, ed., *Social System*

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the same lines, recent studies of international regimes emphasize the centrality of interactional expectancies.[4]

What has not been answered satisfactorily is why convergent expectations characterize some issues but not others. Why do some issues admit of extensive regulation whereas others do not? Put another way, the problem is to go beyond a reassertion of the distinctive subject matter of international political economy and to construct a *theoretically principled account of why significantly different institutional arrangements are associated with international economic and security issues*. An answer to this fundamental question could well lie in the different forms of strategic interaction (including expectations) that typify these two broad issues.

The Prisoner's Dilemma as a Political Dilemma

The most direct and systematic approach to questions of strategic interaction is through game theory (and, relatedly, through theories of simulated gaming). In this section I shall consider one particularly important game, the Prisoner's Dilemma, which helps clarify some basic features of international conflict and cooperation. In the following sections, I shall argue that the situational context is crucial to achieving cooperation in a repeatedly played Prisoner's Dilemma, and, further, that this context is significantly different in economic and security issues.

The Prisoner's Dilemma, in its simplest form, involves two players. Each is assumed to be a self-interested, self-reliant maximizer of his own utility, an assumption that clearly parallels the Realist conception of sovereign states in international politics. Each player can move only once per game, and each faces a simple choice: to cooperate or to defect. Under these conditions, each player can maximize his own reward by defecting, *regardless of what the other does*. Note, however, that if both defect, each receives a smaller reward than if they had cooperated. The formal result is that the game's equilibrium, in which both players defect, is stable but not Pareto optimal.[5]

Unfortunately, it is not easy to move toward the collectively rational solution or to maintain it, were it ever achieved. If a "nice" player were to try to cooperate, for example, his counterpart could play him for a "sucker" and reap greater rewards by defecting than by reciprocating.

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and Legal Process: Theory, Comparative Perspectives, and Special Studies (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978), 61, 76.

[4] See the definition of regimes given by Krasner in his introductory essay and used by most contributors to *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.

[5] The Prisoner's Dilemma is the only two-player game with such a deficient equilibrium in which both players have dominant strategies.

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FIGURE 1

THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA

		Player 2			
		Cooperate		*Defect*	
Player 1	*Cooperate*	R = 3	R = 3	S = 1	P = 4
	Defect	T = 4	S = 1	P = 2	P = 2

Note: Payoffs are given as ordinal rankings, with 4 as most preferred; for each player T > R > P > S, where
T = temptation to defect
R = reward for mutal cooperation
P = punishment for mutal defection
S = sucker's payoff for unreciprocated cooperation

No player has any incentive to take the first step toward a cooperative solution, and, if it could be achieved, every player would have strong individual incentives to depart from it.[6] The dilemma, then, is the ineluctable failure to coordinate despite the obvious possibility of joint gains.

Because the Prisoner's Dilemma highlights both the potential gains from cooperation and the temptations that prevent it, it has been taken as an elegant expression of the most profound *political* dilemmas, including that of the social contract. Indeed, Jon Elster once defined politics as "the study of ways of transcending the Prisoner's Dilemma."[7] Social-exchange theories take up this problem quite directly. The central explanatory issue in such theories, according to Russell Hardin, is to determine "how relationships are ramified in relevant ways to make cooperation of exchange rationally secure."[8] This issue is obviously pertinent to the study of international political economy, with its emphasis on the emergence of cooperation and exchange in an anarchic world of sovereign states.

Actually, cooperation under the Prisoner's Dilemma would be relatively simple were it not for several restrictions that define the game in its fundamental form. One is that players cannot rely on any outside

[6] In Jon Elster's terms, a cooperative solution is not "individually accessible" or "individually stable." Elster, *Ulysses and the Sirens* (Cambridge, England, and Paris: Cambridge University Press and Editions de la maison des sciences de l'homme, 1979), 21. The problems of the "nice" egoist, who takes the first step toward cooperation, are explored in Robert Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," *American Political Science Review* 75 (June 1981), 306-18.

[7] Elster, "Some Conceptual Problems in Political Theory," in Brian Barry, ed., *Power and Political Theory* (London: John Wiley, 1976), 249.

[8] Russell Hardin, *Collective Action* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, for Resources for the Future, 1982), 215.

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assistance. There is no external mechanism to enforce threats or promises.[9] Nor can any player know what the other will do on a given move, so reputation is worthless. This restriction also prohibits metagame strategies in which either player can choose "the same move as the other player."[10] Finally, there is no way for a player to change the other's payoff ranking. [11] The game is thus rigid (all its rules are completely specified and defined in advance) and "environment poor" (all players understand the rules, the number of variables is highly limited, and the emphasis is on abstract structure rather than on institutional or environmental detail).[12]

These restrictions, and the ability to vary them, permit the Prisoner's Dilemma to be simulated in interesting ways. At the same time, they suggest that in situations resembling the Prisoner's Dilemma an inhospitable social context and the absence of certain institutions may block cooperative solutions. In fact, the restrictions imposed by gaming theorists point to practical devices used to resolve real-life Prisoner's Dilemmas. Metagame solutions are possible, for example, if escrow mechanisms are available (since they permit simultaneous, contingent decisions) or if third parties such as the state can guarantee contracts. Such institutional devices are common domestically but rare internationally. Indeed, the absence of reliable guarantees is an essential feature of international relations and a major obstacle to concluding treaties, contracts, and agreements. Thus, the constraints on opportunism are weak.

If cooperation is to arise in the institutionally arid setting of the Prisoner's Dilemma, its sources often lie in the game's environmental context or its repeated play. The mere fact of repetition changes several key features of the game, especially if the players can communicate.[13] These subtle but important changes are one reason why Martin Shubik speaks of a "class" of Prisoner's Dilemma games, which are often mis-

[9] Thus, any promises (such as "I will cooperate if you will cooperate") cannot be relied upon. If, however, a player feels ethically obliged to keep such promises, then his payoff structure must be modified accordingly and the game is no longer a Prisoner's Dilemma.

[10] Such metastrategies permit synchronic reciprocity and leave no room for being a "sucker" unless only one side can play a metastrategy. Metagames and their strategies are treated in depth in Nigel Howard, *Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971).

[11] Axelrod (fn. 6), 308; see also Axelrod's innovative treatment of changes in players' utilities in *Conflict of Interest* (Chicago: Markham, 1970).

[12] Martin Shubik, *Games for Society, Business and War: Towards a Theory of Gaming* (New York: Elsevier, 1975), 3-4.

[13] Repeated moves *within* a single game can have similar effects. As R. Harrison Wagner has shown, cooperation can arise in single-play games resembling the Prisoner's Dilemma (that is, where conditional cooperation is Pareto optimal) when the players must make an indefinite sequence of moves. Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 77 (June 1983), 330-46.

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taken for a single game.[14] Not only does repetition permit players to make threats and commitments, it also makes reputation important—all the more so since there is no external guarantee that promises will be kept. Beyond developing a reputation, a player can also make his strategy explicitly contingent on the choices of others, including their willingness to cooperate for joint gains.

TIT FOR TAT is one such contingent strategy (and a very important one, as we shall see later). Using this strategy, a player always cooperates on the first move. This "nice" strategy receives either the reward for mutual cooperation or the sucker's payoff if it is not reciprocated. From then on, the TIT FOR TAT player does whatever the other player did on the previous move. This strategy simultaneously offers to cooperate, to retaliate, and to resume cooperation after punishing defection.

Like all strategies in iterated games, this one has a present (discounted) value, which players try to maximize. To calculate this value, we assume that earlier payoffs are worth more than later ones, either because future consumption is valued less or because the game's continuation is uncertain.[15] Then, using each player's discount for the future, we can cumulate the present value of all payoffs.

To illustrate, let us assume that both players choose the strategy, TIT FOR TAT. Each then wins the payoff R (the reward for cooperation) for every round of the game. Since the first round is played immediately, its present value to each player is R. If the game continues for a second round, each player will again receive R. But he will receive it only when that round is played—sometime in the future. The present value (before round one) of this second payoff is wR, some fraction of the immediate reward. This fraction reflects the player's discount for future rewards and his uncertainty about the game's continuing to this point. (Thus, the discount parameter, w, will approach 1.0 if the game's continuation is likely or if future consumption is relatively important.) For a potentially infinite game, the present value for the stream of cooperative payoffs is

$$V = R + wR + w^2R + w^3R + \ldots$$

$$V = \frac{R}{1 - w}, \qquad \text{where } 0 \leqslant W \leqslant 1.$$

Robert Axelrod has shown that if the discount parameter, w, is sufficiently large, there is no one best strategy independent of the other

[14] Shubik, "Game Theory, Behavior, and the Paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma: Three Solutions," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14 (June 1970), 191.

[15] Axelrod (fn. 6), 308.

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player's choice.[16] If the future is very important, in other words, the players' optimal strategies are interdependent.

Even more important, Axelrod has shown that a strategy of cooperation based on reciprocity (TIT FOR TAT) can foster the emergence of stable cooperation among egoists.[17] He assumes that many individuals are playing separate games against each other, one at a time. In such a world, even if many players refuse to cooperate, small clusters of discriminating players can still profit from playing TIT FOR TAT as long as they have even a small fraction of their interactions with each other. Axelrod's conclusion is striking and evocative: "Mutual cooperation can emerge in a world of egoists without central control, by starting with a cluster of individuals who rely on reciprocity."[18]

These findings obviously bear on a central issue in international relations theory: the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among sovereign, self-interested states, operating without any centralized authority. If the time horizon is long enough, then the best strategy for individual actors is some initial generosity (that is, cooperating unilaterally on the first move), followed by tough-minded reciprocity. The more general result, as Hardin observes, is that "when there is even tacit opportunity for making one's choices contingent on those of one's adversary-partner, that is, of threatening the partner with defection in return for defection, rationality can become strategic."[19]

It is now generally recognized that cooperation can be strategically rational if the Prisoner's Dilemma is potentially infinite or if it is simultaneously linked to a wide variety of other games with the same players. Under these conditions, players can *individually* benefit from coordination conventions—whether they arise spontaneously, by following a leader, or through centralized efforts. In international relations, such conventions, which are typically grounded in ongoing reciprocal exchange, range from international law to regime rules. They form "baselines for interaction" and are extensive despite the chronic condition of international anarchy.[20]

[16] *Ibid.*, 309. As we already know, if the game is played only once, then $w = 0$ (since all future payoffs are worth zero) and defection is always the best individual strategy.

[17] These arguments are summarized in Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

[18] Axelrod (fn. 6), 317; also see Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton, "The Evolution of Cooperation," *Science* 211 (March 27, 1981), 1390-96. The stability of this strategy depends on prompt retaliation: the TIT-FOR-TAT player is "nice," but he is not a patsy. It is also important to recognize that Axelrod's treatment is limited to players who can discriminate, not to the provision of public goods as such.

[19] Hardin (fn. 8), 145.

[20] Such conventions and tacit contracts can even embrace large groups if they are built up from the overlapping interactions of smaller groups. These smaller groups are critical

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International Cooperation under the Prisoner's Dilemma

This analysis of iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas suggests several vital elements of stable cooperation in international affairs:

1) the actors' perceptions that they are interdependent and that their decisions are mutually contingent;
2) a timely capacity to monitor and react to each other's decisions;
3) a strong interest in the long haul;
4) moderate differences between the payoffs for cooperation and defection.

These general conditions highlight the most significant issues in forging international cooperation. Consider, for example, the actors' interdependence. If they play the same game repeatedly or several games contemporaneously, then defections can be punished and coordination conventions can develop.

Of course, if decisions are to be made contingent (over time or across several games), then the actors' moves must be reasonably transparent. Timely monitoring is especially important if the "sucker" pays a high price for unwitting and unreciprocated cooperation.[21] In its absence, he will be reluctant to cooperate. In general, when players share a conditional preference for cooperative solutions (as they do in the Prisoner's Dilemma), then confidence in monitoring capacity can foster cooperation.

Knowledge about other players' payoffs and strategies is important because a player who offers to cooperate runs real risks. These risks are minimized, however, if the sucker's penalty (for unreciprocated cooperation) is not grievous and if any gains from immediate defection are modest when compared to the value of long-term cooperation. There are two distinct issues here. One is how much future payoffs are discounted. If the future is highly valued, then a player might prudently risk the sucker's payoff now in hopes of fostering reciprocal cooperation over the long term. The other is the relative costliness of the sucker's payoff *in any single game*, compared to rewards for mutual cooperation and the temptations to defect. Experimental studies show that players are much more likely to cooperate when the immediate gains from

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because they permit low-cost sanctions, such as exclusion, against defectors and because they help disseminate the knowledge required for conventional behavior. Hardin (fn. 8), 174, 191-93.

[21] Thomas C. Schelling offers a perceptive discussion of these surveillance issues and their significance for U.S.-Soviet relations. When facing a potentially hostile enemy, says Schelling, "what one wants is not to *be* confident, but to be *as* confident as the true state of affairs justifies. What one wants is *grounds for confidence*, evidence that confidence is justified." Schelling, "Confidence in Crisis," *International Security* 8 (Spring 1984), 56.

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FIGURE 2

PRISONER'S DILEMMAS WITH DIFFERING CARDINAL PAYOFFS

Game 1

	C	D
C	1, 1	−50, 50
D	50, −50	−1, −1

Game 2

	C	D
C	9, 9	−10, 10
D	10, −10	−1, −1

defection (against a cooperating opponent) are small and the costs of mutual defection are high. Consider the two games in Figure 2, both of which are Prisoner's Dilemmas. If the payoffs are ranked ordinally, the two games are identical. Yet Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah found that if pairs of students played one variant hundreds of times, they were almost three times as likely to choose cooperative strategies in Game 2.[22]

In cases involving jointly supplied goods (where consumption by one party does not diminish that of others), cooperation may also be impeded by free riders and communicative difficulties. The size and structure of the group are critical. Is the group able to determine its own membership? Can it exclude or punish defectors? A small group, or a larger one composed of overlapping small groups with extensive interactions, may be important for the establishment and diffusion of conventions, for the detection and sanction of defectors, and, in the case of truly public goods, for the formation of a viable coalition.[23]

These game-theoretic issues have profound implications for the maintenance of political cooperation among open economies. The ramifications of contingent decision making are a good example. The basic question here is whether key actors really consider their decisions mutually contingent and can convey that point effectively. This issue is especially important, and problematic, in the case of rising economic powers like modern Japan or interwar America. Once minor players, they may be slow to recognize the full implications of their new international status. Formerly allowed to defect with impunity, they may fail

[22] Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah (with the collaboration of Carol J. Orwant), *Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), 33-39.

[23] The problem of creating and sustaining a viable group of cooperators is treated imaginatively (as a multiperson Prisoner's Dilemma) in Thomas Schelling's "Hockey Helmets, Daylight Saving, and Other Binary Choices," in *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978).

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to recognize that their defections are now considered pernicious and that others' decisions are now contingent upon them. They assume, in effect, that others act completely independently. Elster terms this "parametric rationality" since it assumes that the actor's environment is a parametric constant rather than the product of strategic interaction.[24]

To its trading partners, Japanese commercial policy appears to be an unfortunate example of parametric rationality and an illustration of the threat it poses to stable cooperation in small groups.[25] Although Japan has recently made substantial efforts to open its internal market, its official policies and corporate practices still make Japan harder to penetrate than other major markets. The issue is one of long standing, but it has become increasingly acute because Japan's domestic market has grown and its manufacturing trade surplus has increased at a time when many of its trading partners suffer from overcapacity. Its trade policies have never been truly reciprocal (indeed, they are more forthcoming now than ever), but the combination of Japan's size and world economic conditions has drawn attention to Japan's implicit (and parametric) assumption that its export markets will remain accessible even though its own market is still laced with restrictions. Japan's major trading partners are now challenging this assumption quite directly—by threatening trade retaliation. Responding to these credible threats, Japan has accelerated the selective opening of its domestic market even though these changes in trade barriers erode the electoral base of the ruling LDP party.

Threats of retaliation are not always taken so seriously, especially when they would be costly to carry out. Perhaps that is why less developed countries have ignored recent U.S. warnings that the Congress will raise trade barriers unless they open their markets substantially. "Oh, you won't do anything," India's trade minister told U.S. officials. "I have confidence in America, and I would be terribly disappointed if America went the protectionist route."[26] Referring to this candid statement, the *Wall Street Journal* concluded that the 1982 multilateral trade talks ended "without much progress, in part because no one believed the U.S. warning."

What was in doubt was America's willingness to act strategically, and therefore its capacity to threaten such action effectively. The Indian

[24] The *strategically* rational actor makes a much more complex calculation. Unlike the parametric actor, he assumes that his environment is made up of other calculating actors, that he is part of their strategic environment, that they know this, and so on. Elster (fn. 6), 18.

[25] America's protectionist Smoot-Hawley tariff, passed in 1930, is an equally good example.

[26] Shiv Raj Patil's private statement to U.S. Trade Representative William Brock at the 1982 GATT ministerial conference, quoted in the *Wall Street Journal*, January 17, 1983, p. 31.

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minister may ultimately be proven wrong (the U.S. continues to press the point), but there is certainly a reasonable basis for his doubts. A sharp increase in American protectionism would carry high costs for the U.S. economy,[27] would be difficult to contain and later reverse, and would have major repercussions in Europe, legitimating and encouraging protectionism there. Trade policy making is an open, fragmented process, especially in America, and is far too cumbersome to plausibly threaten adroit strategic action. These difficulties encourage parametric thinking in all trading countries—this despite a shared recognition that the major actors' policies are fundamentally interdependent.

This discussion of trade policy making suggests some limits in our earlier treatment of strategic interaction under the Prisoner's Dilemma. Our analysis, like most stylized treatments of international bargaining, presumes that states are coherent, unitary, rational actors. This strong assumption is, of course, descriptively inaccurate. Governments do not choose between alternative tactics, as single decision makers might, to maximize expected returns or to assure some minimum payoff. Rather, such choices are typically the product of politically mediated coalition bargaining.

Such descriptive inaccuracy is hardly damning—spare, simple models can seize essential elements of the problem at hand—but it does highlight the stylized framework of most bargaining models and the inherent limitations of their empirical application. For example, a national policy that appears irrational *as an international bargaining strategy* may actually be preferred by some domestic actors or may be the product of internal compromise. International bargaining models could then be used to analyze the implications of this suboptimal strategy. Equally important, the process of building and sustaining domestic coalitions necessarily limits the capacity of modern states to devise and execute sophisticated strategies, which may require plausible threats to change policy sharply or to stick to one policy resolutely. Although contingent strategies are often used—in the START talks, for instance, or in the GATT trade rounds—the negotiators' threats and promises may be more or less credible because of domestic political constraints.

More generally, at least four objections can be made to using the Prisoner's Dilemma as a model of international interaction. The first, already indicated, is that it oversimplifies the nature of the actors and

[27] To threaten trade protection as a strategic act amounts to blackmail. The reason is straightforward: blackmail involves a threat to do something that one does not really want to do for its own sake, but will refrain from doing only if compensated. See Kenneth Oye, "The Domain of Choice," in Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert Lieber, eds., *Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World* (New York: Longman, 1979), 14.

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distorts both their goals and policy processes. The second is that it fails to acknowledge the cognitive and perceptual elements of strategic interactions. The third is that it fails to capture subtle interactions: the give-and-take of bargaining, the creation of new alternatives, and the search for symmetry and joint gains. And, finally, it compresses a variety of bargaining situations into a single type of game when, in fact, several analytically distinct games are being played.

These objections, each significant in its own right, indicate the properly circumscribed uses of gaming models in the analysis of international relations. Such models cannot adequately describe the actual play of experimental subjects, much less the play of actors as complex as states. Still, as Henri Theil once remarked, "models are to be used but not to be believed."[28] Certainly that is true of gaming models, which are useful, despite their limitations, for the analytic exposition of bargaining relationships. They can be used to explore (1) the pattern of structural constraints on players' choices; (2) the varied inducements and punishments they represent; (3) the role of environmental variables, including time horizons, in modifying the players' interactions; and (4) the relationship between the choice of each and the outcome for all. As Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing observe in their study of crisis bargaining, "A 2x2 model can be used to describe the *basic structure of the crisis situation*. . . . The 2x2 alternatives are not specific strategies but general directions that specific strategies may take. They represent the two basic modalities of accommodation and coercion that run through all crisis bargaining"[29]—through all bargaining, one might say.

Nor do gaming models depreciate the importance of cognition, perception, and information processing.[30] As Thomas Schelling's work illustrates, gaming can be used to consider the role of expectations and the complex motivational structures associated with particular games.[31] These cognitive and communicative issues are central to the analysis of coordination games, for instance. In pure coordination games, including contract by convention, neither player has any reason to defect. But, because there may be more than one equilibrium, the solution may fall

[28] Henri Theil, *Principles of Econometrics* (New York: John Wiley, 1971), vi. I am indebted to Adam Przeworski for this quotation.

[29] Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 83 (their emphasis).

[30] Arthur Stein, "When Misperception Matters," *World Politics* 34 (July 1982), 505-26.

[31] Schelling, for example, finds three distinct motivational structures associated with the game of Chicken. Chicken can be a "pure test case" in which the only stakes are the players' reputations; it can be a "conventional case" in which the nominal stakes take on special importance by virtue of the actors' own commitments to winning them; and finally the "real case" in which the ostensible stakes are intrinsically valuable to the players. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 118-19.

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short of Pareto optimality if players cannot communicate adequately. These informational requirements are especially important because, for small numbers of actors, an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma of indeterminate length is essentially equivalent to a coordination game.

Strategic Interaction in Security and Economic Issues

This extended treatment of the Prisoner's Dilemma and its variations lays the groundwork for reconsidering the basic question with which we started: Why are significantly different institutional arrangements associated with international economic and security issues? The answer lies, I think, in sharply differing ideal-typical forms of strategic interaction in these two broad issues.

Conflict and cooperation are, of course, comingled in both issues, but there are still important and systematic differences: economic issues are characterized far more often by elaborate networks of rules, norms, and institutions, grounded in reasonably stable, convergent expectations. Security regimes, on the other hand, are very rare indeed, as Robert Jervis and others have concluded.[32] One might object that a reasonably stable set of rules and norms (although virtually no permanent, formal organization) does exist in certain carefully defined areas such as nuclear proliferation, weapons testing, and so forth. Reaching back to the early nineteenth century, some would even call the Concert of Europe a generalized security regime since it encompassed a range of basic national security concerns among the major powers. But the basic point still stands. Generalized security regimes are exceptional, even though alliances are not. There are few equivalents in the security field to the comprehensive, rule-guided arrangements in trade and money. *The real question is why security regimes—but not economic ones—are so rare and so limited in scope.*

One straightforward answer is that security issues and economic issues lend themselves to quite different types of strategic interaction. According to this view, economic games often involve relatively simple coordination or mutually beneficial exchange. Security issues, by contrast, are inherently more conflictual and their equilibria less stable. The recurrent attention paid by security analysts to the game of Chicken is testimony to this view.[33]

This answer is both illuminating and misleading. It resists, quite

[32] Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), 357-78.
[33] Steven J. Brams, for instance, treats the Cuban Missile Crisis as a game of Chicken in *Game Theory and Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1975), 39ff.

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properly, any conflation of international affairs into one or two simple games. Certainly the Prisoner's Dilemma is not a prototype for all interactions. It also underscores the sharper conflicts that surround security issues and implies that the skillful use of gaming approaches must pay close attention to payoff matrices, as the actors themselves understand them.

Yet it is seriously misleading to assume that security issues do not present the opportunity for significant joint gains, or at least the prevention of joint losses. Even adversaries like the United States and the Soviet Union wish to avoid nuclear war. And both could profit from restraints on arms racing: limits on the number of launchers and warheads, reduction of conventional forces in Europe, and so forth. Fundamental opposition, colored by mistrust, is thus tempered by the chance for genuine joint gains. This complex mix of motives was captured in Nikita Khrushchev's comment about John Kennedy: "He was, so to speak, both my partner and my adversary."[34]

This mix of motives suggests a broad analogy to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Each nation would undoubtedly prefer military superiority; that is, it would prefer to defect opportunistically while the other state accommodated. Similarly, the worst alternative for each is to play the sucker while the other state builds its arsenal and extends its military reach. To minimize these grave risks, each may avoid cooperation, or sharply limit its scope, producing a result no one really wants: a competitive escalation of military research, expenditures, and deployments. If the analogy to the Prisoner's Dilemma holds, both countries consider this competitive escalation inferior to a cooperative, negotiated solution, but better than unilateral restraint. In this important sense, the major powers are, in Bruce Russett's phrase, prisoners of insecurity.[35]

This dilemma is not a static, one-shot affair, but a game played repeatedly. The United States and the Soviet Union are militarily interdependent on a continuing basis, just as the United States, Japan, and Western Europe are economically interdependent. The superpowers also recognize that their decisions are mutually contingent, even if they habitually portray their own actions as prudent *responses* and gloss over their own impact on others. In all these respects, including the opportunity to avoid joint losses, security issues share significant common features with economic issues.

Where contingent decision making is the rule, cooperative solutions

[34] Quoted in Bruce Russett, *The Prisoners of Insecurity* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1983), 99.

[35] *Ibid.*

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are possible in iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas. But if both economic and security issues can be understood, in part, as iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas, then why are cooperative arrangements rare in one, recurrent in the other? The answer lies in the conditions that foster cooperation in games of indefinite iteration. Cooperation is most likely if (1) the future is not highly discounted, and (2) the penalty for unreciprocated cooperation is not devastating.

What is typically different in economic and security affairs is:

—the immediate and potentially grave losses to a player who attempts to cooperate without reciprocation; and

—the risks associated with inadequate monitoring of others' decisions and actions.

If a security game is indefinitely iterated, cooperation (including a generous effort to begin cooperation) may well be rational individually as well as collectively. But if one player, by defecting, can reap rewards by placing the other player at an immediate and overwhelming disadvantage, then there is little hope for stable, extensive cooperation.

It is this special peril of defection, not the persistence of anarchy as such, that makes security preparation such a constant concern.[36] In "placid peacetime," write Snyder and Diesing, the expectation of war (the worst defection) remains in the background, its effects muted and hard to observe. In a crisis, however, "the expectation [of war] is dramatically elevated and its behavioral effects stand starkly revealed."[37] But a crisis is too late to begin serious military preparation, too late to discover that one's cooperative efforts have been dashed. Knowing these risks, prudent states are reluctant to cooperate with adversaries unless they can monitor with confidence, prepare in time to meet a prospective defection, and circumscribe the arrangements to minimize vulnerability.

In game-theoretic terms, this danger of defection has two complementary elements: the immediate gains from defection and the long-term costs. The costs, which stem from diminished cooperation in the future, can be given a present value. If these prospective payoffs are deeply discounted, or if one's opponent is likely to defect anyway, then the game resembles a finite Prisoner's Dilemma and there is a best strategy: defection. We have also seen how, in experimental settings, defections are encouraged when the immediate gains are high.

This deadly logic of noncooperation lies behind Rousseau's fundamental insight:

[36] Anarchy is a necessary condition for the security dilemma, but it is misleading to stress it exclusively, since anarchy and extensive cooperation coexist in international economics.

[37] Snyder and Diesing (fn. 29), 4.

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> It is quite true that it would be much better for all men to remain always at peace. But so long as there is no security for this, everyone, having no guarantee that he can avoid war, is anxious to begin it at the moment which suits his own interest and so forestall a neighbour, who would not fail to forestall the attack in his turn, at any moment favourable to himself, so that many wars, even offensive wars, are rather in the nature of unjust precautions for the protection of the assailant's own possessions than a device for seizing those of others. However salutary it may be in theory to obey the dictates of public spirit, it is certain that, politically and even morally, those dictates are liable to prove fatal to the man who persists in observing them with all the world when no one thinks of observing them towards him.[38]

Thus, the high costs of unreciprocated cooperation, together with uncertainty about others' intentions, fuels suspicion and fosters anxiety to strike first.[39] Under these difficult conditions, all interactions with potential adversaries may come to be seen as purely competitive, or may be plausibly depicted that way in political discourse. In the extreme case, termed "status games," each player aims exclusively to maximize the *difference* between his own score and that of his opponent.[40] This harsh perspective transforms a variable-sum game like the Prisoner's Dilemma into a strictly competitve struggle with no possibility for joint gains.

In practice, two factors dampen this tendency and encourage modest collusion between the superpowers. First, as long as there is little prospect of a successful first strike, the confrontation is likely to remain a deterrent standoff. This prospect of continuity (as we have observed) encourages further cooperation, at least to diminish the risks of a clear common aversion such as nuclear war.[41] Second, although competitive status concerns are important, they are typically combined with welfare goals, leaving some room for joint maximization. Even so, the tendency to convert variable-sum games into constant-sum struggles is a persistent feature of security issues and an impediment to cooperative conventions.

This mixture of status and welfare calculations can be found in both security and economic negotiations, but, in economic negotiations, status goals are seldom a significant end in themselves. Rather, they are instrumental—a rough measure of balance among the parties in extending

[38] J. J. Rousseau, *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe*, trans. by C. E. Vaughan (London: Constable, 1917) 78-79, as quoted in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 63.

[39] It will be especially difficult to allay these suspicions when the offense is considered dominant.

[40] Martin Shubik, "Games of Status," *Behavioral Science* 16 (March 1971), 117-29; Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), 319.

[41] Note that as both sides' fear of a preemptive strike has increased, cooperation on strategic issues has become more difficult—precisely when it is most needed.

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trade concessions, for example. In security matters, on the other hand, status calculations are often critical to the overall value of the agreement to either side. Opponents of SALT II, for instance, argued that the treaty gave the Soviets certain advantages, so the U.S. was necessarily the loser *even if there were significant joint benefits*.[42]

This recurrent image of competitive struggle, and the anarchic conditions in which it is rooted, naturally limits the scope and durability of security agreements between potential adversaries. In spite of the risks, however, agreements are still possible if each side has reasonable grounds for confidence and if defection does not threaten devastation.[43] The specific environment is crucial. Surveillance capabilities, weapons characteristics, the scope of the proposed agreement, and the pace of technological change all matter a great deal. So, too, do actors' perceptions about each other's willingness to act in bad faith—and its likely consequences.

If it takes time to execute a really damaging defection, and if good-faith cooperators can detect violations promptly, then agreements are quite possible. They are possible, at least, if adversaries are confident about their monitoring and their ability to withstand a surprise defection.[44] Similarly, agreements are more likely if both sides have a significant margin of security, a "surplus" allowing each to proffer cooperation with some protection in case the agreement fails.[45] Finally, if defensive forces are considered preeminent, the risks of any breakdown are surely lessened and the opportunities for agreement significantly broadened. The most fragile and dangerous situation by far is when offensive forces are believed to hold the advantage and when an offensive posture cannot be reliably distinguished from a defensive one.[46]

A margin of safety may be necessary for arms control, but it is not sufficient. The essential dilemma, unresolvable in the abstract, is whether

[42] Opponents of SALT II also emphasized the difficulties of monitoring compliance—a recurrent obstacle to security cooperation, as we have already noted. In this case, the difficulties are related to the characteristics of specific weapons systems, the nature of treaty provisions, and the limits of technical surveillance (in the absence of on-site inspection).

[43] Schelling (fn. 21), 56.

[44] The best situation, as Jervis notes, is one in which "a state will not suffer greatly if others exploit it, for example, by cheating on an arms-control agreement . . . but it will pay a high long-run price if cooperation with others breaks down." Such situations are more common, I think, in economic issues. See Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 173.

[45] The idea of surplus security is developed in Bruce Andrews, "Surplus Security and National Security: State Policy as Domestic Social Action," mimeo. (Washington, D.C.: International Studies Association Convention, 1978).

[46] Jervis (fn. 44), 173, 189, 211. Therein lies much of the current debate over the deployment of new land-based ICBMs, which the Reagan administration portrays as a catch-up deterrent force but which others view as a potential first-strike weapon. Herbert Scoville, Jr., *MX: Prescription for Disaster* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1981).

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to make an initial concession and then promise still more if properly reciprocated. This is the TIT FOR TAT strategy once again. Its aim is to promote reciprocal cooperation by initially lowering tension and by supplying evidence of nonaggressive intent. Clear and seemingly simple, it is actually a complex mixture of inducements and implied threats, generosity and possible retribution.

Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult for states to conceive and make credible such a sophisticated strategy. It requires a durable yet precise commitment, one that must be executed with consistency over many years.[47] Even more troublesome, an aggressive, expansive power may consider an adversary's initial concession to be a sign of weakness and irresolution rather than a carefully designed inducement to cooperate.[48] It is precisely these problems of mistrust, which spring from cognitive uncertainty and the danger of surprise, that make cooperation so difficult and unstable.

The dangers of swift, decisive defection simply do not apply in most international economic issues.[49] Timely monitoring is important but rarely vital since most economic actions are reasonably transparent. A few, such as nontariff barriers or short-term Mexican debt, may be opaque, but most are matters of public record.[50] Second, although defection would (by definition) injure others, the prospect of immediate, critical damage is quite unusual. As a result, states know that they can readily verify compliance with economic agreements and will have time to discuss possible violations and, if need be, adjust to them. These favorable conditions facilitate trust and diminish the risks of cooperating.

The luxury of time is especially important. Evidence from experimental gaming suggests how it may aid cooperation. If a player is given the chance to change his mind after seeing another's choice, he is much more likely to switch his move toward cooperative reciprocity than toward exploitation or betrayal.[51] Thus, transparency and the absence of immediate peril encourage mutual accommodation.

[47] These issues are not germane in formal game theory since strategies are viewed as absolute commitments and all strategies are considered equally plausible. According to Shubik, "the concept of *plausibility* is at the crux of the relationship between a strict game-theoretic formulation ... and the treatment of conflict by a mixture of 'gamesmanship,' bargaining and strategic theories, and behavioral models of man." Shubik (fn. 14), 188 (his emphasis).

[48] Jervis (fn. 38), chap. 3.

[49] There are exceptions, of course, mainly in monetary affairs. The most notable was the United States' suspension of gold convertibility on August 15, 1971.

[50] Making nontariff barriers more visible to foreign producers was a major accomplishment of the Tokyo round of trade negotiations.

[51] Russett (fn. 34), 109. These experimental results suggest a significant gap in game theory: the treatment of speech acts and symbolic interaction. "Much of the confusion and misapplication of game theory," according to Shubik, "has been caused by the failure to

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In the most fundamental security matters, this luxury of time may not exist. The classic instance was the rush to full mobilization after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. In retrospect, those days in August 1914 seem positively languid when compared to the eight minutes it would take a Pershing II or SS20 to fly across the terrain of Western civilization and change it forever.

To summarize, then, our analysis has emphasized the possibilities for strategic cooperation that foster the development of rules, norms, and political institutions in the world economy, and the more impoverished possibilities in security affairs. We have argued that *both* economic and military issues are often characterized by the opportunity for joint gains and by interdependent but autonomous decision making, so these factors cannot adequately differentiate their regulation. The crucial differences appear to lie in the costs of betrayal, the difficulties of monitoring, and the tendency to comprehend security issues as strictly competitive struggles.

It is these environmental conditions that transform otherwise similar iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas into distinctive games. Speaking of such environment-rich games, Shubik concludes that considerable attention should be paid "to institutional detail, to context, and to the problem of 'realistic representation,'" including the problems of devising and interpreting rules.[52] Indeed, the development of rule systems and common interpretations can serve as crucial signposts, as informational devices to coordinate expectations in a murky, complex environment. In security issues, though, the risks severely constrain reliance upon such conventions. They also highlight the importance of an undisturbed margin of safety and a reliable warning system for any significant security agreement.

Hegemons, Recessions, and the Evolution of Cooperation

This analysis shows how, in the context of international economic relations, cooperation can be sustained among several self-interested states. Thus, it provides a theoretically principled and empirically plausible account of sustained economic cooperation among advanced capitalist states. What it does *not* show is how such cooperation can emerge in the first place. In practice, the rise of economic cooperation and

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perceive that the formal theory of games makes no claims to having solved the critical problem of how to represent verbal acts as moves. Many aspects of negotiation depend upon trust, interpretation, and evaluation. These factors and precommitments are implicitly assumed in game theoretic analysis." Shubik (fn. 12), 15.

[52] *Ibid.*, 4.

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commercial openness among industrial states has been associated with the rising power of hegemons: Victorian Britain and postwar America. I shall concentrate here on how America fostered economic cooperation in the Atlantic community. Its policies can be understood, I think, as institutionalizing a relatively open world economy through a TIT FOR TAT strategy.

To build the postwar order, the United States not only gave essential economic assistance and security guarantees to Western Europe, it also sponsored a network of multilateral institutions committed to liberalizing trade and long-term capital flows. It founded the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and funded the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Beyond that, the U.S. offered prominent solutions to the most serious coordination issues, made side payments when necessary,[53] and promoted relevant conventions of cooperation. In the same way, the United States set the limits on cooperation. When it defected from cooperative commercial arrangements, as it did in agriculture, liberal trade was stymied in the sector involved.[54] Similarly, when the International Trade Organization failed to win congressional support, it died stillborn.

These limitations are important, but the basic U.S. policy was to foster greater openness in trade and capital flows. At the broadest level, the United States was deeply engaged in the political, economic, and military reconstruction of Western Europe as a whole. Less obviously, it stimulated a discourse among parallel national bureaucracies, offering them opportunities for joint gains—but only if they could cooperate.[55]

Early on, key European economic ministries were caught up in a web of collaborative enterprises. As a consequence, bureaucratic membership in the basic postwar economic regimes was solidified by the late 1940s. Repeated intercourse among these bureaucracies was to forge transgovernmental alliances in trade, money, and finance.[56]

[53] Japan's entry into the GATT, for instance, was "bought" by U.S. trade concessions to several European states. Charles Lipson, "The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), 250-51.

[54] Karin Kock, *International Trade Policy and the Gatt, 1947–1967* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1969), chap. 7; Gerard Curzon, *Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy* (London: Michael Joseph, 1965), chap. 7.

[55] The best example is the postwar distribution of Marshall Plan aid to a unitary Western European institution, which then had to distribute the funds.

[56] The fact that specific bureaucracies, with their particular interests, control national participation in different regimes tends to strengthen issue-specific interdependence over time but attenuates the connections across issues. The fragmentation of national decision making thus systematically favors longitudinal (diachronic) interdependence, issue by issue, over simultaneous interdependence across many issues, which requires more centralized national control.

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American leadership and the shared experiences of war and depression ultimately shaped a trans-Atlantic policy community with common values, perspectives, and language. Evidence from postwar negotiations reveals broadly shared standards for categorizing action and evaluating possible violations of embryonic rules and norms. Robert Hudec, in his study of *The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy*, concludes that such shared standards were crucial to the success of trade adjudication in the 1950s.[57]

America's hegemonic system, like that of Victorian Britain, began with unilateral initiatives designed to spur multilateral cooperation (on the hegemon's terms, of course). In Britain's case, however, the opening of her domestic market was considered advantageous in its own right, regardless of what others did. The United States, which reluctantly acknowledged greater state economic controls, never aimed at such openness at home and was willing to tolerate the slow dismantling of trade and capital restrictions abroad.

The United States thus reconstituted the Atlantic community in a particular fashion, established its central institutions, and nurtured a dense array of relationships that was to ensure broad and deep interdependence. But even though the United States gave economic aid and allowed discrimination against the dollar, it was ultimately committed to a TIT FOR TAT strategy in which U.S. concessions would be fully reciprocated by the opening of foreign markets. The opening phase of this strategy established the possibility of stable, long-term cooperation. The aims were large and the efforts strikingly successful (even though the very strength of U.S. commitments created some incentives to cheat on joint activities).[58]

After the difficulties of postwar reconstruction were over, the moment of greatest strain lay in the transition from hegemonic unilateralism to multilateral reciprocity. The problem is *not* that multilateral reciprocity is inherently unstable, although hegemonic systems may be more stable yet, especially when the supply of truly collective goods is involved.[59] It is rather that a difficult learning period must be traversed.

[57] Robert Hudec, *The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy* (New York: Praeger, 1975), esp. chap. 17.

[58] This suggests that there may well be an optimal level of weakness in collective arrangements—a level that, by making the strategies of others appear contingent and the outcome uncertain, diminishes the likelihood of parametric rationality and encourages strategically based cooperation.

[59] The reason is that the hegemon alone may find it worthwhile to supply the collective good, bypassing the difficulties of forming and sustaining a group of joint providers. Remember, however, that such collective goods are rare internationally and certainly do not include all cases of cooperation for joint benefit (since, in many cases, noncooperators can be excluded).

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This is truly a moment of passage—what, in another context, cultural anthropologists call a liminal period (from the Latin for "threshold"). The parties' relative status and obligations shift from fixity to ambiguity, and once-customary classification and routinized spheres of action become problematic.[60]

In the world economy, this liminal period, with its special cognitive uncertainties, began in the late 1960s. By then it was clear that American economic and military capacities were diminishing, at least in relative terms. Hence, hegemonic diplomacy was no longer appropriate, as all the major actors understood in their own self-serving ways. The United States wanted to retain its leadership while bearing fewer costs. Europe wanted a larger voice in joint policies without incurring significantly greater responsibilities. These positions encapsulate what is so intriguing about moments of liminality—their implicit redescription of structure, away from a differentiated hierarchical model toward a substantially more equal community. In trade relations, this period began with the onset of the Kennedy Round, negotiated on a fully reciprocal basis and successfully concluded in 1967. In monetary relations, it began with the unraveling of the asymmetric dollar-exchange standard in the late 1960s, culminating in the breakdown of fixed exchange rates in 1971.

At the conclusion of liminal periods, in which roles are necessarily ambiguous and conventional relationships less determinate, the actors are normally reintegrated on new terms.[61] The transition from a hegemonic system, however, was especially difficult because it was followed by a series of economic catastrophes. Unfortunately, we still have an inadequate understanding of the relationship between the decline of American hegemony and the decade of instability that followed. There is a tight nexus (but not necessarily a causal chain) linking U.S. military overcommitments, U.S. monetary expansion, the resulting excess of global liquidity, the oil shocks, and the ensuing recession.

That recession, the worst since the Depression, confronted all Western states with the same severe problems: high unemployment, surplus capacity, and significant inflation. It also strained, but did not break, multilateral arrangements for economic openness.

Why do recessions and depressions create such powerful incentives to defect from collective agreements and cooperative conventions? First, a recession heightens calls for *immediate* solutions to crushing problems. Since the value of collusion often lies in the longer run, and since some

[60] See, for example, Victor Turner's analysis of rites of passage in "Liminality and Communitas," in *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), chap. 3.

[61] *Ibid.*, 94-95.

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gains from defection might seem to be available immediately, the incentives for collusion will be weakest when economic crises are at hand. In the language we used earlier, the discount parameter for future rewards has shifted. Second, given the already difficult circumstances, the sucker's payoff may be disastrous. In short, cooperation becomes riskier in the short run and less valued over the long haul.

The surest obstacle to this dissolution is the mutual recognition by key actors that any defection will be met swiftly and surely by reciprocal punishment, eliminating any potential short-term gains for the "cheater." This has been an underlying theme of economic summitry, for example. So, too, has been the public recommitment to long-standing cooperative conventions. Given the scale of economic problems in the 1970s and 1980s, and the continuing shift in underlying power distributions, the continuity of cooperation through these times is far more striking than its imperfections or frailty.

Conclusion

Cooperation is, indeed, a fragile enterprise in the world economy. Yet rule-guided and norm-governed arrangements are far more common than the usual insistence on an international "state of nature" would suggest. The idea of anarchy is, in a sense, the Rosetta stone of international relations: a heuristic device for decoding its basic grammar and syntax. But what was once a blinding insight—profound and evocative—has ossified and so become blinding in the other sense of the word—limiting and obscuring.

Theory construction and theoretically principled accounts must incorporate this fundamental notion of deep structure, but they must also move beyond even compelling metaphors to consider the subtle ways that environmental conditions shape interactions in particular issues, the patterned incentives and disincentives for national choice, and the processes by which individual choices affect the rewards for all. This task is largely a matter of reconstructing the ways in which these rewards are structured and understood and the uneven role played by convergent expectations, which can reduce the uncertainties generated when *interdependent* players make *independent* decisions.

That states are independent actors, as the Realist tradition insists, is a durable truth. That their choices are interdependent, at least in their consequences, is equally important. It is precisely the juxtaposition of these two compelling features that defines the fundamental problems of international relations. Our theories must cope with both.

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Nor should the centrality of policy choice be masked by an exaggerated distinction between the international political environment (Waltz's Third Image) and the internal structure and actions of state (the Second Image).[62] Although this distinction is a useful clarification, it should not be extended to treat international structure as an analogue of competitive markets, which are a much more profound limitation on actors' choices.[63] Thus, the two images are analytically distinct but need not be treated as mutually exclusive, even in ideal-typical form. *The real problem, again, is to integrate choice and structure*, not to depreciate or conflate the distinction.

To stress interdependence is not to minimize conflict. In different contexts, interdependent decision making can produce Hobbes's "warre of all against all" or a nexus of cooperative conventions. As Louis Hartz once remarked of the debate between liberal and progressive historians, "The argument over whether we should 'stress' solidarity or conflict misleads us by advancing a false set of alternatives."[64] Our goal, instead, should be to understand the checkered pattern of rule construction and anomie in international relations.

[62] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), chaps. 4, 6.

[63] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 89-98.

[64] Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), 20.

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MUSLIM CADRES AND SOVIET POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
Reflections from a Comparative Perspective

By STEVEN L. BURG

CENTRAL Asia confronts the Soviet leadership in Moscow with a number of important policy problems. The difficult issues raised by economic and demographic trends in the region and the potential rise of Muslim nationalism among the masses there have received careful and increasing attention from Western analysts in recent years, as have some of the current and potential responses of the Soviet leadership to them.[1] Far less attention, however, has been directed toward a more directly political problem raised by developments in Central Asia; a problem the resolution of which appears to be of far more pressing urgency, and which has potentially far more profound implications for the future of the Soviet political order itself: the rise of a modern, secular Muslim, communist elite.

The rise of this elite has resulted in extensive "nativization" of Central Asian institutions.[2] This, in turn, raises the possibility that Muslim cadres may soon enter the central party and state hierarchies in Moscow as

[1] The problems posed by regional economic and demographic imbalances have been addressed in a number of recent works. I. S. Koropeckyj and Gertrude Schroeder, eds., *Economics of Soviet Regions* (New York: Praeger, 1981), contains several important contributions. A useful guide to the earlier literature on regional development is contained in Donna Bahry and Carol Nechemias, "Half Full or Half Empty? The Debate over Soviet Regional Development," *Slavic Review* 40 (No. 3, 1981), 366-83. Demographic trends are summarized in Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy, "Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies," U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1976), 113-54. See also the separate contributions of these authors to U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1979). Some of the policy problems posed by these trends are also explored in John F. Besemeres, *Socialist Population Politics: The Political Implications of Demographic Trends in the USSR and Eastern Europe* (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1980); Michael Rywkin, "Central Asia and Soviet Manpower," *Problems of Communism* 28 (No. 1, 1979), 1-13; and Murray Feshbach, "The Soviet Union: Population Trends and Dilemmas," *Population Bulletin* 37 (No. 3, 1982). The potential rise of Muslim nationalism is treated in Alexandre Bennigsen, "Several Nations of One People? Ethnic Consciousness among Soviet Central Asian Muslims," *Survey* 24 (No. 3, 1979), 51-64, and in Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State* (New York: St. Martin's, 1983).

[2] Grey Hodnett, in his study, *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics* (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1978), displays data that suggest the period from 1955 to 1972 was actually characterized by marginal *decreases* in the number of native cadres occupying positions at the very highest levels of the Central Asian republics (see table 2.11, p. 100). If we examine the broader "social elite" of these republics, however, we find evidence of a dramatic

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well. Such a development would be likely to add a new element of complexity to internal debates over domestic social and economic policies, for, to ensure the continued development of the Central Asian economy—development on which the continued upward mobility of native elites in their "home" republics will depend—Muslim cadres will be required to "represent" the interests of their region against competing demands for resources from other regions. Conflict over scarce resources between cadres of differing nationality from regions with objectively contradictory interests may have important consequences for the evolution of central decision-making practices. Indeed, in Yugoslavia it was precisely such conflict that resulted in the dramatic transformation of the political order in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[3]

In this article, I use lessons derived from the evolution of Yugoslav multinational decision-making processes, and especially the role of native Muslim cadres in that evolution, as well as past Soviet experience, to identify some of the political problems posed by the rise of native Central Asian elites, and the alternatives open to the Soviet leadership for dealing with them. I use the Yugoslav case to suggest that the potentially destabilizing or even explosive character of the more obvious short-term solutions may impel the Soviet leadership to adopt a solution they might otherwise have been unwilling even to consider. I argue that although such a solution would inevitably be intended to preserve the essential characteristics of the existing Soviet system, both past Soviet and ongoing Yugoslav experiences provide ample evidence that it would be likely, over time, to give rise to pressures for changes in central decision-making practices that the present leadership appears unwilling to permit. And I conclude that, in this sense, the rise of loyal Muslim cadres committed to maintaining the Soviet political system and increasing the benefits they derive from it, which is the direct result of past Soviet policies, may now be confronting the Russian-dominated Soviet leadership with a genuine political dilemma.

Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union: "comparable cases"?

The Soviet response to the problems posed by the rise of a native political elite in Central Asia will undoubtedly be shaped for the most

expansion in the number and proportion of natives. For these data, see Steven L. Burg, "Russians, Natives and Jews in the Soviet Scientific Elite: Cadre Competition in Central Asia," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique* 20 (No. 1, 1979), 43-59.

[3] See Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

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part by past Soviet experience. However, the experience of other regimes with analogous Muslim or other minority problems may also affect Soviet decision making in this realm. Soviet scholarship on nationality issues includes a substantial commitment to the study of ethnicity and multinationality in other states and includes some scattered references to the relevance to the U.S.S.R. of experiences elsewhere. Although Soviet scholars working on nationality problems may have less direct influence on the formulation of official policy than has been suggested in the West, it is clear that they do have at least some indirect influence.[4] Of particular interest in this respect are references to the relevance of Yugoslav experience.[5] For, whether or not Soviet policy makers take that experience into consideration in the formulation of policy, from the perspective of a Western analyst Yugoslavia offers the opportunity to explore the potential consequences of the multinational condition for Soviet political development through comparative analysis.[6]

Direct comparisons between the contemporary Yugoslav and Soviet systems are, of course, likely to be useful for only a limited set of issues. However, if we carry out a *diachronic* comparison between the Yugoslav system of the 1950s and early 1960s—that is, before the purge of the central police apparatus in July 1966 and the ensuing rapid transformation of the domestic political order[7]—and the present Soviet system,

[4] For the suggestion of such influence, see Paul A. Goble, "Ideology, Methodology, and Nationality: The USSR Academy of Sciences Council on Nationality Problems," a paper prepared for delivery at the National Convention of the APSA, Washington D.C., August 1980, and Jeremy R. Azrael, "Emergent Nationality Problems in the USSR," in Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1978), 363-90, but esp. 365. My own more sanguine estimate of the role of academic expertise in the formulation of Soviet nationality policy is the result of conversations with several of the most prominent Soviet ethnosociologists—some of them members of the scientific council mentioned above—during my recent tenure as a visiting researcher at the Institute of Ethnography of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences in Moscow, home institution of the council.

[5] Iulian V. Bromlei, director of the Institute of Ethnography and a leading figure in the study of the nationality question in the U.S.S.R., for example, is also a specialist of ethnicity in Yugoslavia and refers to that country as an "analogous" case for the study of the emergence of a common "international" identity among the population of a multinational state in "XXVI s'ezd KPSS i zadachi izucheniia sovremennykh natsional'nykh protsessov" [The XXVI Congress of the CPSU and the task of studying contemporary national processes], in Bromlei, ed., *Razvitie natsional'nykh otnoshenii v SSSR v svete reshnеii XXVI s'ezda KPSS* [The development of national relations in the USSR in light of the decisions of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU], (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 25. It should be noted, however, that in direct conversation other Soviet researchers from Bromlei's own institute are quite reluctant to acknowledge the relevance of any comparison of the Soviet and Yugoslav cases.

[6] Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are particularly well suited for comparison on the basis of a "comparable cases" or "most similar systems" approach. See Arend Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," *Comparative Political Studies* 8 (No. 2, 1975), 158-77, and Adam Przeworksi and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), 32-34.

[7] Pre-1966 Yugoslav politics are analyzed in Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968) and Deborah D. Milen-

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we will be making comparisons between cases that are very similar in important ways.

Ethnographically, both pre-1966 Yugoslavia and the contemporary Soviet Union are cases of multinational countries comprising both Slavic and non-Slavic peoples. Slavs constitute a large majority, but each country contains a significant traditionally Islamic minority population. Demographically, the populations of both are divided into slow-growth groups that include almost the entire Slavic population and groups experiencing very rapid population growth, comprising mostly the non-Slavic Islamic population. Structurally, both are cases of federations in which internal political-administrative divisions coincide in large part with ethno-national divisions in the population. Economically, both are characterized by regional economic inequalities that each is committed to eliminating. Politically, both are ruled by single communist parties that claim a monopoly on authoritative decision making and, although divided into national-territorial organizations, profess a singularity of interests and purpose that they attempt to enforce. Moreover, in both cases these ethno-national, demographic, structural, economic, and political divisions tend to reinforce one another. Thus, the central political leaderships of both pre-1966 Yugoslavia and the contemporary Soviet Union are confronted by similar conditions that raise similar policy problems.

Most important of all, however, in each case there is a history of domination by the country's largest nationality group that is inconsistent with ideological commitments to political equality among the nationalities. As a result, the creation or expansion of elite cadres among the other nationalities, or any increase in their power or authority, inevitably represents a challenge to Russian power in the Soviet Union or Serbian power in pre-1966 Yugoslavia. This is as true of other Slavic cadres as of non-Slavs. But the most dramatic examples are to be found where Serbs and Russians exercise colonial-like control over ostensibly non-Serbian and non-Russian territories; that is, in Bosnia and Kosovo, and in Central Asia.

The contemporary Soviet Union and pre-1966 Yugoslavia are, of course, not *identical* cases. The scale of economic problems, the characteristics of nationality groups and the nature of relations between them, the distribution of power, and even the simple size of these two cases differ in ways that have important consequences for the resolution of

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kovitch, *Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

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the problem with which we are concerned here. However, it is precisely the existence of specific differences in the context of an overall similarity that makes any comparison between cases useful. Where we can identify the consequences of the character of a specific element of the Yugoslav system for the role of minority elite cadres and the later development of multinational decision-making processes, we are able to use this knowledge to suggest with greater confidence the possible consequences of differences in that specific element in the Soviet case. In this way, differences between the cases, combined with knowledge of the later outcome of conditions in one of them, enhance the utility of comparisons between them. Such comparisons allow us to use detailed knowledge of the inner workings of one case to shed light on another about which we know very little.

The Rise of Secular Muslim Elites

Economic development and social modernization of the Muslim territories in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resulted in the emergence of native intellectual and political elites. The power of these Muslim political elites, however limited it may be, as well as their status, rests on the communist political order. The secular intellectuals are major beneficiaries of the expansion of educational and cultural institutions that resulted from the developmental commitment of the communist regime. Thus, both can be expected to be quite loyal to the regime. However, loyalty to the communist order does not exclude simultaneous identification with the Muslim community and its interests. Indeed, there is a built-in incentive for the Muslim cultural intelligentsia to emphasize the distinctiveness, the historical importance, and the contemporary significance of the Islamic heritage, for they exercise a virtual monopoly over its development and exploitation. Similarly, there is an important incentive for political elites to emphasize their own "Muslimness" as a means of strengthening mass identification with them and the communist regime they represent.

Efforts by the Muslim cultural intelligentsia to develop the Islamic heritage are facilitated by the existence of a modernist "official" religious hierarchy. It provides important theological and political support for interpretations of the heritage that emphasize the compatibility of Islam and communism even though it may also provide support for the development of interpretations not entirely to the liking of communist authorities.[8] By helping to alter the cultural heritage and by altering the

[8] On the role of the official Islamic hierarchy in adapting the faith to modern circumstances,

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definitions of basic religious obligations, such modernist hierarchies enable secular elites to maintain their links to the broader Islamic community as they advance on the ladder of social mobility. Indeed, the full participation of Muslims in political life is encouraged by such a hierarchy's assertions of the compatibility between belief and loyalty. In this way, the existence of a modernist religious hierarchy facilitates the participation of secular elites in the communist system without their concomitant assimilation and contributes to the creation of genuinely *national* leaderships for the Muslim peoples.

In Yugoslavia, the creation of a secular Muslim intelligentsia preceded the establishment of communist rule. That intelligentsia arose among the Slavic Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina and benefited from the dramatic expansion of educational and cultural institutions that followed the establishment of communist power there. Members of this secular Muslim intelligentsia, although by no means unanimous in this respect, soon became outspoken exponents of the distinctiveness of the Islamic heritage of the Slavic Muslims and determined advocates of the official recognition of a Muslim *nationality*. Their advocacy found important support in the revitalization and expansion of the "official" religious hierarchy and a concomitant increase in religious activity among believers that took place during the 1960s. But it also reinforced ethnic, cultural, and even religious divisions between the Slavic Muslims concentrated in Bosnia and the non-Slavic Islamic population, composed primarily of ethnic Albanians and concentrated in Kosovo and bordering territories. Thus, the Islamic population of Yugoslavia became divided into two communities: one "Muslim" and one "Albanian."[9]

The recognition of a distinct Muslim nationality by the Bosnian political leadership had important political consequences for the organi-

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see Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "Islam under Communist Rule: Volga-Ural Muslims," *Central Asian Survey* 1 (No. 1, 1982), 5-42, esp. 21ff, and Rorlich, "Notes on the Dynamics of Religion and National Identity in Central Asia," in David Halle, ed., *Conference on the Study of Central Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1983), 29-38, esp. 31-34.

[9] On the development of a Muslim nationality in Yugoslavia see Muhamed Hadžijahić et al., *Islam i Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini* [Islam and Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina] (Sarajevo: Starješinstvo Islamske Zajednice u SR Bosne i Hercegovine, 1977); Hadžijahić, *Od tradicije do identiteta: geneza nacionalnog pitanja bosanskih Muslimana* [From Tradition to Identity: The Genesis of the National Question of the Bosnian Muslims] (Sarajevo: Svetlost, 1974); Salim Čerić, *Muslimani srpskohrvatskog jezika* [Muslims of the Serbocroatian language] (Sarajevo: Svetlost, 1968); Atif Purivatra, *Nacionalni i politički razvitak Muslimana* [The National and Political Development of the Muslims] (Sarajevo: Svetlost, 1969); Dennison I. Rusinow, "Yugoslavia's Muslim Nation," *UFSI Report*, No. 8, Europe (DIR-1-82) (1982); and Burg, "The Political Integration of Yugoslavia's Muslims: Determinants of Success and Failure," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, No. 203 (1983).

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zation of the Yugoslav political system and the distribution of power within it, as well as for the political system of the Bosnian republic itself. Although it can by no means be seen as a "cause" of the devolution of power and authority that took place in Yugoslavia during this period, the recognition of Muslim nationality did contribute to the development of a genuinely multinational leadership in Bosnia and gave that leadership additional political leverage in discussions then underway within the central leadership concerning the nature of federal political institutions and their relationship to the regions. In this sense, "Muslimness" was as much a tool in the hands of the Bosnian leadership, intent on increasing its own power and advancing the interests of its own region, as it was a social force compelling the leaders to act. Its utility to the leadership, however, depended—and continues to depend—on the ability of the "official" hierarchy to maintain the faith that lies at the core of "Muslimness" while carefully controlling its content and expression. From the perspective of even the Muslim secular political leadership, the latter task can be performed reliably only if the hierarchy is "modernist" and accommodationist, and willing to oppose antiregime forces within the Islamic community, such as fundamentalists or "Islamic revolutionaries."

The creation of secular Muslim cultural and political elites also preceded the establishment of community power in the Soviet Union. However, the relationship between these cadres and the central authorities was an uncertain one, and completely reliable central control in the Islamic communities—as elsewhere in the country—was established only by purging and replacing them. Significant numbers of new indigenous cadres once again began to assume positions among the secular elites of these communities as the result of postwar development, during the 1950s and 1960s.[10] It was during this same period that the "official" Islamic hierarchies in the Soviet Union began the process of adapting the tenets of the faith to the constraints of modern society and Soviet power. Thus, the "modernization" of the Islamic communities in the U.S.S.R. since World War II has occurred on all fronts simultaneously: economic, political, cultural, and religious.

Although under continuing pressure and control, and for a period even renewed assault, the practice of Islam—in its "modernized" variant and infused with pro-Soviet content—has been granted a carefully limited, but nonetheless officially sanctioned, place in Soviet society. In large part this can be explained by the fact that, although the regime can limit the number of official Islamic institutions and clergy available to the

[10] See Burg (fn. 2).

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faithful, and in fact has acted assiduously to do so, neither formal institutions nor clergy are necessary for believers to fulfill the basic obligations of the faith. Their destruction, therefore, would be unlikely to destroy widespread adherence to Islam among the masses but would eliminate potentially important instruments for controlling it. The regime has thus sponsored selective rather than wholesale attacks on religion, while the "official" hierarchies have sponsored the abandonment or replacement of "backward" or "reactionary" practices.[11]

The result has been a partial accommodation of the faith to the demands of the Soviet regime and, at the same time, the apparent preservation of widespread adherence to it. Moreover, this arrangement has not prevented, and in some ways has even contributed to, the growing influence of Islamic culture on the national identities of the Muslim peoples of the U.S.S.R. As a result, Muslims have been able to attain elite status in the postwar period without abandoning entirely their "Muslimness."

Muslim Elites and Central Power

The entry of secular Muslim cadres into positions of responsibility in the party and state apparats in the traditionally Islamic territories of the U.S.S.R. will inevitably raise important political issues for the Russian-dominated central leadership, if it has not already done so. It will be increasingly difficult, for example, for that leadership to justify continuation of the long-standing "colonial" pattern of Russian and Slavic political domination of Muslim Central Asia through the staffing of key local positions—such as the party organizational secretaryship and the K.G.B. chairmanship—exclusively with Slavic cadres. As the number of perfectly capable indigenous Muslim cadres with proven records of loyal service to the regime increases, the pressure to turn even these positions over to natives will increase, especially given the fact that they have been staffed by indigenous personnel in other non-Russian areas (for example, the Ukraine) with longer histories of resistance to Russian rule and far more dissident, nationalist and anti-Soviet activity.[12]

It will also become more difficult for the Soviet leadership to justify continuation of the apparent barrier to service by Muslim cadres in the central party and state hierarchies, not only because significant numbers of non-Russian cadres from other territories have served in responsible positions in them, but also because Muslim cadres appear rapidly to be

[11] Rorlich (fn. 8).

[12] Hodnett (fn. 2) classifies the Ukraine as "largely self-administering" in four out of five political-administrative categories (table 2.13, p. 105).

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acquiring the Russian language skills necessary for such service, and the Muslim territories from which they come—or at least Central Asia—are becoming economically, demographically, and politically more important to the Soviet regime.[13] The resolution of these issues may have even more important consequences for the distribution of power and influence in the Soviet system than the resolution of similar issues had for Yugoslavia, both at the center and more broadly.

One possible response to pressure for participation from minority elites open to any dominant nationality group—one that might be characterized as "reactionary"—is to reinforce its control over the instruments of power and to strengthen the techniques of domination. Thus, in Yugoslavia, as the process of liberalization began in the early 1960s, the predominantly Serbian conservative faction in the central leadership strengthened its hold over the party and police organizations through which it exercised power. It stepped up its surveillance of minority cadres at all levels of the system, from local institutions to the central party *apparat*, and reinforced their exclusion, and the exclusion of others as well, from all key positions in the power structure under its control. This was reflected in a marked overrepresentation of Serbs in key institutions at the federal center in Belgrade and in certain regional institutions—particularly in the police and security organizations in Kosovo and Croatia. This overrepresentation later became a central complaint of regional leaders—officials and nationalist activists—during the conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, rather than forestalling conflict, this "reactionary" response actually exacerbated it in Yugoslavia.[14]

There is some circumstantial evidence that in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev's leadership, despite the presence of a few Muslims in positions of prominence (but apparently not power) in the Politburo, the political predominance of ethnic Russians may have increased. The Brezhnev years saw the gradual elimination of those Ukrainians who had held important positions and had wielded significant power and influence in the central party and state *apparats*, and their replacement by loyal ethnic Russian members of Brezhnev's entourage.[15] It is difficult to determine,

[13] The most recent data available on the number of CPSU members in the Central Asian republics and of Central Asian nationality, reported in "KPSS v tsifrakh [The CPSU in Figures]" *Partinaia zhizn'* 14 (July 1981), 13-26, esp. 14 and 18, suggest that nativization of local institutions continues unabated. See also the comments by Andropov on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the creation of the U.S.S.R. concerning the nationalities question, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service [henceforth FBIS], *Soviet Union—Daily Report*, December 21, 1982, pp. P4-P5.

[14] See Shoup (fn. 7), 208ff and 254ff.

[15] The Ukrainians identified by Bialer as members of the central leadership in 1974, for

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however, whether these changes represent a conscious "reaction" or simply reflect Brezhnev's preference for relying on those cadres with whom he shared long career associations. Indeed, even the elevation of Kazakh first secretary Kunaev to full membership in the Politburo can be seen primarily as part of Brezhnev's efforts to fill the Politburo with his loyal associates, rather than as an attempt to increase the representation of Muslims *per se*. There can be no doubt, however, that the Brezhnev years saw an increasing awareness of, and sensitivity to, the nationality dimensions of the Soviet political agenda on the part of the central leadership,[16] and that by the end of Brezhnev's rule almost every important portfolio in the Politburo and Secretariat was in Russian hands. Moreover, there is no evidence as yet that the co-optation of Kunaev or the later co-optation of Azerbaidzhan first secretary Aliev to candidate membership resulted in any movement by Muslim cadres into positions in the central apparat.

A response at the opposite extreme of the spectrum of potential responses by a dominant group is the complete incorporation and sharing of power with heretofore subordinate minority elites. Although Yugoslavia has moved quite far in this direction, that movement has not been accomplished without conflict, indeed even crisis, within the Party itself. Even at present, the relationships between center and region and between formerly dominant and formerly subordinate national elites are uncertain ones. Moreover, as one might expect, these relationships appear to vary from group to group. Movement toward full incorporation has been far more successful in the case of the Bosnian Muslims than in the case of the Albanian minority. But in both cases increased local autonomy and increased participation in multinational structures at the center of power has been won by nationality and regional elites only in exchange for their careful limitation and, if necessary, repression of those elements in their communities that threaten, or represent potential threats to, the existing political order. The Yugoslav case, therefore, seems to suggest a third type of response, which might be characterized as a limited accommodation.

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example, have since lost their positions (Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors* [Cambridge: At the University Press, 1980], 223). This trend has continued under Andropov, with the ouster of the Byelorussian party secretary and the co-optation to full membership in the Politburo of the premier of the Russian republic. The most important indicator of a contrary trend is, of course, the promotion to full membership of the Azerbaidzhani party secretary, Aliev, and his assignment to important responsibilities in the Council of Ministers, discussed below.

[16] Azrael (fn. 4) points to the activation of the scientific council on nationality problems as evidence of "mounting official concern" (365). See also Goble (fn. 4) for additional discussion. At the very least, this reflected growing interest in the subject on the part of a large number of scholars in a broad range of disciplines.

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The Accommodationist Response

The basic feature of the accommodationist response is the attempt to develop an "official" Islamic hierarchy and use it to encourage popular support for the secular political order. The resources of the state are used to subsidize the development of, and thereby at least partly to control, a modernist religious leadership. To the extent the communist leadership is willing to grant "authority" to religious officials at all, it grants that authority only to this "official" hierarchy. In this way, the communist regime attempts to compete with and undermine the potential appeal of conservative religious leaders who might otherwise be able to organize an essentially anticommunist religious movement. At the same time, the regime encourages the development of secular Muslim cultural and political elites. But it does so in a manner that heightens the salience of internal divisions within the Islamic community and preserves the sharp official distinction between religion and nationality so that the affirmation of one need not necessarily entail affirmation of the other.

The Yugoslav case suggests that an accommodationist response may include genuine concessions in the narrowly religious realm: the opening of new mosques, increased religious instruction, and other activities designed to strengthen the bonds between the "official" hierarchy and the Muslim masses. But such concessions are possible only where the communist authorities are confident that such activities will not engender anticommunist sentiments or activities. It is instructive to remember, for example, that the Yugoslav regime appears to be far less willing to make such concessions to the Catholic church because it has been unable either to establish a distinction between Catholicism and Croatian nationalism similar to the distinction between Islam and "Muslimness" or to establish a loyalist Catholic religious hierarchy of its own. Croatian nationalism, it will be remembered, provided the mobilizing force behind early opposition to the establishment of a communist order and a later challenge to the maintenance of communist power. Hence, where a communist regime is constrained from permitting the expansion of religious activity, the strategy must be focused exclusively on the development of loyalist secular elites.

In order to implement an accommodationist strategy, loyalist Muslim political elites must fulfill both a representative and a control function in their respective territories. In Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, central authorities have insisted that native elites repress all manifestations of local nationalism and any other antiregime activity among their ethnic brethren. Indeed, in Yugoslavia, it appears to be the case that such

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repression has been a requisite condition for the transfer of control in key areas—internal security and military or defense matters—to native cadres. Where native cadres have proven reliable, as in Bosnia, these funtions have in the main been transferred from center to region; where native cadres have proven unreliable or simply unable to repress such activity on their own, as in Kosovo, the central authorities have apparently retained control over them. In the Soviet Union, native political leaders of the Muslim republics, like the native leadership of other non-Russian republics, already are expected to, and do, perform the same function; but there is no evidence that its performance has as yet won them any increased local autonomy.

An accommodationist strategy also requires that native cadres control far less violent, and sometimes even subtle, manifestations of nationalism. Where control over cadre policy in almost all areas has passed from center to region, as in Yugoslavia, regional political leaders are charged with the task of preventing discrimination against nonnatives by the upwardly mobile and expanding native elite. But even in the Soviet Union, where cadres policy remains under the close control of the central leadership and the discretionary power of regional leaders is more restricted, the Russian-dominated central leadership periodically cautions native leaders of the non-Russian republics against permitting exclusionary practices aimed against nonnative cadres.[17] This can be a particularly explosive issue where "nonnative" cadres are members of a dominant, or formerly dominant, nationality and assert a legitimate claim to "indigenous" status, as is the case in both Yugoslavia (Serbs in Kosovo) and the Soviet Union (Russians in Central Asia).

For Muslim elites to participate in the communist political order in this way requires a certain degree of acculturation, if not assimilation, to the dominant nationality or culture, if only because of the practical requirements of contact and communication. This has been true even in Yugoslavia, which has gone further in the direction of establishing multilinguistic central political institutions than any other multinational state. But, in order to fulfill their symbolic and genuine representative functions, native political elites are compelled to reserve and even assert the authenticity of the national identity they share with the masses they represent. Yet they cannot do so in any way that calls their loyalty to the existing order into question. For these reasons, the creation of a loyal

[17] The post-Khrushchev leadership began its tenure with a warning against such practices (see *Pravda*, September 5, 1965, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [henceforth *CDSP*] 17, No. 34 [November 15, 1965], p. 4), and Brezhnev ended his rule with a similar warning (see "Brezhnev's report to the Congress—II," *CDSP* 33, No. 9 [April 1, 1981], p. 6).

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native political elite and its successful performance in office is unquestionably facilitated by the development of a loyalist native cultural intelligentsia and a modernist religious hierarchy supportive of the adaptation of Muslim identity to the modern communist order.

An accommodationist response is thus characterized by an inherent tension that makes its successful management particularly difficult. To a certain degree, loyalist native leaders may, in fact, *need* the presence of religious or nationalist pressure—or at least the perception of such pressure—in order to demonstrate their own loyalty and improve their positions by controlling or repressing it. Indeed, Yugoslav experience suggests that, under conditions short of open assault against the established political order, the more important the control function they perform, the greater the leverage enjoyed by native leaders for extracting concessions to their autonomous power. Native leaders are constrained from carrying out the repression of nationalist or religious activity too vigorously, however, lest they undermine their own legitimacy in the eyes of their co-nationals and thereby reduce their utility to the center. Yet, failure to carry out such repression would also reduce their usefulness, and almost certainly would result in their replacement. Such failure might even allow the growth of a genuine nationalist or religious threat to the regime—a threat that would be met with forceful repression directed from the center. Indeed, this appears to be precisely what happened in Kosovo, culminating in the nationalist upheaval of spring 1981.[18]

Thus, an accommodationist solution would appear to be an inherently unstable formula for ordering political relations between dominant and subordinate national elites. In Yugoslavia, it has tended either to lead rapidly to full incorporation—with profound consequences for the nature of the political order—or to founder, and to degenerate into more repressive arrangements. Similarly, movement in the Soviet Union toward the establishment of a limited accommodation of Muslim elites during the 1920s gave way to the Stalinist repression of the 1930s. Today, the central Soviet leadership appears once again to have established some of the elements of a limited accommodation with its Muslim political elites, but seems not yet to have adopted an accommodationist strategy. Yugoslav experience suggests that, were such a strategy to be adopted, its success would depend on a number of factors, some of them subject to manipulation and control by the Soviet leadership, and some of them not.

[18] Events in Kosovo are summarized in Pedro Ramet, "Problems of Albanian Nationalism in Yugoslavia," *Orbis* 25 (No. 2, 1981), 369-88.

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Determinants of Success

The more successful accommodation of the Bosnian Muslims in comparison to the obvious failure in the case of the Albanians in Yugoslavia can be attributed to a number of factors not subject to manipulation in the short run, if at all. None of these, however, are present in the Soviet Union. These include the fact that Bosnian Muslims are ethnically Slav; speak a language shared by the two most numerous national groups, including the formerly dominant one; share a substantial common cultural heritage with these groups; and are geographically dispersed among them in a pattern that makes it difficult to claim exclusive control over an extensive historical territorial "homeland." At the same time, some of the factors that seem to have made the establishment of an accommodation with the Albanian minority such an intractable problem do appear to be present in the U.S.S.R. These include the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural distinctiveness of the native population, and its disproportionately high rate of population growth in comparison to the Slavic majority. In addition, a competition and conflict of interest between native Muslim elites and non-native—primarily Russian—elites, analogous to but certainly not as intense as the conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, appears to be emerging in Central Asia.[19] There is also at least the potential for Muslims in Central Asia to become subject to the influence of radical Islamic movements across the border, just as bordering Albania exerts influence over the ethnic Albanians of Yugoslavia. All of this suggests that a genuine accommodation with the Muslims of Central Asia may be difficult for the Soviet leadership to achieve.

Perhaps the most important factor, however, contributing to the apparent failure of the accommodationist strategy in Kosovo is *not*, or at least not yet, present in the Soviet Union—that is, the relative underdevelopment, indeed backwardness of the Kosovo economy in comparison to the economies of the other regions, and especially the progressive widening of the gap between them.[20] Developmental imbalances between

[19] Inter-nationality friction between Russians and native elites was first suggested by the sociological research of Iu. V. Arutiunian ("A Concrete Sociological Study of Ethnic Relations," *The Soviet Review* 14 [No. 2, 1973], 14-15). At the time, Arutiunian's findings, although consistent with a growing literature on the politics of multiethnic states in the West, were unusual for the U.S.S.R. Recently, however, even Andropov acknowledged that "economic and cultural progress of all nations and nationalities is accompanied with the growth of their national self-awareness" and that this necessitates "great tact in selecting and posting cadres" (FBIS [fn. 13]).

[20] Per capita national income in Kosovo declined from 53 percent of the Yugoslav level in 1953 to 36 percent in 1961. It was only 48 percent of that in Croatia (29 percent of that in Slovenia) in 1953 and declined to only 30 percent (21 percent of the Slovenian level) in

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the Muslim regions and the rest of the Soviet Union are narrower than those between Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia. When measured in terms of per capita income, the relationship between the Central Asian republics and the rest of the U.S.S.R. is far closer to the relationship between the more successfully integrated Bosnian republic and the rest of Yugoslavia than it is to that of Kosovo. And there is no evidence of a precipitous decline in the relative developmental level of the Central Asian republics analogous to that experienced by Kosovo. Where declines do seem to have occurred, they have been on the more modest order of that experienced by Bosnia during the period from 1953 to 1961.[21] Indeed, if we use the standard of living as an indicator, conditions in Central Asia may even be better than in other areas of the U.S.S.R.[22]

Although economic development alone does not guarantee that an accommodationist strategy will succeed, it is surely the case that without it such a strategy will fail. Among other things, the most recent round of nationalist demonstrations and violence in Kosovo demonstrates that native occupancy of elite positions, accompanied by extensive concessions in the realm of language, culture, and religion, cannot by themselves forestall the rise of mass discontent prompted by inadequate levels of material achievement.

The demonstrations in Kosovo also suggest that even where the activity of "parallel" Islamic organizations is widespread, the most immediate danger to the established political order is not religious but secular. And secular factors such as economic development policy *are* subject to control by the Soviet leadership. Given the growing numbers of loyalist Muslim cadres, the existence of a supportive Muslim intelligentsia, and the activity of a modernist and adaptive "official" Islamic religious hierarchy, an accommodationist strategy for the ordering of political relations between Moscow and the Muslim communities of

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1961. Calculations based on data in Savezni Zavod za Statistiku [Federal Institute for Statistics, henceforth SZS], *Statistički Godišnjak Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije 1963* [Statistical Yearbook of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1963, henceforth *SGFNRJ*] (Belgrade: SZS, 1964), 356; and SZS, *Statistički Bilten*, No. 1295 (Belgrade: SZS, May 1982), 8-17.

[21] For data on Bosnia, see sources cited in fn. 20. Comparisons are to data presented in Martin C. Spechler, "Regional Developments in the U.S.S.R., 1958-78" in *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change* (fn. 1), table 3, p. 151; James W. Gillula, "The Economic Interdependence of Soviet Republics," *ibid.*, table 5, p. 629; and Alistair McAuley, *Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), table 5.1, p. 109.

[22] Inter-regional differences in living standards favoring Central Asia are summarized in Feshbach, "Prospects for Massive Outmigration from Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the Next Decade," in *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change* (fn. 1), 656ff., esp. 659-60; and Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Regional Living Standards," in Koropeckyj and Schroeder (fn. 1), 118-56.

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Central Asia might prove successful. Whether the central Soviet leadership will choose to adopt such a strategy, however, will depend on how the Soviet leaders view its implications.

Implications for Soviet Development

The adoption of an accommodationist strategy in Yugoslavia had profound consequences for the nature of the political order. It contributed to the decentralization of political power and helped to alter the relationship between elites and masses in important ways. It stimulated the emergence of latent conflicts between the nationalities and exacerbated existing conflicts between the regions—two sets of conflicts that were mutually reinforcing. Ultimately, it changed the fundamental character of the Party itself. But this need not necessarily be the outcome of a decision by the Soviet leadership to embark on an accommodationist strategy with regard to the Muslim minorities, at least not in the short run. What might be characterized as decentralizing consequences in Yugoslavia were conditioned by several important factors such as the timing, sequence, and sponsoring of a number of discrete, but nonetheless related, decisions. And it is certain that the Soviet leadership will not reproduce this sequence. Indeed, on some important policy issues it is almost certain to make entirely different choices than did the Yugoslav leadership. Thus, it is quite possible that such a strategy might be carried out without necessarily introducing a significant decentralization of political power in the Soviet Union.

In Yugoslavia, for example, the adoption of an accommodationist policy with respect to the nationalities followed, and drew its impetus from, decisions to decentralize the economy. In addition, both economic decentralization and movement toward the accommodation rather than the repression of multinationality were sponsored by a coalition of central political leaders, some of whom were at the same time strongly associated with regional political bases. Thus, both the sponsorship and the timing of accommodation impelled it in the direction of increasing the power of the emerging leaderships of the nationalities.[23] In the Soviet Union, however, the economy remains highly centralized, and those who command decisive political power are all closely associated with the center rather than the regions, and have shown no inclination to permit significant reform in the direction of decentralization. Thus, if this leadership continues to introduce elements of an accommodation with its

[23] Milenkovitch (fn. 7) and Shoup (fn. 7) report extensively on this political debate within the Yugoslav leadership.

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Muslim communities, it is almost certain to do so in a manner designed not to call into question the highly centralized character of the Soviet system. But even here Yugoslav experience is instructive.

It is not the "nativization" of social and political institutions in the nationality areas *per se*, or even the genuinely multinational staffing of central party and state organs that appears to have been the decisive factor in the transformation of the Yugoslav political order. Rather, it appears to have been the decision to transfer control over personnel appointments—cadres policies—from central to regional bodies, a decision made possible by the political defeat of conservative, Serb-dominated political forces that opposed economic decentralization and that controlled cadres policies from the center. Although this was by no means the only factor, it is clear that with the transfer of cadre control the retention of elite status came to depend on the approval, not of the center, but of one's own republic, province, or nationality. The central leadership effectively lost the ability to limit the process of accommodation, and native cadres in both the regional leaderships and central political institutions rapidly came to represent their respective—and often mutually contradictory—regional economic and nationality interests. This soon produced political deadlock and, ultimately, the crisis of the early 1970s.[24]

The relative effectiveness of even limited central control over cadres policies was demonstrated during the post-crisis period in Yugoslavia, during which the central leadership reasserted its ability to intervene in regional affairs under certain conditions and thereby restored the balance between the representative and control functions of the native leaderships in the regions. The central Soviet leadership, in contrast, appears not to have relinquished its control over cadres policies even where extensive "nativization" of regional leaderships has already taken place, as in the Ukraine and the republics of the Caucasus. As a result, it has been able to ensure that native cadres in these regions have continued to fulfill their control functions, or it has replaced them.[25] It appears entirely likely, therefore, that it will continue to follow this policy in the Muslim republics of Central Asia as well.

Given the extensive subordination of the Soviet economy to central control, however, it is questionable whether the "nativization" of local leaderships, including even positions heretofore monopolized by Rus-

[24] Burg (fn. 3) reports on these developments.

[25] Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone inventories a series of leadership purges in the non-Russian republics in the sixties and seventies in "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* 23 (No. 3, 1974), 1-22, esp. 12-13.

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sians, will by itself be sufficient to establish an accommodation in Central Asia akin to that already established in the Ukraine and other republics. An important element in the accommodation established in those republics has been the elevation of native cadres to positions of responsibility in the central hierarchies of the Party and the state. Although they have not functioned as "representatives" of their respective regions or nationalities, their presence at the center has helped to legitimize continuing central control over them. Indeed, service in positions of responsibility at the center, providing it does not expose these cadres to racism on the part of the dominant nationality,[26] can be expected to strengthen their loyalty to the established order and thereby make them ideal candidates for later service in their home republics as native "agents" of central power. And, most important from the perspective of the center, their access and potential ability to influence the policy-making process probably serves to forestall demands for the transfer of decision-making power from the center to the regions. "Nativization" of the local leadership in the absence of such mobility, on the other hand, might very well encourage demands for the devolution of political power to the regions.

Thus, despite the evident reluctance of the still Russian-dominated central leadership to do so, it would appear that the structure and organization of Soviet decision-making and personnel policies are well suited for carrying out an accommodationist strategy with respect to the Muslim elites of Central Asia, and that adoption of that strategy might reinforce rather than degrade existing central controls over them. Indeed, there are strong incentives for Muslim elites, once they gain access to and influence in the central hierarchies, to increase their support for preservation of the highly centralized character of the Soviet economy. Yugoslav experience suggests unambiguously that the continued economic advance of "their" regions—and the concomitant continued expansion of opportunities for native elite mobility—will depend heavily on the existence of central institutions powerful enough to compel the inter-regional transfer of capital resources over the objections of the more developed regions. Data on the sources of Yugoslav investment capital in the pre-1966 period suggest that the underdeveloped regions were, as a group, disproportionately more dependent on credits and funds under central control than the most developed republics, which appear to have been more dependent on internally generated capital and amortization funds. The ability of the center to transfer capital permitted

[26] An occurrence alleged by one Yugoslav informant who served in the central apparatus in the sixties.

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the underdeveloped regions to maintain rates of investment in the pre-1966 period—expressed as capital invested measured as a proportion of national income produced—substantially higher than those maintained in the developed republics.[27] And the underdeveloped regions became even more heavily dependent on centrally disbursed capital in the post-1966 period.[28]

In the short run, therefore, the participation in central Soviet institutions of Central Asian Muslim cadres who have proved their loyalty to the Soviet order through service in their native territories may actually preserve, if not strengthen, central power in the U.S.S.R. Indeed, the recent elevation of Aliyev to full membership in the Politburo and his promotion to first deputy prime minister has been accompanied by renewed emphasis on discipline and authority in the economy. Thus, while Aliyev's rise must be explained at least in part by his possible K.G.B.-based ties to Andropov, it also suggests that an accommodationist strategy encompassing participation in positions of "real" power at the center cannot be discounted entirely.

Yugoslav experience suggests, however, that there are important costs to such a strategy over the longer run: highly placed members of the Yugoslav leadership and middle-level functionaries alike acknowledge in published memoirs, private conversations, and in official party documents as well, the growing tensions among national cadres in the central party apparatus that arose out of inter-regional conflicts over economic development policy, and that led to the political crisis of the early 1970s. Representatives of the underdeveloped regions, including the Muslim territories of Bosnia and Kosovo, supported the preservation of strong central institutions. The representatives of the more developed regions, in contrast, tried to reduce central power in an effort to retain greater control over a larger share of the capital generated by the economies of their respective regions, and thereby to prevent its transfer elsewhere. Although the Soviet leadership has at its command far greater resources than the Yugoslav, it also faces potentially far greater demands on them, especially from the demographically expanding Muslim territories. Moreover, the poor performance of the Soviet economy promises to make decisions about the allocation of these resources even more difficult. Under these conditions, the entry of Muslim cadres into central power

[27] Data on national income produced, and on invested capital and its sources, for 1955 and 1960 are reported in SZS, *SGFNRJ 1957* (Belgrade: SZS, 1958), 132 and 302; and SZS, *SGFNRJ 1962* (Belgrade: SZS, 1963), 344 and 419-21, respectively. Unfortunately, data for investments in Kosovo are not broken out separately from those for Serbia in these sources.

[28] Sources of expenditures for investment in the regions for the period 1963 to 1971 are shown in Burg (fn. 3), table 2.10, pp. 58-59.

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structures might very well provide a catalyst for the emergence of inter-regional economic conflicts analogous to those that characterized Yugoslav politics in the period up to the decisive decentralization of power in 1966.

Fragmentary evidence on Soviet inter-regional capital relationships in the 1960s and early 1970s suggests a fundamental similarity to Yugoslav conditions in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The more developed republics of the U.S.S.R. seem to have been subsidizing higher than proportional investment in the less developed republics, especially the Central Asian republics.[29] As in Yugoslavia, these transfers of capital were carried out despite the lower productivity of investment in the less developed regions, and over the objections of at least one of the developed republics affected by this policy, that is, the Ukraine.[30] And, as was also the case in Yugoslavia, these transfers failed to narrow significantly the overall developmental gap between the republics. Moreover, it appears that the character of transfers in the U.S.S.R. changed in the late 1970s, with the Central Asian share in total investment beginning to decline slightly and that of the Russian republic beginning to increase, apparently as the result of a central decision to increase investment in the exploitation of energy and other resources in Siberia.[31]

Capital investment in Central Asia appears to have been directed toward increasing employment opportunities for the growing population there, but in a manner that has reinforced established patterns of specialization in raw-materials extraction and agricultural production, rather than contributing to regional self-sufficiency.[32] Thus, the inter-regional transfer of capital carried out in the sixties and seventies can be said to have perpetuated Central Asian dependency on the developed republics. Its failure to improve the relative level of development of the region suggests that greater, not reduced, levels of investment will be required in the eighties if such an improvement is to take place. Continued redirection of capital away from Central Asia and toward Siberia is, on the other hand, likely to increase the gap between the Central Asian republics and the developed republics of the U.S.S.R. And in the face

[29] Gillula (fn. 21), throughout.

[30] On the lower productivity of investment in the underdeveloped regions, see Spechler (fn. 21), and Gillula (fn. 21), as well as Michael Connock, "Is industry inefficient in Yugoslavia's poor regions?" *South Slav Journal*, 3 (No. 4, 1980), 3-9. On the assertiveness of Ukrainian leadership, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Mykola Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest: An Essay on the Persistence and Limits of Ukrainian National Communism," in Azrael (fn. 4), 105-43. For a broader treatment of the economic and political position of the Ukraine, see I. S. Koropeckyj, ed., *The Ukraine within the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1977).

[31] James W. Gillula, "The Growth and Structure of Fixed Capital," in Koropeckyj and Schroeder (fn. 1), 162-63.

[32] *Ibid.*, 177ff; and Gillula (fn. 21), 649-52.

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of the continuing demographic expansion of Central Asia, it might even result in an absolute decline in the levels of development there, with important negative consequences for the Central Asian population and their elite representatives.

If Soviet Muslim cadres elevated to the center use their influence to restore or increase capital subsidies to Central Asia, they may prompt a response among Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Russian cadres similar to the reaction of Slovenian and Croatian leaders in central party and state organs in Yugoslavia in the 1960s. And such responses would constitute far more powerful forces for change in the direction of decentralization than demands advanced by the Muslim cadres themselves. The parallels between the Croatian predicament in the 1960s and the potential Ukrainian predicament in the 1980s are particularly striking in this respect. Both are highly developed republics with substantial industrial and agricultural sectors; both are comparatively productive economies that export capital to other regions of the country; and both are characterized by aging economies in need of capital investment for modernization in order to sustain and expand productivity. Moreover, both are characterized by nationalist activity among the masses and a history of relative outspokenness by representatives in central institutions.

The dramatic devolution of decision-making power in Yugoslavia in the post-1966 period was in large part the product of demands emanating from Croatia for retention of a greater share of the capital generated by the economy of that republic, demands advanced by both a growing nationalist "movement" and increasingly assertive regional party leaders. Even after that movement was suppressed and those leaders purged, however, the devolution of power was sustained. Inter-regional transfers of capital have continued but now are subject to explicit, and highly contentious, bargaining between regional leaderships.[33] Representatives of the developed republics have, over time, used their power to limit the extent of such transfers and to increase the benefits to their respective regions from them. But they have been unable, short of denying representatives of the underdeveloped regions equal participation and power in central decision-making institutions and suppressing mass demands in those territories, to put an end to them. Thus, although an accommodationist strategy might preserve or even reinforce the existing Soviet

[33] Inter-regional bargaining processes are reviewed in Burg (fn. 3), 242ff. The scope of inter-regional capital transfers in the period from 1971 to 1980 is reported in Joseph T. Bombelles, "Transfer of Resources from More to Less Developed Republics and Autonomous Provinces of Yugoslavia 1971-1980," *Occasional Papers* OP-69, Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe (1981).

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political order in the short run, its adoption might also introduce forces for change that would be difficult to control in the longer run.

The Soviet Dilemma

These potential longer-term consequences of pursuing a strategy of genuine accommodation may explain why the Russians who have controlled cadre policies in the Soviet Union up to now have hesitated to introduce Central Asian Muslim cadres into central decision-making bureaucracies. But Yugoslav experience suggests that continuation of the "nativization" process already evident in the Central Asian republics is very likely to create leaders in Central Asia who are conscious of their own relative powerlessness vis-à-vis the center and who perceive their entry into positions in the center to be blocked by Russians unwilling to share "real" power with them. This would constitute fertile conditions for the rise of resentments that could easily be translated, with the cooperation of the religious hierarchy and cultural intelligentsia, into nationalist discontent. This might even become likely if the Russian-dominated leadership adopted a strategy of investing scarce capital resources in modernization of the advanced economies of the European regions and in exploitation of Siberian natural resources at the expense of investment to meet the needs and demands of the growing population of Central Asia and its economy. The recent decision not to go ahead with the diversion of water to Central Asia seems to portend this scenario.[34] Under such conditions, the central Soviet leadership might choose to deflect mass discontent away from the regime and onto the native leaders of Central Asia by using them as "scapegoats" for failure. It might also turn toward more repressive measures, as the Yugoslav leadership has done—under far more extreme circumstances, to be sure—in Kosovo. But the potential size of such a "Muslim problem" in Central Asia suggests that even simple repression would represent a monumental task. Moreover, it would not "solve" the problem, and it would constitute an admission of failure with potentially historic consequences for Soviet relations with the Third—and especially Muslim—World.

Consequently, the entry of Muslim cadres into central Soviet decision-making bureaucracies would appear imminent, as would the increase in the level of internal conflict in these institutions over the formulation of economic and other domestic policies likely to result from their entry. However, Yugoslav experience suggests that such conflict by itself need not become disintegrative conflict. The Yugoslav leadership of the early

[34] *The New York Times*, December 16, 1983, p. 1.

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1960s, like the present Soviet leadership, was able to endure a relatively high level of internal policy conflict. Indeed, for the entire period from 1958 to 1965 the Yugoslav system was characterized by the deep division of the central leadership and the clear emergence of distinct and conflicting regional perspectives on economic issues. Yet there was no dramatic change in the political order. During this entire period regional leaders, and even lower-level cadres far more particularistic in their orientation, remained closely wedded to the preservation of the political status quo. Indeed, one is tempted to suggest that the communist ideology of development shared by both Yugoslav and Soviet elites not only legitimizes but even encourages responsible cadres at all levels of the system to press demands for ever-greater allocations of resources,[35] and that the conflicts that arise out of such demands represent not so much disintegrative pressures as evidence of a strong commitment among such cadres to the existing order.

Yugoslav experience also suggests, however, that such commitment remains strong among regional leaders and other responsible cadres only so long as development of their respective regions continues. In more practical terms, even communist elites remain loyal only as long as they retain a reasonable expectation that their interests will be served. If we postulate a set of elites that are unconcerned about, or unresponsive to, social and economic forces, the only such demands we can talk about sensibly are "careerist" ones. If, however, we postulate even a modicum of concern or responsiveness, then we may begin to talk about local, regional, or even ethno-national demands—even if the ability to advance such demands is constrained by continuing central control of cadre policies. One has only to recall the repeated complaints over the years by the central Soviet leadership against "localism" to realize how far in this direction the Soviet system has already gone. In Yugoslavia, it was the continuing inability of cadres from the underdeveloped regions to increase the resources available to their own regions for development, even after they had won equal participation in central institutions, that led some of them to begin to question the established "rules of the game" for formulating policy and to support the radical decentralization of power that eventually took place.

Thus, the Soviet leadership appears to confront a dilemma. The problems posed by the emergence of a loyal Muslim elite are as much regional development problems as they are a "nationality" problem, and

[35] See the obituary of Uzbek party secretary Rashidov (*Pravda*, November 1, 1983, p. 2.) for official praise of his successful representation of regional interests as manifest in the development of his republic during his tenure as first secretary.

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it may be possible to manage them through the combination of an accommodationist strategy toward native elites and further development of Central Asia. But management in this way may require capital resources that the Soviet economy cannot generate on its own as long as it continues to perform poorly, or that are more than members of the leadership from other regions of the U.S.S.R. are willing to allocate. Under these circumstances, accommodationist practices would be likely to fail and to degenerate into a purge of Muslim elites discontented with central policies, and into the repression of potential mass discontent in Central Asia resulting from feelings of "relative deprivation" caused by unfulfilled expectations of continued developmental progress. Yugoslav policies in Kosovo are a case in point. Were the costs of such a failure perceived as too high, the Soviet leadership might undertake those economic reforms necessary to allow it both to pursue a policy of accommodation and to commit sufficient resources to Central Asian development to satisfy at least the minimal demands of the native population. However, the short-term political costs of the reforms that would be required—beginning with the reduction of military spending—might themselves be too high.[36] Moreover, Yugoslav experience suggests that such success would be likely to give rise to pressures to move from accommodation to full incorporation. This would inevitably diminish the power of Russian cadres in central institutions and perhaps even lead to demands for political changes that would alter the very character of the Soviet system; and these are consequences that all Soviet leaders up to now seem to have feared more than the uncertainties of repression.

[36] Joseph Berliner has suggested that precisely such political costs may constitute important constraints on the ability of the Soviet leadership to undertake economic reform ["Managing the USSR Economy: Alternative Models," *Problems of Communism* 32 (No. 1, 1983), 40-56, esp. 54-55]; a similar argument is made by Soviet scholars in the so-called "Novosibirsk memorandum" (excerpted in *The New York Times*, August 5, 1983, p. 4.).

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WHY PEASANTS REBEL: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso

By CYNTHIA McCLINTOCK*

I. Introduction

IN this article I shall examine the origins of a major rural revolutionary movement, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). An extremist Maoist organization, Sendero has gained considerable peasant support in Peru's southern highlands, especially in the Ayacucho area. Although peasant unrest has been endemic in Peru, the scope and intensity of the current movement are unprecedented. Never before has a Peruvian guerrilla group ranged over such a wide part of the country, and never before has such a group threatened the order of daily life in the capital.

Why has rural protest risen to such levels in Peru? In exploring this question, I also seek to shed new light, from the Peruvian experience, on the prevailing theories of peasant revolution.[1] As Jack A. Goldstone has pointed out, scholarship on revolution has been based on very few cases, and thus a new instance of peasant rebellion is significant.[2] To date, the list of twentieth-century peasant-based revolutions that have been thoroughly studied within a comparative perspective includes only those of Mexico, Russia, China, Algeria, and Vietnam. Among these Mexico is the only Latin American case.

There are various theoretical controversies in the scholarship on peasant revolution; although the single case of Peru cannot definitively resolve these differences, it does provide new evidence. It may be that,

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[1] The most influential recent works on peasant revolution are probably James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics and Revolution: Pressure Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Jeffery M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World* (New York: Free Press, 1975). Two earlier classics on the topic, not by political scientists, are Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) and Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[2] See Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980), 425-53, at 450-51.

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because Peru has been studied intensively since the 1960s, and because more careful records have been kept in recent times, the data on the Peruvian experience seem relatively solid and comprehensive.

The rise of Sendero Luminoso sheds particular light on two key controversies in the literature.[3] First, how important is a crisis of subsistence to peasant revolt? I will argue that, in the Peruvian case, it has been outstandingly important. Second, what type of agrarian structure is most conducive to revolutionary activity? The Ayacucho peasants who were mobilized by the Shining Path guerrillas are predominantly smallholders, and relatively unintegrated into the capitalist market economy.

The Peruvian experience also highlights the importance of two factors in peasant revolution that are generally insufficiently stressed in the literature. First, if a state plays an active part in agricultural policy making (as has been common in Latin America in recent decades) and a subsistence crisis occurs, the peasantry is likely to assess the government's policies and possibly blame them. These policies thus become an important component of the revolutionary equation. A second factor is geopolitics. The area of Ayacucho has two particularly significant characteristics: it is remote, and it has a university. Almost unnoticed, young university-educated radicals were able to forge a working alliance with the peasantry in Ayacucho.[4]

The peasant revolt in Peru is novel in taking place *after* a major agrarian reform. By most criteria this reform is the second most sweeping in Latin America after that of Cuba.[5] In other peasant movements, the revolutionaries have generally demanded land and/or the diminution of the power of the large landowning class. In Peru, to the contrary, the agrarian reform by the military government (1968-1980) transferred large landholdings in Ayacucho to the peasantry. For various reasons, however, the economic impact of the reform was minimal in the southern highlands. By contrast, its political implications were considerable; political space was opened to leftist groups, and the peasantry became increasingly politicized.

The current Peruvian peasant revolt is also significant because its relative success since 1980 contrasts sharply with the failure of the guerrilla movement of the 1960s. It is unusual that scholars can compare

[3] Excellent recent overviews of these controversies are Goldstone (fn. 2) and Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" *Comparative Politics* 14 (April 1982), 351-75.

[4] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) places special analytical importance on this alliance as a requisite for successful revolutionary movements.

[5] See Cynthia McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 60-63.

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two such movements in the same country across a mere twenty years. The contrast puts into sharp relief a variety of conditions for a successful peasant rebellion. In terms of organizational strategies, Sendero is the more skillful and shrewd of the two movements. The Peruvian state, beleaguered for almost a decade now, has not yet found an effective response to Sendero.

One caveat here: this article is about the origins of a revolutionary group that has gained significant peasant support and has transformed daily life in Peru; it is not about a revolutionary group that has gained state power. Nor, in my view, is it likely to gain state power. It varies in this respect from most peasant revolutions that are usually cited in the literature. The Shining Path movement is also different from most of the revolutionary movements that have in fact won power in Latin America. As Cole Blasier and, most recently, Robert H. Dix have pointed out, successful revolutionary movements in Latin America—especially in Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua—have been as much urban as rural, combining the efforts of urban moderates, university students, and peasants, among others.[6] Sendero is not as broad based; its popular support is very limited among Peruvians in Lima or other areas of Peru's coast.[7]

II. Sendero Luminoso and its Peasant Support, 1968-1982[8]

For the most part, the individuals who were to be the core leaders of Sendero Luminoso became politically active in the early 1960s at the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho. Refounded in 1959 after almost three hundred years, the university was the professional

[6] Dix, "The Varieties of Revolution," *Comparative Politics* 15 (April 1983), 281-94; Blasier, "Social Revolution: Origins in Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba," in Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes, eds., *Cuba in Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), 18-51.

[7] In early 1984, a survey by the respected public opinion firm Datum reported that, in Lima and Callao, "the type of government considered most adequate for a country like ours" was "a democratic government (in power through votes)" for 72% of the respondents; a "socialist government (in power through revolution)" for 13%; and "a military government (in power through a coup)" for 9%, with a "don't know/no answer" response from 6%. See *Caretas*, No. 787, February 20, 1984, p. 24. In an informal survey (1983) in "Marla" and "Estrella" (two coastal agrarian cooperatives that have been a longstanding focus of my research), every one of the 40 respondents said that Sendero was harming the country rather than helping it. Asked why, over 90% replied that Sendero "only wanted to kill innocent people," to "destroy things," or to "destroy Peru." Some added that "they make the economic crisis worse" or that "they are enemies of the people."

[8] This section on Sendero Luminoso owes a great deal to the work of David Scott Palmer. See especially his "From Mao to Mariátegui in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso, 1963-1983," discussion points prepared for delivery at the New England Council of the Latin American Studies Association meeting, University of New Hampshire, Durham (October 8, 1983). Other useful works include Mario Vargas Llosa, "Inquest in the Andes," *New York Times Magazine*, July 31, 1983, 18 and ff.; Colin Harding, "Notes on Sendero Luminoso," *Communist Affairs* (No. 3, 1984), 45-61; and Cynthia McClintock,

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home of various extremely radical groups until 1978. The political debate about the correct road to revolution was intense, and a cause of considerable factionalism.

The Communist Party of Peru, as Sendero Luminoso formally calls itself, was founded in 1968 by Abimael Guzmán. Originally from Arequipa, Guzmán became a philosophy professor in the program of education at the university in 1963. Most of the other leaders of Sendero at this time were also from the coast or from large urban areas.

Sendero's ideology is Gang-of-Four Maoist. Stridently critical of the current Soviet and Chinese governments as well as of Izquierda Unida (the coalition of Marxist parties that participates in Peru's electoral process), Sendero is unusually sectarian. There is no evidence of support from any foreign government. Sendero is also extremely taciturn about its strategies and programs for the future. The group has published only two very slim documents, which deal primarily with its view of the guerrilla struggle.[9] This view is classically Maoist: revolution is to be achieved by a prolonged popular war that will first gather support in the countryside and then finally encircle the cities. Sendero has incorporated symbols from the Incan insurrectionary tradition into its posture.

The movement grew gradually. During the early 1960s, the charismatic Guzmán held hundreds of political meetings and discussions at his home, and attracted a large number of university students. Many of these students were from peasant families; many were women. In contrast to the other revolutionary groups of the 1960s, Shining Path was committed to intensive, long-term political work in the countryside. First in university training programs, and later on their own, the Senderista militants actually lived for long periods in Indian communities. They learned the Indian language if they did not already know it, married into the communities—and preached politics.

In May 1980, Sendero began terrorist activities as a component of the third stage of the guerrilla struggle. According to official figures, Sendero has been responsible for about 615 deaths between 1980 and 1983 (more than 500 of these in 1983) and about 2,500 terrorist attacks during the same period (505 in 1980, 1,028 in 1981, 778 in 1982, and 910 in 1983).[10] Sendero has coordinated a great variety of terrorist attacks. Using dy-

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"Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas," *Problems of Communism* 32 (September-October 1983), 19-34.

[9] The more substantial of the two is "Desarrollemos la Guerra de Guerrillas" ["Let us develop the guerrilla war!"]. It is reprinted in Harding (fn. 8), 50-55.

[10] *Caretas*, No. 780 (December 26, 1983), 15.

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namite stolen from the many small mines in the southern highlands and weapons captured from the security forces, the guerrillas have attacked transportation, communication, and electrical facilities; diplomatic embassies; and factories, including even rural agricultural enterprises. The economic toll to Peru from Sendero's attacks may exceed U.S. $1 billion by now.[11]

At the same time, Sendero's membership and area of activity have expanded.[12] As of 1980, estimates of the number of Sendero militants ranged between 200 and 300; the attacks impressed and attracted other revolutionary groups. The largest of these was the peasant organization of Julio Mezzich, based in Apurímac. By 1983, the official estimates of the number of Sendero militants ranged between 500 and 3,000. At the same time, however, the government maintained that 1,439 Senderistas had been killed in 1983 alone.[13] Throughout 1983, Sendero was recruiting intensively, especially at regional highlands universities, and it is quite possible that the real number of Senderista cadres is above 3,000.

Sendero gradually began to penetrate a larger geographical area.[14] Its early strongholds had been communities near Ayacucho bordering the Pampas River; by December 1982, when the government decided tht the army should go to Ayacucho to head the counterinsurgency effort, seven provinces were declared the "Military Emergency Zone": Cangallo, Victor Fajardo, Huamanga, Huanta, and La Mar in Ayacucho; Andahuaylas in Apurímac; and Angaraes in Huancavelica. As of early 1984, the total number of provinces in the Emergency Zone is thirteen, including all five provinces of Huancavelica, all but the southernmost Ayacucho province, and two provinces of Apurímac (see map). Roughly 12 percent of Peru's peasantry live in these provinces.[15] In addition, it was officially estimated in early 1983 that Senderista cells had been established in thirteen of the country's twenty-four departments. After the onset of counterinsurgency operations in Ayacucho and the disper-

[11] My estimate from various reports of damages.

[12] Membership figures are based on *Latin American Regional Reports, Andean Group* (RA-82-04) (May 14, 1982), 5-7; also see, for instance, Kenneth Freed, "Pocket of Terrorism Stirs Fear Among Peruvian Peasants," *Los Angeles Times*, February 20, 1983; Jay Mallin, "Shining Path Guerrillas," *Soldier of Fortune* (March 1983), 52.

[13] *Caretas* (fn. 10).

[14] For documentation of the gradual extension of the Military Emergency Zone, see *The Andean Report* 9 (February 1983), 13-14; *Latin America Weekly Report* (WR-83-49), December 16, 1983, p. 9; DESCO, *Resumen Semanal* 7, February 24–March 1, 1984, p. 3; March 16–23, 1984, p. 4. On the number of Senderista cells, see Mallin (fn. 12), 52. On the areas of 1983 and 1984 Senderista activity, see *The Andean Report* 10 (March 1984), 47, and *Latin America Weekly Report* (WR-84-02), January 13, 1984, p. 10.

[15] Calculation on the basis of 1961 figures for the "farm labor force" in Richard Charles Webb, *Government Policy and the Distribution of Income in Peru, 1963-1973* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 119-29.

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FIGURE 1
PERU'S "MILITARY EMERGENCY ZONE"
(early 1984)



Source: Presidencia de la República, *Peru 1982* (Lima: Presidencia de la República, 1982)

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sion of the top Senderista leadership by mid-1983, the guerrillas became more active—not only in Huancavelica, but in other areas as well, especially in the eastern Andean foothills bordering on the jungle, around the town Tingo María and the Huallaga River in the departments of San Martín and Huánuco.

How many of the peasants in the Emergency Zone actually support Sendero? Certainly, not all. As Mario Vargas Llosa has pointed out, for instance, some twenty villages in the highest altitudes of Ayacucho, inhabited by a distinct ethnic group called the Iquichanos, have been hostile toward the Senderistas.[16] Their significance should not be exaggerated, however. They are estimated to number about 20,000 people out of a population of 503,392 for the Ayacucho department as a whole.[17] Moreover, the particular configuration of high-altitude communities in opposition to lowlands communities that Vargas Llosa describes is rare. Most highlands communities span the entire gamut of ecological zones and take advantage of the production possibilities at different altitudes.[18] In the only widely respected study of agrarian structure in Ayacucho in recent decades, David Scott Palmer describes peasant communities that fit this common pattern.[19] Palmer depicts conflict among the Ayacucho peasant communities, but does not mention the Iquichanos.

The evidence available from a variety of sources suggests substantial backing for Sendero among large majorities of Ayacucho citizens. Interview data have been indicative. For example, in mid-1982 in the city of Ayacucho, Raul González asked "all those who wanted to converse" whether or not they thought Sendero was a peasant movement, and whether or not it counted on support from the population; according to González, the response was virtually unanimous: "It's a movement supported by the youngest peasants. The older ones are resigned to their lot, but they do back their kids."[20] In my own discussions in Huancayo in early 1983, I posed the question to several peasant leaders and officials who were knowledgeable about the situation in the southern highlands; they also replied that substantial majorities were supportive.[21] More

[16] Vargas Llosa (fn. 8), 33, 36, 37.

[17] *Ibid.*, 33; Presidencia de la República, *Peru 1982* (Lima: Presidencia de la República, 1982), 523.

[18] This is a virtual axiom in the anthropological literature on highlands Peru. See, for example, John Murra, *Formaciones Económicas y Políticas del Mundo Andino* [Economic and political structures of the Andean world] (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1975).

[19] David Scott Palmer, *"Revolution from Above": Military Government and Popular Participation in Peru, 1968-1982*, Cornell University Latin American Studies Program Dissertation Series, No. 47 (January 1973), see esp. 196-203 and 216-28.

[20] González, "Por los Caminos de Sendero" [Following the paths of Sendero] *QueHacer*, No. 19 (October 1982), 47.

[21] One of the interviewees, a supporter of the Acción Popular party in 1980, had worked

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recently, an Ayacucho police chief estimated that "80 percent of the townspeople of Ayacucho sympathize with Sendero."[22]

The behavior of Ayacucho citizens suggests widespread support.[23] Sendero has called a considerable number of strikes in the region, and they have almost invariably been successful. For the funeral of Edith Lagos (a young Senderista commander who died in mid-1982 in a battle with police) an estimated 30,000 people turned out—more than for any other event in Ayacucho in years. Handcarved statuettes of Lagos have sold briskly in the Ayacucho market.

The poor record of the government's intelligence personnel is another indication of support for Sendero.[24] The identities of many of the leaders are still unknown. The whereabouts of leader Guzmán are a total mystery. The security forces have arrested only one major leader, Antonio Diáz Martínez, reportedly number three in Sendero. The primary factor in the government's intelligence failure is likely to be the peasants' readiness to protect Senderistas.

Electoral data in the area attest to political backing for Sendero. Tables 1 and 2 compare electoral patterns in the two primary Emergency Zone departments, Ayacucho and Huancavelica, to those in other areas. Table 1 shows the large Marxist vote throughout the southern highlands; in 1980, the Marxist vote was greater in Ayacucho than in any other department of the country except for two tiny mining departments on the southern border.[25] Table 1 also shows the inordinately high rate of null and blank voting in the Emergency Zone departments, while Table 2 indicates the high rate of abstention in these zones. The extraordinarily large null and blank vote may be the best evidence of Sendero influence in the region; some citizens may abstain out of fear of retaliation by Sendero.[26]

Table 3 shows the results of the November 1983 municipal elections in the Ayacucho province of Huamanga. (Elections were not held in other provinces.) The table indicates massive disaffection from the elec-

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for several years in Sendero-controlled territory.

[22] *The Andean Report* (fn. 14), Vol. 10.

[23] Raul González, "Las Batallas de Ayacucho" [The battles of Ayacucho] *QueHacer*, No. 21 (February 1983), 19; Harding (fn. 8), 49; *The Andean Report* (fn. 14); and, on the subject of Edith Lagos's funeral, Jonathan Cavanagh, "Peru's Army Arrives in Guerrilla Area," *Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1983.

[24] A good overview is in *Latin America Weekly Report* (WR-84-02), January 13, 1984, pp. 10-11.

[25] Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, *Elecciones Municipales: Cifras y Escenario Político* [Municipal elections: statistics and political context] (Lima: DESCO, 1983), 171-76. See also Presidencia de la República, *Peru 1981* (Lima: Presidencia de la República, 1981), 100-118.

[26] DESCO, *Resumen Semanal* 6, November 4-11, 1983, p. 5.

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TABLE 1
THE SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS VOTE, 1978 AND 1980
(percentages)

	Marxist Vote 1978[a]	*Marxist Vote May 1980*[a]	*Null and Blank Vote 1978*[b]	*Null and Blank Vote May 1980*[b]
Emergency Zone Departments				
Ayacucho	37	27	32	42
Huancavelica	39	22	30	42
Other Southern Highlands				
Apurímac	31	13	28	37
Cuzco	39	18	22	30
Puno	41	24	22	26
Other Highlands				
Cajamarca	20	11	28	27
Junín	35	20	16	26
Pasco	53	20	20	22
Nationwide	29	18	16	27

[a] As a percentage of the valid vote. The 1978 election was for the Constituent Assembly; the 1980 elections were for national offices.

[b] As a percentage of all votes.

Sources: For the Marxist vote, Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, *Elecciones Municipales: Cifras y Escenario Político* (Lima: DESCO, 1983), 159-70. In 1980, "Marxist" parties were PRT, UNIR, UI, UDP, and FOCEP; in 1978, they were UDP, PC, PSR and FOCEP. The 1980 tallies are for Chamber of Deputies, not the Presidency. Other "left" parties also competed, but were not unequivocally Marxist.

For the null and blank vote in 1978, Enrique Bernales, *Crisis Política: Solución Electoral?* (Lima: DESCO, 1980), 90-96; for the null and blank vote in May 1980, *Presidencia de la República, Perú 1981* (Lima: Presidencia de la República, 1981), 101-7.

toral process in Huamanga. Of an estimated 115,000 people in the province, only 13,059, or about 11 percent, cast valid votes.[27] The triumphant party, PADIN, fared less well than the nulls and the blanks. Moreover, a vote for PADIN, a party that ran only in Ayacucho and promised amnesty for the guerrillas, cannot be considered an explicitly anti-Sendero vote. (There was no new law-and-order rightist party in Ayacucho or any other highlands region.)

Although the above data demonstrate considerable support for Sendero, some aspects of the recent picture are blurred. Especially after January 1983, when counterinsurgency operations began in earnest and

[27] Calculated from González (fn. 20), 62; and from *QueHacer*, No. 27 (February 1984), 34.

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TABLE 2
ABSTENTION RATES, 1978 AND 1983
(percentage of registered voters)

	1978 (for Constituent Assembly)	*May 1980 (National Elections)*	*November 1980 (Municipal Elections)*	*November 1983 (Municipal Elections)*
Emergency Zone Departments				
Ayacucho	22	27	49	Above 50[a]
Huancavelica	25	26	48	N.A.
Other Southern Highlands				
Apurímac	26	31	42	N.A.
Cuzco	21	22	41	N.A.
Puno	17	19	35	N.A.
Other Highlands				
Cajamarca	28	27	40	N.A.
Junín	19	19	38	N.A.
Pasco	21	25	28	N.A.
Nationwide	16	19	30	38

[a] For the province of Huamanga only.

Sources: For 1978, May 1980, and November 1980, Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, *Elecciones Municipales: Cifras y Escenario Político* (Lima: DESCO, 1983), 61. Abstention figure for Ayacucho (province of Huamanga), from *QueHacer*, No. 27 (February 1984), 33. Nationwide figure from *Caretas*, No. 789, March 5, 1984, p. 19.

TABLE 3
THE VOTE IN THE AYACUCHO PROVINCE OF HUAMANGA, NOVEMBER 1983
(percentages)

Abstention[a]	*Null-and-Blank*	*PADIN*	*APRA*	*Acción Popular*
Above 50%	56	19	14	11

[a] Abstention rate is a percentage of registered voters; all other figures are percentages of total vote.

Source: *QueHacer*, No. 27 (February 1984), 34.

journalists were virtually barred from the Ayacucho countryside, the peasants' attitudes could not be thoroughly explored. As we shall see, it is possible that Sendero's behavior at this time alienated some sectors of the peasantry; it is even more possible that the military's behavior did so.

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III. The Subsistence Threat in Peru's Southern Highlands

All scholars of revolution agree that poverty is a factor in peasant protest movements. However, there are considerable differences in the emphasis they give to this variable.

James Scott has focused most intensively on subsistence crises as the root elements in revolutionary movements.[28] Briefly stated, Scott argues that the peasants' guiding moral principle, the standard by which they accept or reject the actions of landlords and government officials, is subsistence. They will consider rebellion when they judge their right to subsistence to be seriously threatened.

More recently, scholars of revolution have de-emphasized the significance of poverty and the threat to subsistence. In *The Rational Peasant*, Samuel Popkin reviews Scott's evidence and concludes that "there is no clear relationship between subsistence threat (or decline) and collective response."[29] He argues that a peasant family's interpretation of a subsistence crisis changes as the social and political context changes. Theda Skocpol's view is similar. Like Popkin, she believes that less emphasis should be given to the socioeconomic circumstances of the peasants themselves and more to the political world around them. She suggests that "grievances" are more or less a constant of peasant life, and that even when a group of peasants is unusually deprived, their deprivation will be subjective and impossible to document empirically.[30]

The Peruvian experience provides considerable evidence in support of Scott's argument. I believe that the data below demonstrate an objective threat to peasant subsistence in Peru—probably more serious than at any time in the twentieth century—as well as the peasantry's subjective perception of a crisis. Although the correlation between the regions of subsistence crisis and of peasant protest is not perfect, it is good.

In most Latin American countries, the socioeconomic gap between the middle classes and the poor has widened in the last decade, but the living standard of the poor has not declined.[31] In almost all Latin American countries, food consumption per capita increased during the 1970s; the only apparent exceptions were Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru.[32]

[28] Scott (fn. 1), esp. 13-26.
[29] Popkin (fn. 1), 245.
[30] Skocpol (fn. 1), 115.
[31] See David Felix, "Income Distribution and the Quality of Life in Latin America: Patterns, Trends, and Policy Implications," *Latin American Research Review* 18 (No. 2, 1983), 3-33.
[32] World Bank, *World Tables*, Vol. I (3d ed.) (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 552. Data compare food consumption per capita in 1967 and 1980.

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Table 4 shows the differences in the living standard of the southern highlands and other areas of the country. As the table indicates, Peru's southern highlands are a region in a Third-World country where poverty is at Fourth-World levels. People in the southern highlands earn little, die young, are mostly illiterate, and usually exist without basic human services. Throughout the southern highlands, peasant incomes are much lower than on the coast, and somewhat lower than in the northern highlands (Cajamarca) or the central highlands (Junín and Pasco).[33] (In Cajamarca, where the altitude is lower, the land is more fertile; it is possible, for example, to graze a considerable number of cows, and the area is a dairy center. In Pasco and Junín, mining and commerce provide economic advantages.)

The southern highlands area is almost exclusively argricultural—in an area ill-suited to agriculture. Most of the terrain is arid, stony, precipitous, and windswept. Altitudes often surpass 12,000 feet. The land provides some meager pasture for livestock, and the peasants can grow potatoes, but little else. This is the case for all the provinces of the department; living standards vary little, although Parinachochas, the southernmost province (and the only one that is not now in the Emergency Zone), seems slightly better off than the other rural provinces.[34]

Not only are southern highlands peasants poor relative to other Peruvians, but they have become poorer in recent years than they were in the 1950s and 1960s. The available evidence, unfortunately rarely broken down by department, is reported in Table 5. The drop in per capita income is especially dramatic. Highlands farm incomes are now probably below $50 a year per capita.[35]

There is no doubt that food consumption fell in the highlands during the 1970s. Table 5 indicates the World Bank estimates of the decline. In 1980, families in the central sierra consumed 92 percent of the daily calorie requirements specified by the FAO, while families in the northern highlands consumed only 72 percent.[36] As the southern highlands area

[33] Geographical disparities in income are clearly described in Webb (fn. 15), 119-29. Among the five southern highlands departments, 1961 per capita resident farm incomes were uniformly low: between 3,000 soles and 4,000 soles annually in Puno, Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and Cuzco, rising to 5,800 soles only in Apurímac. The corresponding figure for Cajamarca is 6,400 soles, for Pasco 10,500 soles, and for Junín 7,500 soles. More recent data are not available.

[34] Webb (fn. 15), 138; Carlos Amat y León, *La Desigualdad Interior en el Peru* [The inequality within Peru] (Lima: Universidad del Pacífico, 1981), Appendix.

[35] Estimate based on trends reported in Table 5, and dollar figures given by José María Caballero, *Economía Agraria de la Sierra Peruana* [The agricultural economy of highlands Peru] (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1981), 107-8.

[36] See World Bank, *Peru: Major Development Policy Issues and Recommendations* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981), 35.

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TABLE 4
REGIONAL INEQUALITIES

	Annual Farm Income Per Capita (thousands of soles) (1961)	*Life Expectancy (Years at Birth) (1972)*	*Adult Illiteracy (percentage) (1972)*	*Without Potable Water (percentage) (1972)*	*Population Per Physician (1972)*	*Calorie Intake (percentage of FAO requirements) (1980)*
Southern Highlands[a]	3.8	44	53	93	21,650	N.A.
Ayacucho	3.3	45	55	93	18,124	N.A.
Northern and Central Highlands[b]	8.1	50	32	86	8,855	72[e]
Coast[c]	11.2	54	17	67	1,822	N.A.
Lima	30.2	57	6	44	583	96
Fourth World[d]	N.A.	44	86	91	30,730	86

[a] Averages for the five poorest southern highlands departments: Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Cuzco, Apurímac, and Puno.
[b] Averages for the three exclusively highlands departments: Junín, Pasco, and Cajamarca.
[c] Averages for the five main coastal departments: Piura, Lambayeque, La Libertad, Lima, and Ica.
[d] Averages for Mali and Nepal. Figures for other low-income Asian and African nations are similar. See World Bank (fn. 32), 150-54.
[e] Figure is for "northern highlands" only. Exact area is unspecified.

Sources: Farm income per capita from Webb (fn. 15), 119-29; life expectancy, adult illiteracy, without potable water from Amat y León (fn. 34), Appendices; population per physician from Presidencia de la República (fn. 17), 543; calorie intake from World Bank (fn. 36), 35.

TABLE 5
VARIOUS INDICATORS OF THE INCREASE IN POVERTY IN THE HIGHLANDS

	Population Density per square kilometer (Ayacucho)	*Per Capita Income as compared to 1972 = 100*[c] *(Highlands Farm Families)*	*Per Capita Calorie Consumption*[d] *(Rural Sierra)*
1940	8.1[a]	N.A.	N.A.
1950	N.A.	106	N.A.
1961	9.3[a]	106	N.A.
1972	10.3[b]	100	2,085
1980	12.1[b]	82	1,971

Sources: [a] Larson and Bergman (fn. 61), 301, 334.
[b] Presidencia de la República (fn. 25), 463.
[c] My calculations, for lower-income among highlands farm families, from Webb (fn. 15), 39, Caballero (fn. 35), 207-8, and World Bank (fn. 36), 155.
[d] World Bank (fn. 36), 140.

is generally worse off than the northern highlands, we may infer that calorie intake in the southern highlands was below 70 percent of daily requirements. In a study made by the Peruvian government, daily per capita intake among lower-class people throughout the country was found to have plummeted from 1,934 calories per capita in 1972 to 1,486 in 1979 (a mere 63 percent of FAO requirements).[37] Most disturbing of all are some official data for particularly poor zones in the southern highlands. As of roughly 1980, individuals in these zones were apparently consuming as little as 420 calories a day.[38]

The World Bank characterized the nutritional situation in 1980 as "bad."[39] By 1983, a year in which the Sendero movement grew considerably, it was even worse. As in a number of the Southeast Asian subsistence crises described by Scott, minimal subsistence conditions were reduced further by natural disasters. Warm ocean currents (El Niño) brought floods to Peru's northern coast and drought to Peru's southern highlands. The southeastern highlands department of Puno was the one most devastated by the drought; almost all the southern highlands region, however, including Ayacucho, was seriously affected.[40] In the country as a whole, officials estimated that in 1983 agricultural production fell

[37] Jorge Fernández Baca, "La Producción de Alimentos en el Peru" [Food production in Peru] *QueHacer*, No. 17 (June 1982), 89-90.
[38] González (fn. 20), 43. Exact sources and names of zones are not given.
[39] World Bank (fn. 36), 35.
[40] See *Andean Focus* (a publication of the Ecumenical Committee on the Andes), No. 2 (November-December 1983), and *Latin America Weekly Report* (WR-83-23), August 26, 1983, p. 9.

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by 15 percent, and potato production by almost 20 percent; in the southern highlands, potato production can be estimated to have fallen between 40 and 50 percent.[41]

The Ecumenical Committee on the Andes described the situation in the following terms:

> In the southern Andes, severe drought completely destroyed the harvest, forcing peasants to consume surplus seed intended for this year's planting. Starvation is rampant among subsistence farmers; illness, particularly tuberculosis, has spread alarmingly. The price of basic foodstuffs rose dramatically in regional and national markets, affecting the urban poor. Unemployment increased in the agricultural sector (subsistence farmers traditionally work as paid laborers at harvest time), forcing hundreds of thousands to migrate to the cities, as many as 8,000 a day at one point. News reports documented cases of peasants selling their children for $25.[42]

Even prior to the natural disaster of 1983, peasants were perceiving a crisis. In Varya, a peasant community in Huancavelica (a site of my longstanding research), 84 percent of 25 respondents said in 1980 that the community's progress in recent years had been "bad."[43] Varya peasants were also asked, "What have been the achievements in your community in recent years?" Despite the optimistic phraseology, 92 percent of the respondents replied, "none."

In early 1984, Varya was alleged to be a pro-Senderista community and was occupied by the security forces. The pessimism of Varya peasants as well as their possible pro-Senderista sympathy is in contrast to the more positive views and non-Senderista inclinations in two other sites where I asked the same questions in 1980 (one a coastal cooperative and the other a prosperous central highlands peasant community). Of 55 respondents in these areas, only 7 percent said that progress had been "bad."

IV. Government Policies toward Agriculture, 1968-1982

When southern highlands peasants began to realize the threat to their subsistence, many blamed the government for their plight. Past and present governments have indeed been, at best, oblivious to the problems

[41] *Latin America Weekly Report* (WR-84-02), January 13, 1984, 11; *Latin America Weekly Report* (fn. 40); and *Latin American Regional Reports, Andean Group* (RA-84-02), March 2, 1984, 6.

[42] *Andean Focus* (fn. 40), 1. See also Raul González, "Desastres!" [Disasters!] *QueHacer*, No. 22 (May 1983), 18-47.

[43] This was an informal, nonrandom application, primarily to men, of a brief questionnaire. For further information on the nature of these surveys and a description of Varya, see McClintock (fn. 5), 102-5.

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in the southern highlands. The biases of government policies to be described here afflict virtually the entire highlands region, but the southern highlands area has been most affected, primarily because of the inferior quality of its terrain and its relative lack of alternative sources of income.

The successive governments do not, however, bear the sole responsibility for the problems of highlands agriculture in Peru. The origins of the difficulties lie in part with factors beyond the governments' purview. One such factor is population growth. As both Jack Goldstone and Eric Wolf have pointed out, demographic growth has frequently been correlated with popular protest.[44] That is the case in Peru: although overall population growth rates have not been higher than in many other Latin American countries, the demographic pressure on the land has been more severe. As Table 5 shows, population density in Ayacucho has increased by over 25 percent since 1961, and by almost 50 percent since 1940. As a result, land is very scarce in Ayacucho, as it is in other parts of the highlands and in Peru as a whole: with only one-fifth of an arable hectare per capita, land is scarcer in Peru than in any Latin American country except El Salvador.[45]

A second underlying factor is the exhaustion of the land, especially on the hillsides where most peasants live.[46] (The early Spanish settlers pushed the Indian peoples out of the more fertile valley land.) If steep lands are not carefully terraced and cultivated, they erode. Erosion, which has been a serious problem in Peru for decades, has become even more prevalent as the social fabric of peasant-community life has unraveled, and the soil-management responsibilities of the community have been neglected.

If population increases while the soil deteriorates, food production per capita can be expected to decline. This is the case in Peru. The output of highlands food staples, such as potatoes and corn, has dropped precipitously.[47] For example, annual per capita potato production plummeted from 161 kilograms during 1951-1955 to 110 kilograms during 1971-1977.

[44] Wolf (fn. 1), 281; Goldstone (fn. 2), 453.

[45] Daniel Martínez and Armando Tealdo, *El Agro Peruano 1970-1980: Analísis y Perspectivas* [Peruvian agriculture 1970-1980: Analysis and perspectives] (Lima: CEDEP, 1982), 39. Comprehensive figures on hectares per capita by department are not available. The partial data in Caballero (fn. 35, pp. 67 and 117) suggest that the number of hectares per capita does not vary a great deal across Peru's highlands departments.

[46] For more details, see Caballero (fn. 35), 59-91.

[47] José Mariá Caballero, *Agricultura, Reforma Agraria, y Pobreza Campesina* [Agriculture, agrarian reform, and peasant poverty] (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1980), 29; Organization of American States, *Short-Term Economic Reports: Vol. VII, 1981, Peru* (Washington, DC: OAS), 54. Unfortunately, data are not available by region.

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The problems of agriculture in the Peruvian highlands can be alleviated by favorable government policies. Between 1968 and 1980, the military regimes, first under General Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) and then under General Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980), set down agricultural policies. Some of these, especially agrarian reform, were advantageous to the peasantry on the coast, but generally not to that in the highlands. Under the civilian regime of Fernando Belaúnde Terry, elected in 1980, key agricultural policies—land tenure and terms of trade—turned against the peasantry altogether, both on the coast and in the highlands. No government has allocated substantial public investment to the projects favored by agronomists for the southern highlands.

A. AGRARIAN REFORM

Land has been an explosive issue in Peru for centuries. It has always been both scarce and unequally distributed—more so than in many Latin American countries.[48] By some estimates, a mere 280 families—less than one-tenth of one percent of all farm families—owned between 15 and 30 percent of all land in Peru as of the 1950s and early 1960s (well over half of the country's best arable soil).[49]

The Velasco government transformed land tenure in Peru. Large landowners (*hacendados*) were driven from the countryside. Most of their estates (*haciendas*) remained intact, but were run as cooperatives. By most criteria, Peru's agrarian reform of the 1970s ranked, with the exception of Cuba's, as the most sweeping in Latin America (see Table 6). Still, only about one-quarter to one-third of all farm families benefited from the reform materially. Moreover, some types of farmers benefited a great deal, and others only a little.[50]

The "big winners" were the 120,000-odd ex-*hacienda* workers, almost all of whom became members of the new cooperative enterprises. This group comprised about one-third of all reform beneficiaries, but only one-tenth of all farm families. The average value of the property transferred to each member was approximately 75,000 soles (about $1,900). In the new cooperatives, living standards improved, sometimes dra-

[48] On land scarcity, see Martínez and Tealdo (fn. 45), 39. In 1961, Peru's Gini index of land distribution was the most unequal of any reported in Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 267.

[49] Martínez and Tealdo (fn. 45), 15-16.

[50] Data on the number of beneficiaries by production mode and by region are from José Matos Mar and José Manuel Mejía, *Reforma Agraria: Logros y Contradicciones 1969-1979* [Agrarian reform: Achievements and contradictions 1969-1979] (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1980), 67. Data on land values are provided in José Mariá Caballero and Elena Alvarez, *Aspectos Cuantitativos de la Reforma Agraria (1969-1979)* [Quantitative aspects of the agrarian reform (1969-1979)](Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1980), 63.

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TABLE 6

IMPACT OF VARIOUS LATIN AMERICAN AGRARIAN REFORMS

	Are large, lucrative tracts still owned by well-capitalized individuals?	*Number of hectares expropriated*	*Percentage of agricultural land in reformed sector*	*Number of families benefited*	*Percentage of rural families benefited*	*Number of landless temporary workers*
Peru, 1979	No	8,599,253	35	399,576	27	250,000
Chile, through May 1973	Yes	9,517,000	36	58,000	13	170,000
Mexico	Yes	44,500,000	36	1,500,000	25	3,500,000
Bolivia, 1969[a]	Yes	9,740,681	30	208,181	39	N.A.
Cuba, 1966	No	5,513,700	60	470,120	90	Very few

[a] In contrast to the other countries, figures include colonization.

Sources: McClintock (fn. 5), 61 and 359, updated with data for Peru from Matos Mar and Mejía (fn. 50), 67, and Martinez and Tealdo (fn. 45), 20-24; for Chile, World Bank, *Land Reform in Latin America: Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela*, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 275 (April 1978), 20-24 and Appendix A, 6. Total number of farm families and total amount of arable land in Peru are reported distinctively and are essentially unknown, so percentage figures are estimates.

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matically.[51] New schools, new community centers, new sports stadiums, and new health facilities were constructed. Members were no longer concerned with subsistence, but with secondary-school education for their children in the provincial capital. Agricultural production did not decline in the cooperatives.[52]

Most of the reform's beneficiaries did not become members of cooperatives; they gained much less from the reform. About one-third were families in "peasant communities" (traditional highlands villages, often extant since the era of the Incas); another third were independent peasants with small parcels of land. There were gains: additional pasture lands, more secure land titles, and, for some three or four hundred peasant communities, membership in a complex new enterprise called the SAIS. Overall, however, the material benefits were small. The average value of the property transferred to peasant communities was only 2,000 soles per beneficiary—a mere $50.

Reform benefits varied not only by tenure mode, but also by region. Coastal families gained much more than highland families. Although the number of beneficiaries in coastal departments was similar to the number in highlands departments, the value of the property transferred to families was much smaller in the highlands (see Table 7). In Ayacucho, the least-benefited agrarian zone, 30,000 to 35,000 families gained prop-

TABLE 7
AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFITS BY REGION

COAST		*HIGHLANDS*	
Agrarian Zone[a]	*Value per Family (Soles)*[b]	*Agrarian Zone*[a]	*Value per Family (Soles)*[b]
Lima	162,288	Ayacucho	4,900
Ica	108,580	Cuzco	10,074
Lambayeque	105,317	Huancayo	22,116
Trujillo	53,383	Puno	62,171
Piura	41,231		

[a] "Agrarian Zone" is not identical to "department." Agrarian Zones were designated for the application of the reform. As a result, data for Cajamarca, Pasco, and other departments are not available.

[b] The exchange rate was roughly 40 soles to the dollar through 1975.

Sources: Ministry of Agriculture (fn. 53), Table 1. Calculation divides indemnities for expropriation (cash plus bonds) by number of families receiving land, in all structural modes (i.e., cooperatives and "groups," and peasant communities).

[51] See McClintock (fn. 5).

[52] Cynthia McClintock, "Domestic Reform Policies and Agricultural Development," in F. La Mond Tullis and W. Ladd Hollist, eds., *International Political Economy of Agriculture*, (forthcoming, University of Nebraska Press).

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erty, a number comparable to other agrarian zones, but the value of the property was a mere 4,900 soles per family (under $150).[53]

Why these disparities? The primary reason may be found in the objective limits to reform strategies imposed on the Velasco government by the dualistic structure of Peruvian agriculture. Most of Peru's agricultural income and almost all its agricultural exports are generated by the large crop estates on Peru's coast and, to a lesser extent, by the massive livestock estates in a few parts of the highlands. If the government had dismantled these enterprises and tried to distribute these lands equally, political and economic chaos would have been the likely result, at least in the short run.

The current Belaúnde administration is opposed to the changes in land tenure implemented under the military governments. The civilian government has called for private property in agriculture, and has begun to pressure the cooperatives to subdivide the land among their members.[54] To this end, it has used various strategies, such as new legal regulations, credit restrictions, dilatory payments by public and private companies, and extremely adverse terms of trade for agriculture. These pressures have weighed heavily upon the cooperatives and, although members have been reluctant—fearing that they lacked capital and expertise—as many as half the cooperatives subdivided by late 1983.[55] Their fears are realistic; for most, the future looks bleak.

B. TERMS OF TRADE

The terms of trade between the countryside and the city are of concern not only to Peru's "modern" coastal farmers, but also to the great majority of highlands peasants. Only a tiny percentage of peasant villages remains unaffected by the market economy. By the early 1970s, the overwhelming majority of peasant communities, however remote, marketed at least 25 percent of their crops and at least 65 percent of their livestock and dairy products.[56] As more and more young men were compelled by economic necessity to migrate to the coast or the upper

[53] On the number of beneficiaries in the zone, see Ministry of Agriculture, *Estadística de la Reforma Agraria (a 31 de Marzo de 1977)* [Statistics on the agrarian reform (up to March 31, 1977)] (Lima: Dirección General de Reforma Agraria y Asentamiento Rural, 1977), Table 3.

[54] Agrarian Bank and Ministry of Agriculture officials in Lima and Trujillo were very open on these scores in my interviews with them in January-February 1983. See also the text of the new government laws, especially the Ley de Promoción y Desarrollo Agrario.

[55] Data on subdivision have not yet been compiled. This estimate is based on discussions in both the countryside and Ministry of Agriculture offices, February and July 1983, and on figures in *El Comercio* (December 16, 1983).

[56] Caballero (fn. 35), 228.

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jungle for temporary jobs, their wages came to represent approximately 25 to 35 percent of the income of the highland peasants.[57]

The terms of trade were generally favorable to the peasantry under the military government and especially under General Velasco, but they have deteriorated markedly under the civilian administration. On-farm prices for agricultural goods have fallen, the cost of key agricultural inputs has risen, and credit has become scarce.

Table 8 shows the dramatic change in agricultural price policy for Peru's farmers that took place between the 1970s and 1980s. Under the military governments of the 1970s, the on-farm prices for most agricultural products rose at rates that were above the consumer price index (CPI). In 1981 and 1982, however, on-farm prices increased much less than the consumer price index. The price of the key highlands staple, the potato, fared especially badly under the Belaúnde government. The current prices are rock-bottom ones; despite the relatively good price increases for farmers in the 1970s, Peru's producer prices were about 10 to 40 percent lower than world market prices for many items even in 1980.[58]

It is curious indeed that the Belaúnde government has maintained state control of on-farm prices for agricultural products and kept prices

TABLE 8
ON-FARM PRICES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, 1971-1982

	1971-1975	*1976-1979*	*1980*	*1981-1982*
Increase in Consumer Price Index (CPI)	63[b]	199	59	146
Average increase in on-farm prices for nine key agricultural products[a]	120	236	53	81
Did on-farm prices increase more or less than the CPI?	Much more	More	Slightly less	Much less

[a] Products are: potatoes, rice, wheat, beans, cotton, sugar cane, hard corn, sorghum, and soya. Data for sugar cane during 1981-1982 are not available, but figures from USDA (fn. 62), 36, for white sugar suggest minimal increase.

[b] See McClintock (fn. 5), 357.

Sources: Statistical Office, Ministry of Agriculture, for product prices. Consumer price index data for 1973-1980 from World Bank (fn. 36), front matter; for 1981 and 1982 from *Business Latin America*, June 2, 1982 and March 16, 1983.

[57] *Ibid.*, 229.

[58] World Bank (fn. 36), 53.

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so low. First, price control contradicts the government's professed commitment to the free market. Second, the usual justification for artificially lowering the prices of agricultural products does not apply; low on-farm prices have not translated into low consumer prices. On the contrary, food prices have skyrocketed in real terms.[59]

Fertilizer policy and credit policy are two other terms-of-trade policies that have affected Peru's peasantry adversely in recent years—especially the more modern coastal farmers who are most likely to use fertilizer and credit, but also approximately 10 percent of highlands farmers.[60] In the early and mid-1970s, fertilizer prices were low and various measures were taken to facilitate the use of fertilizer; prices began to rise by the late 1970s, and in 1982 they were increasing at almost twice the rate of inflation. Trends have been similar in the cost and availability of credit. Real credit availability increased until 1975 and then declined, with a record fall of 15 percent in 1982. In real terms, interest rates have generally been low, but in the early 1980s the peasantry perceived them as being high because of the low price levels for agricultural products. Throughout these years, only meager amounts of credit have been allocated to the highlands, and especially little to Ayacucho.[61]

Yet another trade policy that has hurt many Peruvian farmers is the import liberalization program of the Belaúnde government. After 1980, tariffs were reduced on all kinds of food imports, from meat to apples. Although 1981 was an excellent year agriculturally, total agricultural imports increased by approximately 18 percent.[62]

C. PUBLIC INVESTMENT

The decline in fertile terrain per capita has not gone unnoticed by agronomists. With a surprising degree of consensus, agronomists recommend that Peru's top priorities for agricultural investment should be

[59] Between July 1980 and December 1982, the purchasing power of the minimum wage fell 27% relative to the cost of a basic foodbasket for a family of five. See *QueHacer*, No. 21 (February, 1983), 11.

[60] For further discussion and documentation of the trends in these policies, see Cynthia McClintock, "Government Policy, Rural Poverty, and Peasant Protest in Peru: The Origins of the Sendero Luminoso Rebellion," paper prepared for delivery at the 1983 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago, September 1983), Tables 5-6. The figure for the percentage of highlands farmers affected by these policies is from Martínez and Tealdo (fn. 45), 104.

[61] Ayacucho is the home of 5.3% of the rural population, according to Magli S. Larson and Arlene G. Bergman, *Social Stratification in Peru* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1969), 303. Yet, Ayacucho received less than 2% of the Agrarian Bank's annual credit between 1975 and 1982, according to the Bank's own data—and only 1.1% in 1981-1982.

[62] USDA (United States Department of Agriculture), *Attaché Report* (Lima: Report No. PE-3010, 1983), 34.

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the rehabilitation of saline coastal lands and the construction of small-scale irrigation systems in the highlands.[63] Although considerable sums have been allocated for agricultural investment, these projects have unfortunately not been priorities.

Public agricultural investment increased considerably during the 1970s, both in terms of real amounts and as a percentage of total public investment.[64] For example, the increase in real amounts between the 1968-1970 biennium and the 1974-1976 biennium was approximately 40 percent. In the early 1980s, public agricultural investment tended to level off.

There is widespread agreement that funds were not invested wisely. The military governments as well as the Belaúnde government allocated at least half the total agricultural investment budget to three high-technology coastal irrigation projects: Majes, Tinajones, and Chira-Piura.[65] Although Majes is especially expensive in terms of the cost per family benefited (see Table 9), almost $600 million has been spent on it—$391 million during the 1970s and $184 million in 1980 and 1981.[66] Despite the expenditure, not even the first stage of the project has been completed.

Why has so much money been spent on Majes and other extravagant irrigation systems, and not on programs such as Rehatic and Meris that are favored by agronomists?[67] Many officials of the military government say that the purpose of Majes was not primarily agricultural, but had to do with national defense, given the proximity of the project to Peru's border with Chile. Military officials also point out that Majes did not seem so expensive at inception. For their part, Belaúnde government officials maintain that, since Majes is underway, it cannot be stopped; contracts have been signed and expectations raised. These expectations are not the full story, however: international engineering and

[63] Documents from and discussions with employees of the World Bank, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture.

[64] McClintock (fn. 60), 6-7.

[65] The available figures are from different sources and may not be comparable. For 1970-1976, the figure is 72%; see Felipe M. Portocarrero, "The Peruvian Public Investment Programme, 1968-1978," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 14 (No. 2, 1982), 433-54. For 1978-1979, the figure is 51%; see Fernando Eguren, "Política Agraria vs. Producción de Alimentos" [Agrarian politics vs. the production of food] *QueHacer*, No. 3 (March 1980), 41. For 1981, my calculation is 51%, from the data provided by the National Planning Institute, "Informe Socioeconómico: Vol. II, Evaluación del Programa de Inversiones" [Socioeconomic Report: Vol. II, evaluation of the investment program] (Lima: National Planning Institute, 1982), 11. In 1981, a fourth large irrigation project (Jequetepeque-Zaña), received close to another 10% of total agricultural investment.

[66] "Proyecto Majes," a collection of data from the Central Reserve Bank of Peru.

[67] For an incisive analysis of this question, see *The Andean Report* 6 (December 1980), 221-23. See also Michael Painter, "Agricultural Policy, Food Production, and Multinational Corporations in Peru," *Latin American Research Review* 18 (No. 2, 1983), 208.

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TABLE 9
IRRIGATION PROJECTS: COSTS AND BENEFITS

	Percentage of Total Public Agricultural Investment Allocated to the Project in 1981	*Cost per hectare*[a] *(thousands of U.S. $)*	*Cost per family benefited (thousands of U.S. $)*
Majes	26	27.3	163.7
Chira-Piura	16	3.3	16.5
Tinajones	8	2.6	10.1
Rehatic[b]	4.2	1.8	8.6
Meris[c]	3.7	1.2	1.3

[a] Per hectare rehabilitated or brought under cultivation for the first time.
[b] Coastal land rehabilitation, primarily of excessively saline lands.
[c] Small-scale irrigation projects in the highlands.
Sources: For cost data, author's calculations from Presidencia de la República (fn. 25), 298. For percentage of total public agricultural investment, National Planning Institute (fn. 65), Vol. II, 11-12.

construction firms, which are contracted for this kind of large-scale, capital-intensive project, benefit handsomely and lobby hard for it. Also, grandiose schemes like Majes are attractive to authorities for their pork-barrel possibilities.

While few analysts would argue that equity should be the sole criterion in public investment programs, most would suggest that it should be at least one important consideration, especially with respect to such programs as health, education, and housing. Yet, equity concerns have been minor in public investment allocations in Peru for many years. Table 10 shows that, under the two military governments, Peru's five southern highlands departments did not receive shares of public investment proportional to their population. The Belaúnde government has apparently planned to correct this pattern. A surprisingly large percentage of its allocations, 43 percent, is, however, for electricity—not the peasants' top priority.[68]

The big winner from Peru's public investment programs has been the military. According to official figures, military expenditures almost tripled in real terms between 1971 and 1982.[69] Nonofficial sources now report that an astronomical one-third of all expenditures is being allo-

[68] Presidencia de la República (fn. 17), 216-28.
[69] Data for 1971 from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971-1980* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1983), 63. Data for 1982 are from *Hoy* (an Ecuadorean newspaper), June 22, 1983), p. 12a, which cites the International Institute of Peace Studies as its source.

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TABLE 10
INEQUITIES IN PUBLIC INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT, 1968-1982

	Percentage of Population	*Percentage of Total Public Investment, 1968-80*[a]	*Percentage of Total Public Investment Planned for 1982*[a]
Ayacucho	3.0	0.6	1
Huancavelica	2.0	3.6	9
Apurímac	1.9	0.3	1
Cuzco	4.9	2.2	7
Puno	5.2	N.A.	3
Total (Five Departments)	17.0	Minimum of 6.7	21

[a] Percentage of total public investment to all departments.

Sources: Population figures from Presidencia de la República (fn. 17), front matter. Investment figures for 1982 calculated from Presidencia de la República (fn. 17), 215-28. Investment figures for 1968-1980 from *QueHacer*, No. 19 (October 1982), 61. *QueHacer*'s source is the Prime Minister's Office, 1982.

cated to the military in 1983 and 1984, in an arms-purchase program that is estimated at an eventual total cost of almost $4 billion.[70]

The biases of government policies have been quite apparent to the peasantry. Table 11 shows that in the mid-1970s the Velasco government was generally perceived as helping the peasantry "more or less" while the current Belaúnde government is almost unanimously condemned as not helping at all. My informal surveys of the early 1980s record that peasants complained vehemently about the government's policies. For example:

> There's no help from the government. On the contrary, everything costs more. Living has just become impossible and every day it's more difficult, especially when you have kids and depend solely on your land. (Q 1981, Patca, #13).

> Here, they've always forgotten us. There's no help. Exactly the opposite—the cost of everything has risen too much, and that's not the way to help. They're killing the poor people. (Q 1983, Marla, #1).

V. PERUVIAN AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND PEASANT REVOLT

One of the sharpest controversies in the literature on peasant revolution concerns the type of agrarian structure that is most conducive to rebellion. The two central questions debated are: (1) which group is

[70] *Latin America Weekly Report* (WR-83-40), October 14, 1983, pp. 1-2.

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TABLE 11
PEASANT SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
(percentages)

Site[a]	*N*	*Government helps*	*Government helps more or less*	*Government does not help*	*Don't know/No answer/ Other*
Rachuis, 1975	27	4	56	37	4
Rachuis, 1981	17	0	6	94	0
Estrella and Marla, 1974	150	11	35	30	25
Estrella and Marla, 1983	40	0	0	95	5

[a] Rachuis is a highlands peasant community in Junín; Estrella and Marla are two coastal cooperatives. See McClintock (fn. 5).

Sources: For Estrella and Marla in 1974, author's random sample survey; otherwise, nonrandom informal questionnaires. See McClintock (fn. 5), 85-93.

more disposed to insurrection—landless rural wage earners or peasant smallholders, and (2) whether the peasants whose lives are most disrupted by the intrusion of capitalism are the most inclined to rebel. In general, Jeffery Paige has taken one side in the argument, James Scott and Eric Wolf the other; Theda Skocpol has suggested that the entire issue is almost irrelevant.[71]

Paige perceives landless rural wage earners as most likely to be revolutionaries. He argues that hired laborers, working on farms under more-or-less uniform contracts, are able to make common cause against landlords. Moreover, they risk no significant assets in a rebellion. In contrast, peasant smallholders are wracked by conflict among themselves over land and water rights, and cannot unite. They are averse to risks to their property, and many are dependent upon large landowners for marketing or other services.

Scott and Wolf take the opposite view. Scott maintains that smallholders, more likely to be living in isolated, cohesive villages, retain firm precapitalist values that spur them to tenacious resistance. Wolf points out that landless wage laborers are closely supervised by their employers and are thus unable to mobilize politically. In Wolf's view, peasant revolutionary action depends on freedom from repression by local authorities, and this freedom is more likely to obtain in smallholding villages, especially inaccessible ones.

Theda Skocpol stands with Wolf on the importance of peasant au-

[71] Paige (fn. 1), esp. 42-45; Scott (fn. 1), and James C. Scott, "Hegemony and the Peasantry," *Politics and Society* 7 (No. 3, 1977), 267-96; Wolf (fn. 1); Skocpol (fn. 1), 353-60.

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tonomy to revolutionary action. She contends, however, that the significance of agrarian structure as a variable has been exaggerated. In her view, landless wage earners and smallholders may both become rebels; the political context is the paramount variable.

The theses of Scott and especially of Wolf are supported by the Peruvian experience. As Table 12 shows, in the conflicted southern highlands departments the population consists predominantly of peasant smallholders. The percentage of rural laborers is much lower here than in the central highlands or on the coast. As Paige predicts, the southern highlands smallholders do compete with each other; as of 1971, 71 percent of Ayacucho's communities were engaged in boundary disputes—one of the highest percentages in the country.[72] Still, these rivalries apparently did not impede Sendero's rise.

Paige's argument cannot be completely discarded, however. Sendero Luminoso grew in the Ayacucho region only *after* the military government's agrarian reform, which ousted large landholders from the area and dramatically reduced official political control. Accordingly, one of Paige's key assumptions—that the landlord serves as an impediment to the revolt of the smallholder—is absent in the Peruvian case. Moreover, many of Peru's rural laborers were no longer merely wage earners. They

TABLE 12
RURAL SOCIAL GROUPS BY REGION, 1961
(percentages)

	Agriculturalists in the Economically Active Population, 1972	*Peasant Smallholders*	*Rural Middle and Upper Middle Classes*	*Rural Laborers*
Southern Highlands				
Ayacucho	73	71	11	15
Huancavelica	70	68	12	18
Apurímac	77	72	9	16
Cuzco	61	62	11	26
Puno	66	66	15	18
Central Highlands				
Junín	46	52	10	36
Pasco	49	36	11	48
Northern Highlands				
Cajamarca	75	N.A.[a]	N.A.[a]	N.A.[a]
Coast	N.A.	41	11	48

[a] The data in the source for Cajamarca are clearly in error.

Sources: For agriculturalists in the economically active population, Caballero (fn. 35), 117; for other groups, Larson and Bergman (fn. 61), 378.

[72] Palmer (fn. 19), 198.

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had become members of cooperative enterprises, receiving shares of the profits; the exploitative *hacendados* were gone. As Skocpol implies, the controversy about peasant type and revolutionary inclinations may be too narrowly and too rigidly framed.

A second debate in the literature concerns the impingement of capitalism on traditional peasant societies. The arguments are often quite nuanced and cannot be fully described here. Paige affirms that the development of large-scale, capital-intensive agricultural export enterprises stimulates rural class conflict and protest. Migdal contends that, as a prerequisite for revolution, peasants must encounter an economic crisis, often the result of increased exploitation by authorities. They will then seek to surmount the crisis by increased participation in the market, only to find that the market networks are corrupt and their participation in it unprofitable.[73] Wolf argues, at a more general level, that the spread of capitalism entails major social and economic dislocation. He cites a variety of changes, from peasants' loss of secure land titles to the rise of new elites.

In Peru, global economic forces and capitalism seem to have played a less direct role than any of the above theorists would have predicted. It was not in the area of capital-intensive export agriculture on Peru's coast that the revolutionary impulse was fostered.[74] Also, as Table 12 shows, it is not in the conflicted southern highlands but rather in the central highlands that many peasants have left agriculture for employment in commerce, the services, and manufacturing (Junín), and in mining (Pasco).[75] The result has not been to stir political radicalism, but to enhance rural incomes.[76]

Throughout the highlands, peasant agriculture remains predominantly at a traditional subsistence level. There are some large, capitalistic livestock and wool enterprises, mainly in Pasco, Junín, and Puno, but the relationship between these enterprises and the peasant communities did not change radically during the 1970s. The major question mark is the recent coca boom. The production of coca has increased dramatically in the Andean foothills. Sendero maintains a modus vivendi with some coca growers and traffickers, probably exacting taxes from them. The region that Sendero has penetrated most recently, around Tingo María and the Huallaga River, is prime coca-growing territory.

Overall, no significant new encroachments on the lives of the high-

[73] Migdal (fn. 1), 229-37.

[74] The contrast between the capital-intensive export agriculture of Peru's coast and the subsistence agriculture of the highlands is elaborated in Paige (fn. 1), 124-210.

[75] Caballero (fn. 35), 117, provides exact figures.

[76] Webb (fn. 15), 18-43. See Tables 1 and 2 for the voting tallies in these departments.

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lands peasantry were apparent during the 1970s. Landlords left the area rather than escalate their demands. The state was largely guilty of inaction, not action. Foreigners were prohibited from landholding in Peru during this period. Agroindustry grew somewhat—primarily in the wheat, milk, and poultry industries—but this growth did not impinge substantially on the agriculture of the southern highlands.[77]

The effect of world capitalist forces upon the Peruvian peasantry seems to have been an indirect one. These forces have not dislocated agriculture itself, but they may have influenced government policies toward agriculture. Some examples have already been cited: the agricultural investment program was probably misled by international economic interests, and the military budget may have been bloated as a result of the fanning of the Peruvian military's traditional rivalry with Chile by the international arms industries. There are other examples. The ready availability of wheat imports from the United States under Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) may have been a factor in the military governments' neglect of the problem of declining production of food staples in the highlands.[78] Also, the Belaúnde government wants to retain the support of the international private and public banks as well as of the International Monetary Fund. Quite possibly prompted by the economic orthodoxy of these organizations, it implemented some of the recent policies that hurt the peasantry, such as higher interest rates for agricultural loans, the withdrawal of subsidies for fertilizers, and the reduction of import tariffs on many agricultural items. The recent United States coca eradication program for the Upper Huallaga valley probably alienated many peasants in this area.

So far, I have distinguished economic and structural conditions in Peru's southern highlands from those in other regions of the country. Ayacucho has not stood out particularly among the southern highlands departments. Why did Ayacucho rather than one of the four other southern highlands departments become Sendero's home base?

Here geopolitics comes into play. Ayacucho is the only one of the five southern highlands departments that is inaccessible, without a main road from the coast,[79] *and* has a nationally recognized university.[80] The Sendero Luminoso experience suggests that it is important to put these two factors together. Traditionally, they have not been. Scott, Wolf, Skocpol,

[77] Michael Painter, "The Political Economy of Food Production in Peru," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 18 (Winter 1983), 34-52, is somewhat more critical of the role of foreign agricultural interests in Peru.

[78] *Ibid.*, 39-42.

[79] *South America: Map of Continent* (Kummerly Frey).

[80] A list of Peru's recognized universities is provided in Presidencia de la República (fn. 17), 532.

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and others have indicated (although not very emphatically) the advantages of geographic inaccessibility for the security of nascent revolutionary movements, but they have not discussed the possible role of university students in inaccessible areas. Huntington, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of an alliance between intellectuals and peasants, but does not examine the location of this alliance. Students at remote, "provincial" universities are different from their counterparts in the capital or other major cities. First, they are more likely to be from peasant families, and thus more able to mix with the peasantry. Second, they do not have the prestigious qualifications or the numerous contacts that students at the more prominent universities do, and thus have even fewer chances than the latter of professional employment upon graduation if the economy turns down—as it did in Peru after the mid-1970s.

VI. Political Changes in the Peruvian Highlands, 1968-1982

Sendero Luminoso is not Peru's first radical peasant movement. It is, however, the first movement that has effectively allied revolutionary activists and peasants in various provinces. In comparison with the 1960s movements, Sendero has been shrewder and more dedicated. The Senderistas carefully increased peasants' material gains and reduced their risks, along the lines of the organizational imperatives specified by Popkin and by Migdal.[81] The comparison of the two guerrilla movements also points to the dramatic changes in the Peruvian polity during the 1970s. As a result of the military government's agrarian reform, traditional political elites left the rural highlands, and thus the repressive capacity of the state was reduced. As Skocpol points out, this is a key factor in the success of revolutionary movements.[82] At the same time, in the pattern most explicitly described by Migdal, various new groups sought to mobilize the peasantry amid considerable official revolutionary rhetoric.[83] One of these groups was Sendero.

A. Peru's Guerrillas of the 1960s[84]

Peru's revolutionary activists of the early 1960s were naive and impatient. Generally of middle- to upper-class origin, and from the cities,

[81] Popkin (fn. 1), 252-66; Migdal (fn. 1), 226-56.
[82] Skocpol (fn. 1), 115-17.
[83] Migdal (fn. 1), 193-225.
[84] For overviews of the 1960s Peruvian guerrilla movements, see Richard Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971), 307-393; David Chaplin, "Peru's Postponed Revolution," *World Politics* 20 (April 1968), 393-420; Howard Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975); and Wesley W. Craig, Jr., "Peru: The Peasant Movement of La Convención," in Henry A. Landsberger, ed., *Latin American Peasant Movements* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), 274-96.

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these guerrillas had been persuaded by the example of the 1959 Cuban revolution that they could mobilize the Andean peasantry relatively quickly and easily. Between 1961 and 1965, various revolutionaries were active in different parts of Peru's central and southern mountains and jungle fringe. Some—most prominently Hugo Blanco—worked to strengthen peasant unions and to spur invasions of *hacienda* lands; others engaged in guerrilla warfare. In neither circumstance were the revolutionaries able to gain the peasants' trust or to organize effective movements.

Hugo Blanco was unable to radicalize the peasants successfully. In the early 1960s, land reform was an attractive alternative to revolution. The Peruvian peasants' primary goal was to pressure the newly elected, professedly reformist Belaúnde government to institute an ambitious land reform program. In cases where peasants invaded estates, they did so in order to attempt their own reform, *de facto* style, not to spark bloody conflagration. Hugo Blanco was gradually perceived as too radical by the bulk of his peasant union.

The guerrilla fighters were almost totally unsuccessful in recruiting highlands peasants to their cause. They did not prepare for a struggle. Nor did they establish a political base, or weigh the risks. In particular, they overlooked the differences between the Cuban *sierra maestra* and the Peruvian highlands. The Peruvian mountains are quite bare. So the roving, undisguised, unprotected guerrilla bands were readily spotted by the aerial surveillance of the authorities. When the guerrillas sought refuge in the jungle, they were even more quickly detected, as their physical appearance was radically different from that of the jungle peoples. Among their few recruits were a number of jungle Indians, some of whom proved disloyal, defecting and informing on the guerrilla leaders. The military defeated the guerrillas in about two years; several thousand people were arrested and about five hundred were killed.[85]

B. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF PERU'S AGRARIAN REFORM

The guerrilla movement of the early 1960s did affect the subsequent course of events in Peru. In particular, it spurred the military to carry out the agrarian reform program. Although agrarian reform brought few economic changes for most of Peru's highlands peasantry, the political changes were dramatic.

First, political authorities virtually absented themselves from the more

[85] There are no official statistics. My figures are estimates based on interviews with various individuals who were familiar with the region at the time, including General Edgardo Marcado Jarrín, a leader in the military government.

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remote highlands regions. In the 1960s, the *hacendados'* professional staff had closely monitored the political activities on the estates and often contiguous areas as well, prohibiting access to would-be peasant organizers.[86] In sharp contrast to the Mexican and most other Latin American reformist and revolutionary governments, the Velasco regime failed to establish new political institutions in the countryside; no new set of political authorities assumed the traditional intelligence role of the *hacienda* staff.

Why did the military government fail in this important task?[87] Not for lack of effort: in mid-1971, with great fanfare, the "social mobilization" agency, SINAMOS, was launched. In many respects, SINAMOS was to have fulfilled the traditional role of the pro-government political party; yet, it survived for only a few years. The reasons for the failure of the military government's political plan are various and complex and cannot be fully described here. Briefly, the government was wracked by ideological differences among top officers, some of whom sought a progressive, even Marxist, social democracy for Peru, while others sought a staunchly anti-Communist, corporatist regime. Since the Peruvian military was on poor terms with most civilian political leaders, patterns of collaboration were uneven. These differences in elite political circles were reflected in ideological and organizational confusion at the grassroots, including Ayacucho.[88] President Velasco, who might have resolved these differences, fell ill in early 1973 and was not up to the numerous challenges before him. Perhaps most important, by 1976 Peru was in the midst of a grave economic crisis, and resources were no longer available for political organizations, especially those in the countryside.

While the government did not succeed in mobilizing the peasantry, other political groups were able to operate more effectively in the highlands. Until about 1976, the political climate was progressive, with the government professing its revolutionary character. Two peasant organizations were active in the highlands: the government-sponsored CNA (National Agrarian Confederation) and the Marxist CCP (Peruvian Peasant Confederation).

Both the CNA and the CCP became large and vigorous during the 1970s.[89] The CNA claimed to have about 23 percent of Peru's peasants,

[86] See especially Julio Cotler, "Traditional Haciendas and Communities in a Context of Political Mobilization in Peru," in Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ed., *Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor, 1970), 533-58.

[87] On the political problems of the Velasco regime, see, among other volumes, Cynthia McClintock and Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 209-346.

[88] Palmer (fn. 19), 180-228.

[89] On the CNA, see McClintock (fn. 5), 259-84. On the CCP, see Howard Handelman,

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and roughly 19 percent of Ayacucho's, as members. These figures are almost certainly exaggerated, but the CNA did raise the peasants' concerns in official and nonofficial circles. At numerous meetings, CNA leaders demanded acceleration of the agrarian reform, admission of more temporary workers to cooperative membership, higher prices for agricultural products, and other steps.

The Marxist CCP, which was founded in 1947, greatly increased its ranks and activities during the 1970s. Membership figures are not available. We do know, however, that the CCP played a key role in peasant mobilizations in Piura, and—especially relevant here—in the land invasions in the Andahuaylas province of Apurímac that is now under Senderista influence.

Southern highlands peasants gradually became more politicized and more radical. In the early 1960s, the Marxist parties had been minute; they did not win more than 6.5 percent of the vote in any southern highlands department in either the 1962 or the 1963 election.[90] As demonstrated in Table 1, the Marxist vote in the 1978 Constituent Assembly election had reached almost 40 percent in several southern highlands departments. The table also indicates, however, that the Marxist vote declined between 1978 and 1980. Although the decline reflected primarily a strong preference for Acción Popular over APRA in a contest essentially between these two parties, some voters were disillusioned with the Marxist parties.[91] The left had been relatively ineffectual in the Constituent Assembly, and it was badly factionalized. To many citizens, the left seemed just another group of ambitious and quarrelsome politicians, wasting their time on partisan infighting instead of taking concrete steps to help the disadvantaged.

In short, by the early 1980s peasants had become more politicized than they had been a decade earlier. They were prepared to examine their lot critically. As we have seen, they tended to identify the government as a major culprit. At the same time, the conventional alternatives to the current administration had been exhausted. Highlands peasants had pinned their hopes first on land reform, only to find that the reform barely benefited them materially; then, they had hoped the Marxist parties and the new democratic government would improve

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"Peasants, Landlords and Bureaucrats: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Peru," *American Universities Field Staff Reports*, No. 1 (1981). CNA membership figures are from CNA, "CNA: Información Básica" [CNA: Basic information] mimeo. (Lima: SINAMOS, 1975), 4.

[90] Larson and Bergman (fn. 61), 382-83.

[91] Sandra L. Woy-Hazleton, "The Return of Partisan Politics in Peru," in Stephen M. Gorman, ed., *Post-Revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982), 50-56.

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their lot, only to see their situation worsen. Some peasants were thus ready to listen to the appeals of Sendero Luminoso.

C. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITIES OF SENDERO LUMINOSO[92]

In tailoring its strategies to the peasants' concerns about personal security and economic survival, Sendero has been a much more calculating guerrilla organization than its predecessors. The movement has reduced its risks in various ways. Most Senderista militants are indigenous to the region and thus do not stand out physically from the rest of the population. Also, members' identities are carefully concealed. All members use aliases, and during terrorist activities they are masked with large woolen hoods. Few Senderistas know more than four others: each guerrilla cell has a maximum of five members; one is the leader, joining the committee at the next higher level.

Sendero has also reduced risks to the peasantry by restricting the presence of governmental authorities in the Ayacucho region. As early as the 1970s, officials who sought to enter Senderista territory were shot.[93] Since 1980, Sendero has targeted civilian authorities assiduously. Between 1980 and August 1983, eighteen civilian officials were assassinated, and many more wounded or threatened.[94] As a result, virtually none are left in the area.

Sendero has provided significant benefits to its supporters. Of course, it promised a better life. But the movement has also taken action—violent action—to benefit the peasants materially. After blacklisting relatively well-to-do landowners, shopkeepers, and intermediaries, and either killing them or causing them to flee, Sendero distributed their property among villagers, and cancelled debts to them. To recruits, Sendero has offered basic subsistence (probably possible as a result of Sendero's economic levies on the drug trade). Sendero's terrorist actions are also apparently perceived as daring by some Sendero recruits, a disproportionate number of whom are mere adolescents.

Since January 1983, with the onset of the government's counterinsurgency offensive, the political cost-benefit equation has blurred somewhat.[95] Sympathy for Sendero has become much more dangerous. The toll of the struggle has mounted. By early 1984, the government admitted that about 3,500 people had been killed; 1,500 "disappeared"; and 4,000 had been arrested. Although the government reports most of the dead

[92] See the works cited in fn. 8.
[93] Palmer (fn. 19), 3.
[94] DESCO, *Resumen Semanal* 6, August 19-25, 1983, p. 3.
[95] See *The Andean Report* 10 (March and May 1984), 46-53 and 85-87, respectively. For victim tolls, see especially *Latin American Regional Reports, Andean Group* (fn. 41), 6.

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as Senderista militants, it is known that villages considered sympathetic to Sendero were raided and even bombed; Amnesty International and other independent observers believe that most of the dead were civilians.

Sendero's own actions during this period may have alienated the peasants. It has been reported that Sendero became more ruthless and wanton in its attacks, and that the guerrillas tried to reduce agricultural production and to stop weekly markets. Probably most important, Sendero was unable to protect its peasant allies from counterinsurgency offensives; when Ayacucho's pro-Senderista villages were assaulted, the guerrilla leaders fled elsewhere. At the same time, Sendero's ranks have become less disciplined and coordinated, and may even have been infiltrated by "pseudo-Sendero" criminals.

Yet, it does not appear that the security forces won many peasants to their side during 1983.[96] As we have seen, the subsistence crisis in the southern highlands was worsening at this time, and peasants were especially angry at the government. Moreover, the behavior of Peru's security forces in Ayacucho, like the behavior of most militaries amid such conflicts, was generally reported to be poor. The counterinsurgency personnel were regarded by many as arbitrary, brutal, and corrupt. While the security forces did attract some peasants to their side—most clearly, the Iquichanos—economic inducements were rumored to be of considerable importance to the peasants' decisions.

VII. Conclusion

As we have seen, various factors have been important to the emergence of Sendero Luminoso in Peru. The *sine-qua-non* element has been the subsistence crisis in the country's southern highlands during the early 1980s. The strong correlation between the regions where there has been a threat to subsistence and Senderista strongholds provides new evidence for the arguments of James Scott in the scholarly controversy on the significance of hunger to peasant revolt.

The Sendero case also provides new evidence relevant to the controversies about the type of agrarian structure that is most conducive to peasant movements. Rural smallholders who are not particularly active in the market economy or nonagricultural networks have been Sendero's primary peasant base. In addition, the Ayacucho area is especially advantageous to revolutionaries because it is relatively inaccessible and

[96] See *The Andean Report* (fn. 95); also, on aerial bombing, see DESCO, *Resumen Semanal* 6, December 23-29, 1983, p. 3; on material inducements to Iquichano villages, see Philip Bennett, "Ayachucho's Quiet War," *The Lima Times*, February 4, 1983.

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because it has a university (many of whose students are currently destined for unemployment).

Sendero emerged in Peru *after* a sweeping agrarian reform, and this fact is one of the most striking aspects of the Peruvian experience. The critical fault of the reform was that it did little for Peru's poorer highlands peasantry, and especially the peasantry of Ayacucho. The dualism of Peruvian and other Latin American agrarian structures—which is much more pronounced now than it was some fifty years ago—is an almost insurmountable obstacle to the implementation of a truly egalitarian agrarian reform.[97] On the other hand, the reform did help large numbers of Peru's coastal peasants; their relative prosperity and confidence in the political process are probably key factors in their opposition to Sendero.

Although the agrarian reform did not significantly improve the lot of the highlands peasants, it set the stage for their politicization and radicalization. The military government had promised even more strongly than previous administrations that it would provide help; when it failed to do so, intense disillusionment was the predictable result. In contrast to that of most other Latin American governments, the Peruvian military was too uncertain and divided on the question of a correct political plan to consolidate its own institutions in the highlands—institutions that might have noted and mediated the rising peasant unrest.

The importance of the subsistence crisis to the southern highlands peasant movement suggests that more favorable policies might well have been the government's best approach to the peasant's discontent. In fact, there is considerable consensus among analysts of Peru that certain policies could make a real difference to the highlands peasantry. If government policies can be a factor in exacerbating peasant poverty (as has been the case in recent years for the highlands of Peru), they can also be a factor in ameliorating it.

In the Third-World countries of Latin America, successful revolutionary movements have been broad-based and ideologically tolerant. Sendero is not such a movement. It is unlikely that Sendero will attract Peru's coastal peasants and urban citizens, most of whom have attained Third-World standards of living. It is thus also unlikely that Sendero will actually gain power.

In Peru's Fourth-World regions such as Ayacucho, however, where

[97] This point is elaborated for Peru and other Latin American countries in Alain de Janvry, *The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

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the peasants' rage and despair are intense, Sendero or similar groups could maintain high levels of violence for many years. Peru's future political course may follow that of Colombia: a government that is civilian, but not very democratic in the full sense of the term, confronting virtually constant revolutionary and criminal violence.

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DISAFFECTION AND DISSENT IN EAST GERMANY

BY PEDRO RAMET

COMMUNISM traces deviance, disaffection, and dissent alike to alienation and presocialist forms of consciousness. Insofar as the building of communism brings about an end to exploitation and alienation, deviance, disaffection, and dissent should disappear with them. The persistence of disaffection and articulate dissent, or of crime, delinquency, and social deviance generally, represents a failure of socialization—a failure, thus, of the system. Communist regimes are anxious, therefore, to deny the existence of crime, to expel dissenters, and to curb social deviance. Dissent and deviance are troubling in yet another respect. Insofar as Marxism aspires to eliminate social conflict and traces it to differences in social or class interest, dissent and deviance may be taken to reflect the persistence of differences in perceived interest, whether "objectively" rooted in class differences or not.

Dissent is therefore a central issue for communist systems and has accordingly been amply discussed in Western scholarship. Disaffection, as an analytical category, has been far less amply treated,[1] though, as I shall argue, it is as great a concern to communist regimes as is dissent. We may begin by drawing distinctions among the chief terms at issue. *Dissatisfaction*, treated technically, may be seen as discontent with the way in which certain parts of the system operate or with certain policies of the regime, without the legitimacy or even the optimality of the

[1] Relevant studies include: Zygmunt Bauman, "Social dissent in the East European political system," *Archives Européenes de Sociologie* 12 (No. 1, 1971); Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977); Walter D. Connor, "Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?" *Problems of Communism* 29 (January-February 1980); Walter D. Connor, "Social Change and Stability in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* 26 (November-December 1977); Andrzej Korbonski, "Conformity and Dissent in Eastern Europe," paper presented at the Second World Congress of Soviet and East European Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, October 1980; Alfred G. Meyer, "Political Change through Civil Disobedience in the USSR and Eastern Europe," in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Political and Legal Obligation* 12: Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy (New York: Atherton Press, 1970); and Peter Veres, "Alienation: A Hungarian View," *East Europe* 14 (March 1965). Disaffection, as treated here, is a specific type of cognitive dissonance. In this connection, the general literature on this theory is also relevant, in particular: Elliot Aronson, "The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Current Perspective," in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Psychology* (New York: Academic Press, 1969), 1-34; Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957); and Leon Festinger, ed., *Conflict, Decision and Dissonance* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964).

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system ever necessarily being called into question. Hence, for example, when East Germany ran short of basic foodstuffs in late 1982, workers in Dresden went on strike and shouted, "We demand better supplies! We want meat and vegetables!"[2] The workers were clearly dissatisfied, and clearly blamed the authorities, but their protest, although of political importance, could scarcely be called "dissent."

By contrast, *disaffection* may be defined as discontent with the system itself without necessarily entailing a belief in one's ability to change the system, but possibly being expressed in social nonconformism or deviance. The pilferage of socialist property in Czechoslovakia has been a highly popular form of protest since the establishment of the communist regime there;[3] it reflects more than mere dissatisfaction, for pilferage is intended as a form of revenge against the system itself. Still, such activity would not ordinarily qualify as dissent.

Finally, there is *dissent* itself, which may be defined as discontent with the system, charged by belief in one's ability to effect change, however gradual or however slight, and implying an external standard by which the system's performance is evaluated. The external standard is, of course, the heart of the matter and constitutes the core of the threat posed by dissenters to communist regimes. Obviously, all dissenters are disaffected and all disaffected are dissatisfied; but not all those dissatisfied are disaffected and not all those who qualify as disaffected are dissenters.

There are several reasons for broadening our focus to include not merely dissent but also disaffection: first, disaffection is the seedbed from which dissent sprouts; second, it is both a broader and a more accurate measure of the problems, tensions, and dilemmas of a society; third, both dissenting disaffection and nondissenting disaffection can have political consequences—the latter insofar as it engenders apathy, antisocial attitudes and behavior, and antiregime sympathies; and fourth, disaffection is a more useful measure than dissent of the failure or limits of political socialization, because it embraces a much larger portion of the population.

Disaffection may be expressed in different ways. Those disaffected may, of course, assert their potency to effect change and adopt a posture of dissent. Alternatively, they may conclude that they are unable to effect change in society and may resign themselves in a spirit of studied apathy. Finally, there is a middle ground in which they may tune out the regime

[2] *Bild* (Hamburg), November 20, 1982, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), November 23, 1982.

[3] Otto Ulč, "Social Deviance in Czechoslovakia," in Ivan Volgyes, ed., *Social Deviance in Eastern Europe* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), 28.

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and drop out, becoming, in some sense, deviant. Deviants, in turn, may retreat into a counterculture (such as punk rock), which will in turn sustain their deviance and reinforce their disaffection. Social deviance may, thus, reflect a fundamental rejection of the dominant values of the society—in this case, the official political culture of Marxism-Leninism—and East Germany's Socialist Unity Party (S.E.D.) accordingly views social deviance with consternation. It is for this reason that, as Paul Shapiro has noted, communist regimes treat dissenters as deviants;[4] it is equally true that communist regimes tend to treat deviants as potential dissenters.

There are four basic sources of disaffection in the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) today: (1) As resocialization fails, the population becomes susceptible to alternative cultures (whether punk rock or Christian faith) that provide value systems and points of reference independent of regime direction. These alternative cultures crystallize doubts about the system and reinforce disaffection by providing independent criteria for assessing the system. (2) Specific policy shortcomings, insofar as they are viewed as both systemic and endemic to the system, may spark disaffection and dissent. The militarization of East German education, persistent abuses of human rights, environmental problems, women's rights, and lingering discontent among the small Slavic Sorb population may be grouped in this class. (3) Marxism itself may be a stimulus to disaffection and dissent, as socialization instills values that the regime flouts. The political radicalism of Robert Havemann and Rudolf Bahro, for example, stemmed from their acceptance of Marxist premises. And (4) the incipient economic erosion of the "East German economic miracle"[5]—new to the G.D.R.—may result in growing discontent with the regime's capacity to "deliver."

These sources are of different character, weight, and importance. Categories 1 (the failure of resocialization) and 3 (the relative success in instilling new values) are attitudinal. The former affects members of society from diverse sectors, the latter becomes articulate only in the hands of intellectuals. The other two sources reflect regime performance, that is, specific policy shortcomings (category 2) and stagnation or erosion in economic performance (category 4). Policy shortcomings may affect only a particular group within East German society (e.g., Sorbs) or may have a wider impact (though the environmentalist case reminds us that wider impact does not necessarily translate into wider concern). The

[4] Paul H. Shapiro, "Social Deviance in Eastern Europe: On Understanding the Problem," in Volgyes (fn. 3), 15.

[5] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 23 and 24, 1983.

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effects of economic performance, on the other hand, are felt by the entire spectrum of society and thus have the capacity to excite other latent sources of disaffection—as the Polish case shows quite clearly. Indeed, although any of these sources can play a catalytic role, the economic factor is perhaps the most potent. Hence, by converse logic, the regime has hoped to "buy" political conformity.

Discussion of these several sources of disaffection invites a further observation. Insofar as we may find it useful to describe a society as passing through sequential or overlapping crises of identity, legitimacy, participation, distribution, and penetration,[6] and, under certain conditions, to speak of a reversal of the developmental process and the onset of political decay, we may expect to find that the strength and importance of any given source of disaffection—as a category, and not merely in terms of specific instances—will vary from phase to phase, and that these categories will play different roles in different crises. Certain kinds of disaffection may be more easily contained in certain developmental phases, and more apt to be translated into dissent in others. For the regime, this may signify that policy invariability, which communist parties perfervidly claim to practice, may be worse than an illusion: it may be a positive weakness.

I propose to probe each of these sources of disaffection, to come to a preliminary assessment of the pervasiveness, depth, and importance of disaffection in each of these categories, to examine the extent to which disaffection has translated itself into dissent, and to estimate the untapped sources of dissent in each category of disaffection. The last of these four tasks will necessarily involve a degree of speculation. Finally, I shall argue that, far from leading to the transcending of alienation and the extirpation of disaffection, communist socialization and policy in East Germany have multiplied the sources of disaffection and deepened the potential for dissent.

The Failure of Socialization

Communist systems may be understood, in part, as political engines for cultural transformation and resocialization. The dominant themes of East German resocialization have been the superiority of socialism, the identification of socialism with peace, the need for unity among "progressive" forces, antinationalism, secularization, and anti-individualism.[7] Connected with the themes of both socialist superiority and

[6] See Leonard Binder, "Crises of Political Development," in Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 3-72.

[7] See Ivan Volgyes, "Political Socialization in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* 23 (January-February 1974), 52.

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antinationalism was the now more or less abandoned effort to instill a concept of a "socialist German nationality" distinct from "bourgeois German nationality," linked to the broader policy of *Abgrenzung*.[8]

The steady erosion in the numerical strength of the Christian churches may be counted as a kind of "success" for S.E.D. policy, and some Western scholars have concluded that East Germans and West Germans are drifting apart in national consciousness.[9] Even these "successes," however, are compromised by the very tangible resilience of the Evangelical church today and its active role in the independent peace movement,[10] and by continuing signs of identification among East and West Germans, as well as by continuing contacts between citizens of the two Germanys—most recently between the anti-establishment Green Party of West Germany and anti-establishment pacifists in East Germany. Moreover, in a survey authorized by the East German regime, young people overwhelmingly indicated that they view themselves as Germans first and only secondly as citizens of the G.D.R.[11]

In other spheres of the S.E.D.'s resocialization program, the limits are even more tangible. The regime has tried to foster a kind of *Systemstreue,* but has failed to win the trust of the population or even, by some accounts, of the bureaucrats themselves, and the political sympathies of the population are said to lie with social-democratic ideas such as those propagated by the West German Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.). The regime has also tried to foster a sense of collective responsibility and collective ethic and to erode the basis for individualism. Yet, ironically, individualism has never flourished in Eastern Germany as much as today, whether one looks to the withdrawal and consumerism of the working and middle classes, or to the rejectionism and headlong assertive individualism of those youths caught up in the East German rock scene.[12]

The persistent flow of disaffected East Germans to the West—including, most recently, the request for political asylum in West Germany

[8] See Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., "Political Socialization in Divided Germany," *Journal of International Affairs* 27 (No. 2, 1973), 188, 192, 196.

[9] Otto Luchterhandt, *Die Gegenwartslage der Evangelischen Kirche in der DDR* [The present situation of the Evangelical Church in the GDR] (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1982), 3; Ernst Alfred Jauch, "Katholiken in der DDR" [Catholics in the GDR], *Kirche in Not* 26 (1978), 66-67; and Kurt Sontheimer and Wilhelm Bleek, *The Government and Politics of East Germany*, trans. by Ursula Price (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1975), 189.

[10] See Reinhard Henkys, "Kirche in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," in Paul Lendvai, ed., *Religionsfreiheit und Menschenrechte* [Freedom of religion and human rights] (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1983), 165-179; and Pedro Ramet, "Church and Peace in the GDR," in *Problems of Communism* 33 (July/August 1984).

[11] Werner Volkmer, "East Germany: Dissenting Views during the Last Decade," in Rudolf L. Tökes, ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1979), 114-115.

[12] "Interview with Robert Havemann," trans. by Jack Zipes in *New German Critique*, No. 15 (Fall 1978), 41-42, 45; and Gunter Minnerup, "East Germany's Frozen Revolution," *New Left Review*, No. 132 (March-April 1982), 27-28.

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by five relatives of East German Premier Willi Stoph[13]—the outspoken remonstrations by articulate East German intellectuals such as Wolfgang Harich, Robert Havemann, and Rudolf Bahro, and the continued incarceration of some 7,000 political prisoners in the G.D.R.[14] are probably the best-known reflections of the limitations of East Germany's resocialization efforts. Equally troubling to the S.E.D. has been its inability to control crime. In Marxist-Leninist thinking, crime reflects social alienation, which is possible only in pluralist societies ("capitalism") or among persons retaining pluralist ideas ("bourgeois vestiges"). Unfortunately for adherents of this theory, crime has been most prevalent among precisely that group, that is, the youth, which has been nurtured entirely under the socialist system, and after the crime rate had risen for the fifth straight year in 1973, the S.E.D. stopped publishing crime statistics.[15] Alcoholism has remained a persistent problem (linked with 30 to 32 percent of violent crimes), and G.D.R. citizens have been more and more frequently beaten up by young "rowdies" for no reason whatsoever. By spring 1980, the crime level was so high that G.D.R. authorities broke with their habit of describing it as negligible and admitted that East German crime was rising tangibly.[16]

But whereas crime, alcoholism, and rowdyism represent inchoate forms of disaffection and reflect failures of socialization in its *social* aspect, antiregime activity represents a more focused and more dangerous strain of disaffection and reflects failures of socialization in its *political* aspect. In mid-1977, for instance, several hundred East German youths burned the blue shirts of the youth league (Free German Youth) in Pankow. Later, in October 1977, a rock concert degenerated into an anti-Soviet demonstration when eight people became trapped in a ventilation shaft. The crowd (some 500 youths) shouted "Russians get out!" and "Germany awake!" (*Deutschland erwache!*—an old Nazi slogan). Police used water cannons and batons to suppress the youth.[17]

A decade ago, a Western observer could write that East German youth could no longer conceive of any alternative to the system established by the S.E.D.[18] More recently, however, the generational gap in

[13] *New York Times*, February 26, 1984. See also *Los Angeles Times*, February 19, 1983; *Washington Post*, January 21 and 28, 1984; and *Kanada Kurier* (Vancouver), February 2, 1984.

[14] Some 83 political prisoners were released in December 1983. See *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, December 6, 1983, and *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, January 27, 1984.

[15] Hans-Jürgen Grasemann, "Zwischen Ideologie und Realität: Jugendkriminalität in der DDR," [Between ideology and reality: Criminality of youth in the GDR] *Deutsche Studien* 14 (December 1976), 368-369.

[16] By 9 percent in the 1977/1978 period: *Ibid.*, 371; *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, July 10, 1973, and *New York Times*, May 6, 1980.

[17] *The Times* (London), October 10, 1977.

[18] Herbert Prauss, "Jugend in der DDR" [Youth in the GDR], *Kirche in Not* 21 (1973), 81.

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the G.D.R. has acquired acute political overtones, and the party itself admits that university students are fed up with the steady doses of required ideological training.[19] Three important catalysts of the estrangement of the youth may be mentioned—namely, the rock counterculture, the militarization of society spawned by the S.E.D., and the consequent attraction of the Christian churches as alternative foci of institutional loyalty.

Rock music represents a minatory influence in several ways. First, rock music as a musical form tends to be hard driving and given to half-resolved or even unresolved dissonances.

> Stirring from the sixteenth century on was a desire for dissonances; an expression of the suffering, simultaneously autonomous and unfree subject, it was forced back time and again, down to the days of *Salome, Elektra*, and the atonal Schönberg, and mostly, as in Mozart's 'Musical Joke', was permitted satisfaction only in disguise, as humorous parody.[20]

Communist regimes, on the other hand, have shown a distinct preference for music falling into one of two categories—either triumphant, "progressive," programmatic music, or mindless, nonevocatory, "harmless" music. As a musical form, rock has been generally considered *harmful* by East European communist elites.

Second, rock lyrics have displayed a consistent and unmitigated *subjectivity*, refusing to cater to political parties or programs (East Germany's Dean Reed being an uncommon exception to this rule). As a result, rock lyrics have tended to be either egocentric or critical of social policy. Indeed, one of the roots of East German pacifism is the "make love not war" ethic propagated in the rock counterculture associated with Bob Dylan, Donovan, and Joan Baez in the late 1960s. Even then the regime worried about the effects of their protest songs, and dance clubs that played too much protest music were reprimanded. Indigenous groups began to imitate the protest genre, however, and in 1965, at a performance of the Leipzig rock group "Butlers," youths clashed with police, with several youths being arrested.[21]

Third, the S.E.D. has feared that rock music, and perhaps especially disco music, reinforces tendencies toward individualism, by accentuating private feelings and dramatizing individual perceptions. Rather than concentrating on relations between the sexes, disco music should be programmed to "contribute . . . to the development of socialist person-

[19] *Die Zeit*, June 17, 1983, and *Forum* (East Berlin, December 1982), 3, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service [JPRS], *East Europe Report*, No. 83252 (April 13, 1983).

[20] Theodor W. Adorno, *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, trans. by E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), 221.

[21] Klaus Ehring and Martin Dallwitz, *Schwerter zu Pflugscharen* [Swords into ploughshares] (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1982), 90-92.

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alities by linking entertainment, sociability, topical information and education."[22]

In the early 1970s, with Erich Honecker's accession to power and the G.D.R.'s eventual garnering of diplomatic recognition from most states in the international community, the hope arose among East German youth that the authorities would at last try to live up to their high-sounding ideals. In reflection of this hope, East German rock groups, such as the Renft Combo, became bolder in their lyrics. The regime, however, was not disposed to tolerate a proliferation of protest, even if "disguised" as musical diversion, and banned the Renft Combo in 1974. The banning of the Renft Combo, a prominent rock group in its time, was widely interpreted to signify that rock groups should eschew "negative" political themes. The subsequent expulsion of singer Wolf Biermann in 1976 seemed to confirm the accuracy of this interpretation.

Faced with the uncomfortable fact that young people were gravitating toward rock music and thus, that regime hostility to rock music would only deepen the disaffection of youth, the S.E.D. decided, in 1976, to loosen up strictures on dance clubs and to allow the establishment of carefully monitored discotheques. Hence, under the guidance of the Ministry of Culture, "disco moderators" receive training in ideology, and district academies conduct disco workshops. The regime continues to watch East German rock groups closely, fearing not merely insidious political criticism but also the "moral decay" promoted by subjective individualism and ostentatious vulgarity. Thus, in March 1983, the East German cultural journal *Sonntag* criticized the "vulgar" lyrics of certain rock groups in the G.D.R., noting that some rock musicians seem to believe that the more vulgar their lyrics are, the better.[23] This apprehensive posture is balanced by a strategy of trying to channel rock music away from opposition; in an expression of this strategy, the Free German Youth organization organized a massive rock festival attended by some 4,000 youths in October 1983.[24]

Recently, punk counterculture has also penetrated the G.D.R., and today there is a thriving punk rock scene with adherents in all the major East German cities. In its more consistent and articulate strains, punk is a species of cultural nihilism, repudiating as a whole all establishment values: the dissident dimension here is obvious. But even in its less

[22] From the East Berlin magazine *Melodie und Rhythmus*; quoted in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, September 15, 1982, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, No. 81941 (October 7, 1982).

[23] *Iwe-Tagesdienst* (Bonn, March 26, 1983), trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, No. 83359 (April 28, 1983).

[24] *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), October 28, 1983.

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articulate strains, punk culture is unmistakenly an anti-establishment pose in which, in the East German context, Marxism-Leninism, the S.E.D., and the entire program of resocialization are rejected as foolish irrelevancies at best. This attitude is aptly captured in the slogan with which East German "punkers" have taken to adorning public buildings—"*legal, illegal, scheissegal.*"[25] The regime is equally clear about its attitude toward the punk counterculture, which it describes as "unmitigatedly hostile" to its program.[26] Students who come to school with multicolored hair and punk fashions are punished by having critical entries made in their permanent academic files; that these entries are likely to block future professional advancement is obvious. The East German security police (colloquially known as the *Stasi*) have likewise been mobilized against punk adherents; they broke up punk gatherings of more than 100 persons in Leipzig in March 1981 and of some 400 to 500 punkers in July 1982, again in Leipzig.[27]

Cultural disaffection is the keynote of punk. A nineteen-year-old East German punker put it this way: "Philistinism turns me off. I am against Germanness. The German is, for me, a *petit bourgeois* and a philistine by nature. I am bothered by this whole pretense, by this mask which is there but which no one removes."[28] Disaffection with "this whole pretense" is the substratum underlying punk nihilism and, although it at present constitutes a drop-out mentality, it could at some future time be catalyzed into more active dissent. In either case, this species of disaffection obstructs the resocialization program and hinders regime efforts to fashion a "new communist man and woman."

Pacifism and the Churches

As alternative social institutions with alternative value systems, the churches remain potent stimuli of nonsocialist thinking and ideas, sharpening the cognitive dissonance between normative standards and the socialist reality, and thus stimulating disaffection from the communist system. State Secretary for Religious Affairs Klaus Gysi has recognized this and noted, in 1981, that "as long as the Church remains a Church, it must be independent. We are of the opinion that it will, in this fashion, never be fully integrated in our society as a social force."[29] It cannot be

[25] Euphemistically translated: "legal, illegal, all the same." All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted.
[26] Quoted in *Der Spiegel*, January 3, 1983, p. 44.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 122.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 131.
[29] Quoted in Henkys (fn. 10), 176.

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fully integrated because it is alien to communism and because church and party offer competing value systems. The churches have also been recalcitrant when it comes to specific desiderata of S.E.D. religious policy. Thus, although the regime hoped at one time to reduce the churches to carrying out liturgical functions, neither the Evangelical church nor the Catholic church has been willing to accept this role.[30] Through the mouthpiece of the East Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.), the regime has urged that "we Christian Democrats can ... only fulfill our social obligation if we penetrate even deeper into Marxism-Leninism and use the resulting insights—regardless of the ineffaceable differences between Christian faith and atheism—as the instrument of our social work."[31] Neither church has embraced this approach. Finally, the regime has defined the terms of policy so that, *by definition*, the regime is a peace movement, the only pacifism worthy of the name is that which supports the regime, critical distance is disloyalty, and disaffection is the breeding ground of opposition. Instead of accepting the practice of "policy by definition," the Evangelical church has, under the influence of the World Council of Churches, the Lutheran World Federation, and the Conference of European Churches, spoken out on the subject of peace with increasing frequency since 1968, and, although the government threatened, in 1981, to crack down unless the Evangelical church toned down its criticism and broke off contacts with West German Evangelicals, the church refused to comply and, on the contrary, became subsequently even more active in its engagement in public discussion of the theme of peace.[32] And, although the Catholic church's approach to the subject of pacifism has been far more low-key, the Catholic bishops did address the subject in a pastoral letter of January 2, 1983, condemning the militarization of East German life.[33]

Both the fledgling independent peace movement and church involvement in it must be traced to the steady militarization of East German society. From the beginning, the S.E.D. has held that pacifism under socialism is "objectively" antipacifism.[34] Since December 1, 1981, all G.D.R. citizens between ages 18 and 65 are obliged to participate in civil defense training exercises, which often involve whole sections of a city. Nursery school children are taught to sing songs about army life

[30] Luchterhandt (fn. 9) 68; and Jauch (fn. 9), 71, 73-74.

[31] Quoted in Luchterhandt (fn. 9), 66.

[32] *Ibid.*, 71-72; and "Notes on Church-State Relations," *Journal of Church and State* 23 (Winter 1981), 166.

[33] *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, January 4 and 7, 1983.

[34] See *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, February 1, 1962, as cited in Ehring and Dallwitz (fn. 21), 14-15.

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and to play martial games. In fourth grade, sports instructors introduce marching and military formation. In sixth and seventh grades, students take part in maneuvers organized by the Young Pioneer Organization in cooperation with officers of the National People's Army (N.V.A.): in sports classes, these students are trained in the use of hand grenades and run obstacle courses similar to those used in military basic training. In eighth grade, students begin special military sports exercises that include the firing of hand arms and hand grenades, rope climbing, first aid, and air defense. Since September 1978, ninth- and tenth-graders participate in formal "premilitary" training, which includes a two-week period of intensive training at the end of the school year. Since September 1, 1981, premilitary and ambulance training has also been obligatory for all eleventh-graders, with special twelve-day summer sessions.[35]

The accompanying sharpening of hostile stereotypes of the West provoked sharp reaction from Evangelical and Catholic clergy alike. In a series of sermons published in early 1982, for instance, Catholic Bishop Joachim Wancke of Erfurt criticized the overemphasis on defense and defense readiness and the habituation, in schools, of students to think in terms of *enemies*. Bishop Wancke also advocated the institution of a civil service alternative to military service—an idea increasingly popular among East Germany's disaffected.[36] Meanwhile, in April 1981, the "Church and Society" committee of the Evangelical church convoked a congress on the theme, "Peace Today," and invited all interested persons to attend, in order to bring together for the first time the previously isolated groups and individuals in the G.D.R. concerned with peace. Pacifist consciousness swelled, and between late 1981 and early 1982 small groups of pacifists appeared in many East German cities. In late 1981, young pacifists planned a peace demonstration to be held at the wreckage of the Frauenkirche in Dresden on the anniversary (on February 13, 1982) of the bombardment of Dresden. News of the demonstration spread by word of mouth ("*Buschfunk*"), and the church leadership in Saxony, fearing that the event could lead to open confrontation with the authorities, decided to co-opt the demonstration and to try to keep it "within limits." Although only one short notice appeared in a local newspaper, "*Buschfunk*" worked well enough to turn out some 5,000 youths from all over the country. Many others were prevented from

[35] *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, September 8, 1982, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, No. 81941 (October 7, 1982); and Ehring and Dallwitz (fn. 21), 20-25. See also Timothy Garton Ash, "Swords into Ploughshares: The Unofficial 'Peace Movement' and the Churches in East Germany," *Religion in Communist Lands* 11 (Winter 1983), 245-246.

[36] *Wiener Tagebuch* (October 1982), trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, No. 82210 (November 10, 1982).

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attending by police, who headed off many youths on their way to Dresden and who ordered some known pacifists to stay at home that day. At Dresden, speakers demanded the introduction of obligatory "peace education" in the schools, and in the months that followed, similar peace forums were held in Potsdam, Eisenach, and Burg (Spreewald), drawing in a total of more than 10,000 youths.[37]

The Evangelical church has sponsored various lectures, discussions, and seminars on peace throughout the country and has, for the past several years, sponsored a ten-day annual peace conference. It has called for arms negotiations in good faith, asked the Soviets to destroy some of their SS-20 missiles, and criticized the militarization of East German society. By April 1982, the regime decided that the emerging peace movement constituted a political opposition and banned the "swords into ploughshares" shoulder patch that had become the emblem of the movement. Far from buckling under, however, the peace movement established contacts with the anti-establishment Green Party of West Germany; by the end of 1983, the regime was bent on isolating and emasculating the pacifist groups. Well over a hundred East German pacifists were arrested during 1983, and many of these were summarily expelled from the country.[38]

Policy Problems and Disaffection

Earlier in this paper, five specific areas of policy problems were listed: the militarization of East German education and society, persistent abuses of human rights, environmental problems, women's rights, and discontent among the Sorbs. Disaffection with regime policy in these areas has spawned groups of anywhere from 5 to 100 persons in size, in various medium-sized towns and in all the larger cities. These groups lack both the formal structure of the Christian churches and the stable behavioral diversions of the disco and punk countercultures. They also lack, as a rule, an all-embracing *Weltanschauung*, and, in contrast to the disaffected analyzed under category 1 (failure of socialization), they tend to focus on more specific issues. There is, however, a grey area between categories 1 and 2 produced by the merging of some of these groups (specifically the environmental groups and some feminist groups) and the independent peace movement, as well as by the obvious fact that some of the disaffected in this category are active Christians. The impact

[37] Ehring and Dallwitz (fn. 21), 59, 70; and *Die Welt*, June 21, 1982.

[38] *Wall Street Journal*, June 22, 1983; *Facts on File*, July 1, 1983, p. 490; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 2, 1983 and January 4, 1984; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, October 24 and November 5, 1983.

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of the militarization of East German education has already been discussed above.

Human rights issues range from conscientious objection and the desire for alternative social service (beyond the construction brigade[39]) to demands for freedom of conscience, association, speech, and assembly, as spelled out in a pamphlet distributed in the G.D.R. in summer 1981. The authors of this pamphlet also called for the release of all political prisoners, a general amnesty, and free elections with free nomination of candidates and secret ballots. Human rights activist Dr. Werner Schädicke, a Leipzig physician, went to prison in 1974 for a six-year term for having written various letters and tracts calling on the regime to honor basic human rights, including the right to emigrate. Günter and Leni Prager, and Bernd and Gerdi Sobe similarly received prison terms for having transmitted information likely to tarnish the East German image abroad. The Sobes had written to the U.N. Secretary General and the U.N. Human Rights Commission about "serious violations of human rights in the GDR." In August 1980, Andreas Koburg received a four-year prison term in Potsdam for having asked the International Committee of the Red Cross to send a delegation to East Germany to inspect prison conditions. In a related case, Dr. Wilhelm Kock, whose concern for human rights in Poland had prompted him to send financial aid to the Polish independent trade union Solidarity, was imprisoned, as were other East Germans who expressed sympathy for Solidarity.[40] There are other examples, but these are sufficient to make the point that, aside from occasional church sermons and synodal statements, human rights activism in East Germany has been the work essentially of individuals and embryonic groups. Human rights activists have failed to institutionalize their dissident activity. They have failed to produce underground organizations akin to, for example, Moscow's now defunct Helsinki Watch Group. Since the translation of disaffection into dissent in this area remains, thus, a question of individuals, it does not appear likely to threaten the regime.

The situation of the Sorbs is a specific human rights issue. Following the model of Soviet nationalities policy, East German policy toward the Sorbs is supportive in some respects and antagonistic in others. A Sorbian cultural movement, the Domowina, was reestablished under regime

[39] The G.D.R. actually allows a limited number of conscientious objectors to serve in a uniformed construction brigade. But, since the brigade works largely on projects of military importance, some objectors have refused even this.

[40] Henry W. Degenhardt, *Political Dissent: An International Guide to Dissident, Extra-Parliamentary, Guerrilla and Illegal Political Movements* (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983), 16-17.

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auspices in 1945, but in the mid-1950s, under S.E.D. pressure, the Domowina endorsed industrialization and collectivization in Sorb-inhabited Lusatia—measures that were very unpopular among the Sorbs. As a result, the membership strength of the Domowina has waned steadily since then.[41] Despite the Sorbian-language instruction in kindergartens, in primary and secondary schools, vocational schools, and in business academies—supplemented by the Slavonic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the G.D.R. in Berlin, and the Sorbian Institute for Teacher Training and the Sorbian Ethnological Institute, both in Bautzen—the younger generations are increasingly becoming detached from their own Slavic heritage and are viewing themselves as immersed in a "German sea." The prize-winning Sorbian author Jurij Brezan captured some of the spirit of the dilemma in his book *Views and Insights*: "My literary bilingualism," he wrote there,

> —it seems to me very difficult to explain it. My mother tongue is Sorbian. I learned to speak it, the way one learns to speak it in the village, and to that purpose—as an option—a pitiful A-B-C, maybe an occasional dictation, but never an essay [to write]. Throughout my 14 years in school, the German language was a major subject: here I wrote a hundred essays, read a thousand books—Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Shakespeare, the Song of the Nibelungen, Cervantes, Zola, Tolstoy were all in German. . . . When I told my sisters stories, and soon after my friends as well, I related the stories in Sorbian. When I tried to write my first story, I wrote it in German. With the girl I loved I spoke Sorbian; when I wrote the first poem for her, I wrote it in German. The spoken word found sufficient room in my mother tongue. . . . The written word . . . could only be built on what I had read. . . .[42]

Interestingly enough, the combination of German cultural engulfment with a general toleration of Sorbian culture and heritage has produced, at least in one respect, an effect very similar among Sorbs to that produced by the civil rights repression among human rights activists—that is, atomization, a failure to organize, and a tendency to deal with the situation as individuals.

The situation is dramatically different with regard to environmental and feminist concerns—probably in part because these have been traditional concerns of pacifists over the years and have thus drawn strength

[41] Zelime Amen Ward, "Minority Politics in the German Democratic Republic: Problematics of Socialist Legitimacy and National Autonomy," in George Klein and Milan J. Reban, eds., *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, East European Monographs, 1981), 98, 101-102.

[42] Quoted in Peter Jokostra, "Ein Archipel von Sprachinseln: Bericht über die Literatur der sorbischen Minderheit in der DDR" [An archipelago of linguistic islands: Report on the literature of the Sorbian minority in the GDR], *Deutsche Studien* 15 (September 1977), 279.

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from the groundswell of pacifist sentiment in East Germany, and in part because environmentalism and feminism are "live" issues in West Germany, whereas human rights and Sorbian culture are not. Thus, contacts with West German "Greens" and other confrontations with the West German example (e.g., on television) can stimulate the former but not the latter (at least not in a straightforward manner).

The environmental issue is serious enough. Environmental destruction is said to be well advanced in five densely populated areas of the country, namely, Halle, Leipzig, Dresden, Karl Marx Stadt, and Berlin, and air pollution in Halle, Leipzig, and Zwickau is said to be more than twice the level of that in Chicago, Tokyo, or Düsseldorf. As in the case of the peace movement, Evangelical pastors have been acting as spokesmen for environmental concerns. In 1979, a regional synod at Mecklenburg-Schwerin held discussions on the environmental risks of nuclear power, and in some parishes environmental groups were formed. Since then, annual tree-planting and cycling events have figured in various parish programs.[43] The Rostock synod of the Evangelical church gave vocal expression to these concerns in early June 1983 and on June 5—the day the regime itself had designated as the "International Day of the Environment"—some 200 residents of Halle donned gas masks and rode bicycles through town to protest the pollutant Buna Chemical Works. The demonstrators were soon stopped and fined by security police, and five people, including the popular parson Lothar Rochau of Halle, were arrested.[44] There can be no doubt that in the case of environmental issues, disaffection has been translated into active dissent. Environmentalists demonstrate not merely against pollution but against the government planning that produces it. Moreover, the various environmental conferences (six regional conferences in the first six months of 1983) have taken place under the protection of the church and thus, implicitly, in opposition to the regime.

S.E.D. policy toward women, like its nationalities policy, has followed the Soviet model: in practice this has meant that economics rather than politics has dictated policy decisions. Hence, although the German Communist Party had demanded the legalization of abortion as early as 1931, it was not until 1972 that the S.E.D. legalized it. Similarly, the encouragement of women to enter the labor force and the consequent establishment of large numbers of day-care centers and kindergartens were

[43] *Der Spiegel*, July 25, 1983, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, No. 84155 (August 19, 1983).

[44] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 5, 1983, trans. in JPRS, *East Europe Report*, No. 84084 (August 10, 1983); and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, July 5, 1983. See also *Die Welt*, August 2, 1983.

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designed primarily to build the economy rather than to advance women's equality—and in fact, only 30 percent of the S.E.D. is female and only 12 percent of the members of the central committee of the S.E.D. are women.[45] Female participation in the work force has been critical to East German productivity, and since 1968 the East German constitution has proclaimed the duty as well as the right to work. Yet, although "East German women are not entirely happy with their lot,"[46] they have lacked an organization to represent their interests—unless, of course, the regime-controlled Democratic Women's Federation of Germany is counted as such. But as David Childs notes, the federation's main tasks are "to encourage more women to seek employment outside the home, to convince women of the correctness of the S.E.D's policies and to support the S.E.D./Soviet line in international organizations."[47]

For all of the continued gender inequality, especially when it comes to housework—a phenomenon scarcely unique to the G.D.R.—it took the extension of military conscription to women to mobilize them into political opposition. An unfavorable status quo was tolerable, but a regime-dictated change for the worse was unacceptable and catalyzed inchoate disaffection into active dissent. A group calling itself "G.D.R. Women for Peace," led by Bärbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe, was founded, basically to press for recognition of a right to female conscientious objection to service.[48] Further, in autumn 1982 several hundred East German women signed a petition addressed to S.E.D. General Secretary Erich Honecker protesting female conscription and emphasizing that military service would entail "entirely new duties" that would be "irreconcilable with the concept we have of ourselves." The letter added that the new law had nothing to do with equality since the signators repudiated "the abstractions of 'enemy' and 'adversary' " and systematic training in "the destruction of human beings."[49]

Clearly, disaffection in this second category has the potential of being translated into active dissent. But just as clearly, disaffection in category 2 is a *less* potent source of dissent than disaffection in category 1. Much

[45] Christel Sudau, "Women in the GDR," trans. by Biddy Martin, *New German Critique*, No. 13 (Winter 1978), 70-71; David Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 251; and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Ideology and Equality: The Status of Women in Eastern and Western Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 13 (January 1981), 459.

[46] Childs (fn. 45), 259.

[47] *Ibid.*, 252.

[48] *Armeerundschau* (April 1982), 55-56; and *Christian Science Monitor*, January 5, 1984. See also *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 6, 1984.

[49] Text of letter given in *Der Spiegel*, December 6, 1982, p. 117, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), December 7, 1982.

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of this has to do with the sheer dynamics of the situation. In category 1 there is a substratum of counterculture that provides a vantage point for an *active* orientation toward the system. Christians, like punkers, define their roles in the system on the basis of external criteria. In category 2, on the other hand, the genesis is more *reactive*: it is only because the regime carries out such and such a policy that individuals become disaffected and contemplate resistance. Because disaffection in this category is more narrowly focused and because it does not necessarily entail the application of articulated external criteria (such as the Christian moral code), it is both more apt to prove ephemeral and less potent a source of dissent, unless it becomes wedded to other sources of disaffection (as in the symbiosis of environmentalism and pacifism), or the regime provides a "spark" by tinkering with the status quo in a fashion viewed as unacceptable (as in the case of female conscription). On a final note here, it might be supposed that the church's role in support of pacifists and of environmentalists ought to be analytically comparable—that is, that these supportive activities ought not be listed in separate categories. But on the contrary, although the church's engagement with the peace issue is an organic dimension of its commitment to seeking alternatives to mass murder and violence, and thus a stance derivable from its core values, its support for the environmentalists seems to have a very different source, namely, the traditional role of pastors in representing the interests of their respective parishes and in helping them articulate those interests.

Marxism as a Stimulus of Dissent

Marxism-Leninism combines Young Hegelian methodology with a system of empirical and normative theories. The normative element is implicit in the revolutionary project and is proudly admitted by the young Marx in *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, but is stubbornly denied both by the later Marx (beginning with *The German Ideology*) and by the Leninists. The gap between the "ought" and the "is" is bridged by asserting that what is inevitable is progressive and that good communists must therefore work hard to make the inevitable even "more inevitable." This identification of the inevitable with the progressive has, in practice, also entailed an identification of *actual* policy with *best* policy, and a portrayal of *desired* results as *achieved* results. A disjunction between practice and theory cannot be admitted because if admitted, the way is open to considerations of alternative applications and realizations of the theory, thereby undermining the party's political monopoly. So,

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since "practice is the criterion of truth,"[50] what is true is what is practical, and Marxism-Leninism reverts to the Hegelian identification of the real (under "socialism") with the rational. Marxist-Leninist systems thus commonly proceed from positing what "ought" to be the case—no unemployment, classes, ethnic frictions, crime, or religious affiliation except among the elderly—to declaring that this already *is* the case. These strange avowals of utopia engender cognitive dissonance (disaffection) when people perceive the disjunction between what is declared to be and what really is, and also provide a basis for critique (dissent). When the critic in fact accepts the theoretical premises of the system, and its normative baggage, the result is Marxist dissent, the third category in our typology of disaffection and dissent.

Because Marxism is so concerned with achieving economic equality and abolishing classes, this species of disaffection ordinarily rivets onto the persistence of social and economic inequality and the existence of distinct classes under socialism. This form of disaffection is not limited to the intelligentsia—though they are the only ones capable of translating it into articulate dissenting theories—but may affect all those who come to feel betrayed by the revolution. This feeling of betrayal is a clue to the fact that this third strain of disaffection does not appear until after the lapse of a certain period of time—long enough to convince the discontents that the system has failed to live up to its promises. Zygmunt Bauman says approximately twenty years must pass before large numbers of people feel betrayed by the revolution—that is, enough time for the second generation to reach maturity, seek its place in the social structure, and discover that distributional equality does not exist.[51]

Given this analysis, it could be expected that Marxist dissent would become more thorough and more encompassing as time passed. This is exactly what has happened. To move from Harich to Havemann to Bahro is to move from criticism of the application of Marxism to a reassessment of certain central Marxist premises to a systematic examination of the Marxist concept altogether. Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin at the Twentieth C.P.S.U. Congress in March 1956 made a deep impression on Wolfgang Harich, a professor of social science in Berlin, and on philosopher Ernst Bloch. They responded by urging the democratization of the party and suggesting unification of the S.E.D. and the West German S.P.D. as a prelude to the reestablishment of a united, neutral Germany. Harich did not question Marx's analysis but believed that the Stalinist model of political development was not merely a per-

[50] Michael Waller, *The Language of Communism* (London: The Bodley Head, 1972), 32.
[51] Zygmunt Bauman (fn. 1), 46.

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version of Marxism but might actually impede the development of authentic communist relations within a society. Indeed, the Stalinist endeavor to skip the "capitalist" stage of development represented a deviation from Marxism, and hence it was conceivable, to Harich, that the pluralist West might achieve "communism" before the collectivist East. Harich organized a group to work for the internal reform of the party, taking into account the contributions of Trotsky, Bukharin, Luxemburg, Kautsky, S.P.D. theorist Fritz Steinberg, and the Yugoslavs. He urged the establishment of workers' councils on the Yugoslav model, a restoration of autonomy for the universities, an emphasis on raising living standards, and the complete abolition of the political police and the secret trials.[52] Harich was imprisoned for a ten-year term, and Bloch was expelled from the party.

Physicist Robert Havemann gained notoriety in 1962 when he launched a series of lectures in Leipzig and East Berlin, denouncing the G.D.R.'s ideology as neither dialectical nor materialist. Surprisingly, he was not dismissed from Humbolt University until 1964, after thousands of East German students had heard his lectures. Though he reproached the S.E.D. for having deviated from Marxism, his dismissal was justified on the grounds that he had "gone beyond productive discussion to the point of radical divergence from the party line and Marxist-Leninist theory."[53] Subsequently, Havemann was expelled from the party, and in 1966 he was removed from the G.D.R. Academy of Sciences. He spent his later years under virtual house arrest and eventually came to the conclusion that the S.E.D. had erred in abolishing parliamentary democracy. For Havemann, as for Harich, pluralism was not incompatible with Marxism but was in fact presumed by it; that is to say, where the S.E.D. had resolved the inner tension within Marx's thought, between his humanism and his desire to use organized revolutionary force to effect social and cultural change, in favor of revolutionary force and revolutionary transformation, Harich and Havemann clung to the inchoate humanism most amply developed in Marx's early writings. Their critique thus challenged the very heart of the S.E.D. system.

Two books appeared in the mid-1970s—smuggled out of East Germany to be published in West Germany—which carried Marxist dissent one step further. Peter Lübbe, in a work published in 1975, argued that socialism had become mired in a bureaucratism in which the state dominated and exploited the people, and concluded that a new revolution

[52] David Childs, *East Germany* (London: Ernest Benn, 1969), 38; and Volkmer (fn. 11), 128.

[53] Horst Sindermann, at Fifth Session of the Central Committee S.E.D. (February 1964), as quoted in Childs (fn. 45), 74.

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would be needed to correct the political subversion carried out by the Soviet and East European communist parties.[54] Two years later came the publication of Rudolf Bahro's book *The Alternative*.[55] Bahro's critique proceeds at two levels. On the first level, Bahro accepts the structure of Marxist analysis and marshals it to upbraid Soviet-style systems for radical deviation. On the second level, Bahro turns a critical eye toward Marxism itself and revises some of its operational principles. Then, having developed a critique on two levels, Bahro moves on to a third level, spelling out his prescription for a Marxist-inspired reform of East European politics.

On the first level, Bahro accepts Marx's argument that the transition from "the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom" requires the abolition of the division of labor but argues that this transition is impossible in Soviet-style systems, because society under these systems is dominated by an entrenched bureaucratic apparatus. By establishing a political and informational monopoly, this bureaucratic apparatus produces a "false consciousness," transforming Marxism from revolutionary methodology into a legitimizing ideology. Indeed, as Hugh Mosley has noted, Bahro's analysis of Soviet-style systems evokes parallels with Marx's so-called Asiatic mode of production, in which the ruling class maintains its rule, not on the basis of private property holdings, but on the basis of its control of the ideological and administrative apparatus. Communist party rule has not, therefore, brought an end to human alienation, however much it might claim to have done so; it is in fact the chief obstacle to social progress in Eastern Europe. Yet, faithful to Marx, Bahro scorns political pluralism as backward and aspires to eliminate bureaucratic domination by expanding political participation from below in a new "cultural revolution." Since this new cultural revolution should provide a basis for eliminating fundamental social conflict, Bahro accepts the Leninist belief that there should be no need for labor strikes, and prefers to keep strikes illegal.[56]

Bahro looks to the attempted Czech reforms of 1968 for inspiration and counsels emulation of Yugoslav self-management. For Bahro, the

[54] Peter Lübbe, *Der staatliche etablierte Sozialismus: zur Kritik des staat-monopolischen Sozialismus* [Official state socialism: Critique of state-monopoly socialism] (Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe, 1975), as cited in Jeffrey Lee Canfield, "Marxist Revisionism in East Germany: The Case of Rudolf Bahro," *The Fletcher Forum* 4 (Winter 1980), 47.

[55] Rudolf Bahro, *Die Alternative—Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus* [The alternative: Critique of the really existing socialism] (Cologne: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1977).

[56] Michael J. Sodaro, "Limits to Dissent in the GDR: Fragmentation, Cooptation, and Repression," in Jane Leftwich Curry, ed., *Dissent in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 97 and *passim*; and Hugh Mosley, "The New Communist Opposition: Rudolf Bahro's Critique of the 'Really Existing Socialism,'" *New German Critique*, No. 15 (Fall 1978), 28, 32.

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fetishization of the plan serves, not the interests of economic rationality as is claimed, but rather the political rationality of maintaining hierarchical subordination and party monopoly of the means of production.

On the second level, Bahro takes a critical look at Marxism itself and identifies three fundamental errors. First, Marx and Engels

> profoundly misunderstood the nature of the modern state. It is not epiphenomenal to society; nor will it wither away; nor is it a means for social welfare and political articulation. Rather it is an apparatus with its own hierarchy and set of institutional interests, ruling and dominating the rest of society and in "tendentially antagonistic relationship to the immediate producers."[57]

As a result, the "noncapitalist" path to socialism has produced a series of problems not anticipated by Marx, problems different from those analyzed by him in nineteenth-century Europe.[58] Second, Marx believed that the elimination of private property and the erection of a system founded on "people's property" would suffice to eliminate alienation: he did not appreciate that even a "people's state" could foster alienation.[59] And third, Marx overestimated the capabilities of the working class, completely failing to perceive its fundamentally conservative and passive character. The working class could *never* dominate a "dictatorship of the proletariat," whereas the revolution is, from the beginning, apt to be administered by a professional elite—the party.[60]

The upshot, for Bahro (as he moves to the third level of his analysis), is that the East European political systems are in serious need of restructuring. He proposes the legalization of extraparty opposition in the G.D.R. and elsewhere, the elimination of privileges for governmental and party workers, the greater equalization of wages, the obligatory participation by all functionaries, managers, and intelligentsia in four to six weeks of low-skilled work in their own work places annually, the establishment of workers' councils modeled on the Yugoslav experience, and the creation of a multiregime "League of Communists" to spearhead cultural revolution throughout Eastern Europe. Bahro is thus aware of the tension in Marx between revolutionary force and humanism, but attempts to resolve it at a higher level. This "higher resolution" is

[57] David Bathrick, "The Politics of Culture: Rudolf Bahro and Opposition in the GDR," *New German Critique*, No. 15 (Fall 1978), 20.

[58] Canfield (fn. 54), 32.

[59] *Ibid.*

[60] Günter Bartsch, "Mehr als Alternative—ein Durchbruch und Neubeginn" [More than an alternative: A breakthrough and a new beginning], *Deutschland Archiv* 11 (May 1978), 474. See also Fritz Schenk, "Rudolf Bahro und das Dilemma des Marxismus-Leninismus" [Rudolf Bahro and the dilemma of Marxism-Leninism], *Deutschland Archiv* 11 (May 1978), 470-471.

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of course no less than a challenge to the entire superstructure of Marxism-Leninism, a challenge all the more troubling to the S.E.D. because it takes Marx as its starting point.[61] Bahro was arrested the day following publication in *Der Spiegel*, in August 1977, of one of the chapters of his book. He was tried and convicted of espionage and sentenced to prison for eight years. In late 1979, however, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the G.D.R., he was granted amnesty and deported to the Federal Republic.

What Harich, Havemann, Lübbe, and Bahro have in common is that they have all marshaled Marxism to argue that the G.D.R. has become too Stalinist and that it has, in this way, betrayed the revolution. A very different tack is taken by East German Stalinists. Although they agree with the aforementioned Marxist dissidents that the S.E.D. has betrayed the revolution (and they have routinely denounced the "*Verräter am Sozialismus*"), they believe that the problem is that the G.D.R. is not Stalinist enough, and they look to Albania's Enver Hoxha for a contemporary model. The East German Stalinist opposition has been active since 1976 and grew to about 500 adherents in 1981, publishing a bulletin called *Der Rote Stachel*. Despite their hardline attitude, the East German Stalinists have also been defiantly anti-Soviet, thus presenting the S.E.D. with an additional challenge. In 1981, eight to ten leading members of this opposition group were arrested, including twenty-eight-year-old Andreas Bortfeldt and thirty-year-old Manfred Wilhelm.[62]

What strikes one at once, when considering this third category, is that the translation from disaffection to dissent entails a challenge to the regime's interpretation and application of Marxism—that is, to both its theory and its praxis. This is a dimension of the practical orientation of Marxism, as expressed, for instance, in Marx's famous thesis on Feuerbach, in which he insisted that the real point was to change the world, not to theorize about it.

The authorities seem to be particularly concerned about this form of dissent because it threatens to create splits within party ranks, to divide the ideology—sowing doubts and creating cracks in which a new form of pluralism might take root and diluting the fundamental operational code of political control.[63] Marxist dissenters bring no external criteria

[61] Wolf Biermann commented, when Bahro was jailed: "What brings them [the S.E.D.] to a complete rage and makes them crazy is the inherent criticism, the criticism that comes from within." *Die Welt*, July 3, 1978, quoted in Canfield (fn. 54), 28.

[62] *Der Spiegel*, August 24, 1981, p. 35.

[63] Peter Reddaway, "The Forced Resignation of the USSR from the World Psychiatric Society," lecture presented at the University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, March 14, 1984.

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to bear; on the contrary, they use the criteria internal to the official ideology to create an alternative to that ideology. Marxist dissent thus strikes at the very heart of the Marxist-Leninist system.

Economic Discontent as a Source of Dissent

The fourth and final category of sources of disaffection is economic performance. East Germans' expectations had been raised both in absolute terms, by the economic boom of the 1960s, and in relative terms, by the ideology of equality. Partly as a result of the general world recession and partly as a function of the structural limits to the G.D.R.'s developmental capacity and economic reforms, economic growth rates began to sag in the mid-1970s. East German planners adopted the solution of increasing imports of Western technology and goods in the effort to upgrade capital stock and reverse the economic slowdown. Instead, the debts spiraled and added to the pressures on the economy. The G.D.R.'s hard-currency debt to noncommunist countries rose steadily from $1.4 billion in 1970 to $4.8 billion in 1975, $11.6 billion in 1980, $10.2 billion in 1981, and $12.8 billion in 1982. By 1982, the G.D.R. had tallied the largest trade deficits in the Eastern bloc, and 40 percent of its hard-currency earnings were going to servicing its debts.[64]

Meanwhile, disturbances in world oil and gas markets in 1978 and 1979 triggered a Western recession, which in turn resulted in an across-the-board drop in the demand for all East European exports except fuel. East German growth rates in national income, gross industrial output, and gross agricultural output were slashed by an average of 40 percent within seven years (1975 to 1982), and nervous East German bankers repeatedly tried to reschedule their debts to the West—only to be turned down. Although the G.D.R. recorded increases in growth rates in national income and industrial production in 1983, and even trimmed back energy consumption by 7 percent, Berlin's planners are faced with both rising unemployment and, as of early 1984, the necessity of imposing a drastic reduction in investments and imports, with a consequent negative impact on living standards.[65]

The East German decision makers have responded to these pressures by shifting their trade to the U.S.S.R. (with whom the G.D.R. will

[64] Jan Vanous, "East European Economic Slowdown," *Problems of Communism* 31 (July-August 1982), 3; *Business Week* (May 24, 1982), 170, 181; and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 23-24, 1983.

[65] Richard Portes, "Effects of the World Economic Crisis on the East European Economies," *World Economy* 3 (June 1980), 26; *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, January 2, 1984, and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 12, 1984.

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conduct an estimated 40 percent of its foreign trade in 1985) and by turning to private entrepreneurs (granting some 30,000 licenses to start private businesses between 1976 and 1982). They have not, however, managed to make headway against unemployment, and some East German workers have come to interpret the dual-tier pricing system, whereunder basic necessities are extremely cheap but other items exceedingly expensive, as supportive of a rigid class system in which the modestly paid workers lack access to luxury goods, except through black market dealings.[66] In 1977 this policy led to worker protests and strikes, after Honecker opened up the hard-currency Intershop chain to East Germans. Since the workers had no guaranteed access to Western currency, the move clearly favored the elite. In one district in East Berlin, workers protested vehemently, forcing the closure of one Intershop outlet. Elsewhere, striking workers demanded to be paid in hard currency. In other instances, East German workers have struck to protest the substitution of an inferior coffee blend for a preferred one, or to object to other irregularities in commodity supplies. Later, in summer 1981, stimulated by developments in Poland, East German workers in at least five cities staged strikes and clashed with police. Seven workers from four industrial enterprises were arrested for discussing ways of democratizing the East German trade union on the model of Solidarity, and, in response, a group of East German discontents drew up a manifesto calling on East German workers to revolt and establish democratic rights of free speech and free assembly.[67]

By late 1982, supplies of meat, lard, milk, and vegetables were so unreliable that workers went on strike in Dresden, Boehlen, Espenhain, and in Premnitz, where factory managers used police to stop the demonstration.[68] G.D.R. authorities admitted to being able to correct only 80 percent of the supply shortcomings, but enacted stiffer measures to deal with unofficial public gatherings, especially where young people were concerned.[69] There were credible and confirmed reports in January 1983 of an attempted assassination of Honecker that month. The regime's haste to deny these reports, offering in their place a strange and not

[66] Martin McCauley, "Storm Signals in E. German Economy," *Soviet Analyst* 11 (February 10, 1982), 5, 6; *Der Spiegel*, October 3, 1983, p. 126; and "Interview with Robert Havemann" (fn. 12), 43.

[67] Volkmer, "East Germany: Dissenting Views" (fn. 11), 119-120; *New York Times*, August 3, 1981, and *Christian Science Monitor*, August 20, 1981.

[68] *Bild*, November 20, 1982, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), November 23, 1982.

[69] *Der Spiegel*, November 8, 1982, pp. 16-17; and *Der Spiegel*, January 10, 1983, pp. 16-17.

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very believable account of how a shot happened to have been fired, betrayed a curious insecurity suggestive of latent vulnerabilities.[70]

There are four preconditions for the translation of economic disaffection into widespread dissent: (1) a general perception of the situation as a problem (by comparison with past performance, performance in other countries, or promises held out by the leadership); (2) a widespread belief that the political elite is responsible for the problem and that it must be opposed (or even overthrown); (3) a diffuse hope; and (4) a belief in one's ability to effect change in one's own condition (sometimes called a "sense of political efficacy"). The first condition exists in East Germany, and perhaps also the third. Moreover, there is ample material suggesting that many East Germans hold the regime responsible for some of the economic problems (and of course for the militarization of society and the tight political controls). It is far from clear, however, that there is anything like a general consensus that the regime "must be opposed"—and actually some evidence to the contrary—or that East Germans have an autonomous sense of political efficacy.

Conclusion

Although disaffection and dissent are organically related, they remain analytically distinct phenomena. In functionalist terms, one might say that, although disaffection serves the "negative" functions of creating a critical distance between the disaffected and the regime, and of undermining socialized expectations and behavioral patterns (the repudiation of military service, workers' strikes, and punk rock all reflecting different kinds of erosion of socialized behavior), the functions of dissent may be seen as "positive." These functions are: (a) the articulation and expression of the meaning of disaffection; (b) critical opposition to the regime and the defense of the right to think differently; (c) presentation of an alternative information source—in this regard the Evangelical church's mini-"think tanks" on disarmament and peace education have served "dissenting" functions within the G.D.R.; and (d) the demonstration of an alternative model.

The differing sources of disaffection are translated into dissent in different ways. Disaffection in category 1 (failure of socialization) is associated with countercultural options and has available transitory or

[70] Reported in Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), January 11, 1983, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), January 11, 1983; and *Stern*, January 13, 1983, pp. 17, 126-127. Denied in Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (East Berlin), January 11, 1983, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), January 11, 1983.

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stable institutional resources. It is thus likely to give rise to forms of institutional or "countercultural" dissent. Disaffection in category 2 (policy shortcomings) is apt to provoke discussion among affected persons and to lead to forms of group dissent through emergent *ad hoc* groups of varying sizes. Disaffection in category 3 (Marxist revisionism) carries great risks for the person who speaks out publicly. The state ideology is the state's preserve and it does not allow individuals to chart their own courses through the Marxist-Leninist corpus, let alone challenge the S.E.D.'s interpretation in public. Disaffection in this category is therefore likely to be translated into individual dissent. And finally, disaffection in category 4 (economic malaise) has the potential of being translated into social dissent, widespread protest, and even—in theory—social disintegration.

The translation of disaffection into dissent is not automatic, of course. If it were, the analytical distinction would break down and the two would have to be seen as, at most, two phases in a single phenomenon. However, the translation of disaffection into dissent requires several factors, among which are hope; the emergence of a vision of an alternative; a sense of political efficacy; and, often, a "trigger" (whether a policy reversal on the part of the regime or a situational change).

Dissent, as resistance to accepted or imposed social and political norms, may arise in any society; the more narrowly those norms are defined, the broader the scope of dissent. Hence, the very approach taken by monocratic-dogmatic systems like that of the S.E.D. tends to subsume larger areas of activity under the term "dissent." But even given this point of departure, the S.E.D. hoped, in consonance with its Leninist presumptions, to extirpate both alienation and disaffection altogether, and in this way to banish dissent, except as an epiphenomenon of mental derangement. I have argued above that, in fact, S.E.D. policy has multiplied the sources of disaffection and deepened the potential for dissent. The militarization of society has produced a critical backlash, especially among youth, and the Evangelical church has become increasingly involved both in this area and in environmental concerns. Antinationalism has not worked and has only produced estrangement from the system, and since late 1982 the S.E.D. completely reversed this policy and set about to reclaim its past—Frederick the Great, Martin Luther, Prussia, and so forth. In a related area the G.D.R.'s obvious subordination to the U.S.S.R., its participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia,[71] and

[71] General Secretary Walter Ulbricht was eager to suppress the Prague Spring, but East German youth were deeply alienated by East German participation in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and some offspring of S.E.D. elite openly protested against the invasion. See Childs (fn. 45), 79-80.

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its fawning endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan rankle German pride and excite anti-Russian sentiments that remain close to the surface. The ideology of equality has encouraged workers to expect real equality and has fostered disaffection in its absence. Marxism itself has proved to be a potential seedbed for oppositional thought and opened new vistas for dissent. And finally, the generally repressive approach taken by the S.E.D. has actually stimulated social deviance and dissent, whether one looks at the effect of political impotence in stimulating egocentric individualism both in supportive (acquisitional) and antagonistic (punk) guises, or at the politicization of counterculture produced by regime intolerance of either Christianity or punk, or at the resistance engendered by human rights violations. In short, the effect of the S.E.D.'s policy in the area of disaffection and dissent is precisely the opposite of what it aspires to achieve.

Disaffection poses a curious and ambiguous threat to the S.E.D. and is therefore, in some ways, more complex an issue than dissent. If disaffection is treated as oppositional activity and suppressed—and Ronald Asmus argues that the S.E.D. could suppress the independent peace movement with "relative ease" if it were to conclude that the benefits outweighed the side effects[72]—that very suppression would be likely to convert even inchoate disaffection into active opposition and to risk deepening disaffection and broadening the base for subsequent (revived) dissenting activity. The S.E.D. obviously prefers not to radicalize its dissidents. On the other hand, if the regime loosens up (as it did with regard to disco music in 1976 and, incrementally, with the church over the course of the 1970s), it runs the risk that the disaffected will take advantage of the looser strictures, leading to a rise in "deviant" behavior, in political withdrawal (well exemplified in the punk counterculture), and in egoistic individualism (or "petit bourgeois" materialism, as the regime prefers to call it). Hence, the S.E.D. has gingerly tried to find a middle course, without knowing if a true "middle course" even exists.

[72] Ronald D. Asmus, "Is there a Peace Movement in the GDR?" *Orbis* 27 (Summer 1983), 338.

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THE LUTHER ANNIVERSARY IN EAST GERMANY

By ROBERT F. GOECKEL

IN 1983 two events focused international attention on East and West Germany. One was the collapse of talks on intermediate range missiles in Geneva and the consequent deployment of the missiles by NATO. The other was the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther. The Luther anniversary cast the spotlight particularly on communist East Germany, which revised its previously negative interpretation of Luther and not only marked his birth with elaborate festivities but also extended unprecedented assistance to the Lutheran church for its celebration. Yet, just as many wondered if inter-German détente would survive the I.N.F. deployment, so, too, many wondered at the nature of the church-state cooperation in the G.D.R., and if it would survive the Luther Year. The present analysis examines the character and direction of this church-state relationship, using the Luther Year experience as evidence.

The Luther celebration is an appropriate case on which to base generalizations for three reasons. First, the Luther celebration indicates the potential for change in official Marxist historiography in communist regimes. G.D.R. historians have, in the past, distorted historical facts, dismissing major figures and periods in German history (for example, the Prussian era) as reactionary. This policy of socialist transformation has, however, encountered the inherited German political culture. The regime's changed historiography on Luther indicates the extent to which the state's goals in the postrevolutionary period have shifted from transformation to inclusion.[1]

Second, the Luther Year represents a test of the rapprochement between the Lutheran churches and the state.[2] Because the G.D.R. is overwhelmingly Lutheran—approximately 85 percent of all religious adherents are Lutherans, 14 percent are Catholics—the regime's church policy has always been focused primarily on the Lutheran churches. In the early postwar era, state policy paralleled that of other Soviet bloc states, although it was less harsh in its execution: G.D.R. goals were

[1] Kenneth Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," *World Politics* 28 (October 1975), 69-96.

[2] For a review of the church-state relationship in the G.D.R., see Trevor Beeson, *Discretion and Valour* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 193-218. On the Honecker era, see Robert F. Goeckel, "Zehn Jahre Kirchenpolitik unter Honecker" [Ten years of Honecker's policy toward the churches], *Deutschland Archiv* No. 9 (September 1981), 942-46.

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designed to undercut the churches' support in the population, to limit the churches to the performance of ritual (as with the Russian Orthodox church in the U.S.S.R.), and to neutralize them politically. The methods used were also similar to those used throughout the Soviet bloc: they included atheistic propaganda, the elimination of church privileges, the promotion of "progressive" clergy, as well as coercive mechanisms. In addition, in the G.D.R. the regime sought, before 1958, to use the churches' all-German status to influence West German policy and, after 1958, to isolate the East German churches by putting pressure on them to separate from the churches of West Germany.

Since 1971 the church-state relationship in the G.D.R. has improved considerably. The Lutheran churches separated formally from the West German churches in 1969 and have sought to be relevant to their socialist environment, as well as to shore up their institution with state financial assistance. The state, for its part, has recognized that religion is not likely to disappear overnight and has, as have most Eastern European regimes, sought limited compromise with the church in order to influence the church hierarchy. The result has been considerable improvement in the churches' institutional status (for example, media access, social services, new church construction, and so forth), especially since a 1978 summit meeting between Socialist Unity Party (S.E.D.) General Secretary Erich Honecker and the church leadership. Together with Poland, the G.D.R. enjoys today the most liberal state policy toward the church in Eastern Europe. Extensive cooperation in the Luther Year promised greater cooperation in other areas. It also threatened to compromise the church leadership in the eyes of the faithful at home and abroad.

Third, the Luther Year represents a test of the inter-German relationship.[3] Following the integration of West Germany into NATO in 1955, the G.D.R. under Walter Ulbricht pursued a policy of *Abgrenzung*, or delimitation, toward West Germany. However, since Ulbricht's resignation under Soviet pressure in 1971, the G.D.R. under Honecker has been more receptive to West German *Ostpolitik*, and a level of cooperation has developed between the two Germanys. This has resulted in renewed ties between the Lutheran churches in the two Germanys despite the formal break in 1969. In 1983, this special inter-German relationship confronted challenges, both international (the chill in East-West relations since the late 1970s) and domestic (the development of an autonomous peace movement in the G.D.R., centered largely in the

[3] Melvin Croan, "A Quarter Century of the Two Germanies," *Survey* 21 (Nos. 1-2, 1975), 79-84.

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churches, and unrest in the churches over discrimination against Christians). The extent of the anti-West German polemic in the G.D.R.'s treatment of Luther and its handling of West German participation in the G.D.R. celebration activities are indicative of the East German stance on inter-German relations.

This analysis will review the shift in Marxist historiography that served as the ideological context for the Luther celebration, the developments in the Luther Year itself (both the state activities and the churches' response to them) and the Luther Year in the context of the two major factors (church-state relations and inter-German relations) that affected its outcome, mediating the translation of Marxist historiography into state policy. Various possible explanations for the state's treatment of Luther will be evaluated, and, on the basis of comparison with other Soviet bloc states, conclusions will be drawn regarding the direction of the church-state relationship in the G.D.R.

I. The Official Marxist Historiography on Luther

The current official S.E.D. interpretation of Luther reflects a transformation over roughly four periods in the state's historiography.[4]

The period immediately following 1945 was characterized by an almost wholly negative view of Luther. Influenced by the Nazi catastrophe, Marxist and non-Marxist historiography alike traced the origins of Nazism to the failures in German development, usually attributing their beginnings to Luther. Thus, Alexander Abusch, later minister of culture in the G.D.R., labeled Luther "the gravedigger of German freedom" and the "biggest intellectual figure of the German counterrevolution."[5] Luther was viewed primarily in terms of his relationship to Thomas Müntzer and the Peasant War; he was held responsible for the defeat of the peasants and for betraying the revolution to the princes, thereby hindering the development of the German nation.

The 1950s saw a partial revision of this view, partly in response to the question of German unity during the height of the cold war. Some G.D.R. historians began to place greater emphasis on Luther's positive contributions to the German nation (for example, his translation of the

[4] For an analysis of the shift in the official Marxist historiography of Luther, see Ronald D. Asmus, "The G.D.R. and Martin Luther," unpub. 1983; also Eleutherius (pseud.), "Luther Rebaptized in Marxist Ideology?" *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe* 3 (July 1983), 21-43. Also see Siegfried Bräuer, *Martin Luther in marxistischer Sicht von 1945 bis zum Beginn der achtziger Jahre* [The Marxist view of Luther from 1945 to the beginning of the eighties] (Berlin/G.D.R.: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1983).

[5] Alexander Abusch, *Der Irrweg einer Nation* [A nation on the wrong path] (Berlin/G.D.R.: Aufbau Verlag, 1949), 20ff. All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted.

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Bible into German is felt to have laid the groundwork for a uniform German language). Despite considerable debate regarding the relative weights of Luther's betrayal of the peasants and his national contributions, however, Müntzer and the Peasant War continued to be viewed as the high point of the German national struggle.

In the 1960s, the focus of the Luther debate shifted from the specifically German national dimension of the Reformation to its role in the broader revolutionary process. The dean of Marxist historians of the Reformation, Max Steinmetz, propounded anew Engel's concept of "early bourgeois revolution," which included both the Reformation and the Peasant War.[6] Luther was thus granted a revolutionary role.

Primary emphasis during the 1960s remained on the social-political effects of Luther's actions, rather than on his intentions or theology. The first official biography of Luther in 1967, for example, distinguished between the subjective Luther, who sought to introduce a new theology, and the objective Luther, who ended the power of the Catholic church and thereby prepared the way not only for the German princes, but also for the nascent bourgeoisie. It cautioned against the "ahistorical wishful thinking" of judging Luther by twentieth-century revolutionary standards.[7]

The 1970s and early 1980s have seen Luther incorporated into the "socialist heritage of the G.D.R." In 1980 Honecker proclaimed that Luther belongs to "the progressive traditions which we protect and carry on ... which have contributed to progress and to the development of world culture, regardless of the social and class ties in which they found themselves."[8] Social scientists codified this new S.E.D. view of Luther in the form of theses in 1981;[9] historians have paid increasing attention to Luther's motivation and theology, which, "though socially determined and with revolutionary effects, is not explained entirely by the social determination"; and there has even been interest in such subjective factors as the "fascinating personality" and psychology of Luther.[10]

The changes in the official G.D.R. reception of Luther can thus be summarized as follows: Luther, earlier seen as a member of the petty

[6] Max Steinmetz, "Die frühbürgerliche Revolution in Deutschland (1476-1535)," in Max Steinmetz, ed., *Die frühbürgerliche Revolution in Deutschland* [The early bourgeois revolution in Germany] (Berlin/G.D.R.: Akademie Verlag, 1961), 7-16.

[7] Gerhard Zschäbitz, *Martin Luther: Grösse und Grenze* [Martin Luther: Greatness and limits] (Berlin/G.D.R.: Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1967), 217-25.

[8] *Neues Deutschland*, June 14-15, 1980, p. 3.

[9] "Thesen über Luther" [Theses on Luther], *Einheit* No. 9 (September 1981), 890-903.

[10] Historian Gunter Vögler, cited in Bräuer (fn. 4), 31; Gerhard Brendler, "Martin Luther—Erbe und Tradition" [Martin Luther: Legacy and tradition], *Wissenschaftliche Mitteilungen der Historikergesellschaft der DDR*, 1979/I-II, 35.

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bourgeoisie, is currently viewed as having been part of the urban intelligentsia, dependent on the princes and the church. Whereas his motives were earlier felt to be derived from his bourgeois social class, the current view admits a role for his insecurity before God and his theology. The earlier view of the means used by Luther distinguished between an "early" progressive Luther and a "late" reactionary Luther who turned against the more revolutionary forces after 1521; current interpretation sees Luther as consistently opposed to all use of force to change society, not just the peasants' use of force. In the earlier view, Luther's goals were seen as consciously reactionary, whereas now Marxist historians distinguish between Luther's subjective goals (a limited reform of the Catholic church) and his objective impact (a wide-ranging upheaval in the social-political order, which facilitated the eventual collapse of feudalism and the rise of the bourgeoisie). Finally, the view of Luther's role in history has changed. Whereas earlier he was considered to have been a "betrayer of the peasants" and a "servant of the princes," he is now considered to have been a progressive who, within the context of the Middle Ages, challenged the power of the Catholic church with theology as the only tool available. Müntzer is now seen as a utopian, Luther as a realist who attempted to institutionalize and defend the "moderate-bourgeois Reformation."

Instruction about Luther in the G.D.R. schools has also changed over time, although the interpretation of Luther that is taught has tended to lag considerably behind that of the official historians.[11] In the early postwar period this worked in Luther's favor, as schools were forced to use prewar textbooks for lack of alternatives. However, new teachers' instruction plans resulted in harsher treatment of Luther, and it was not until 1967 that the concept of "early bourgeois revolution" was introduced into the textbooks. The 1978 version reveals few of the recent changes in Marxist historiography, and, although another revision is planned, the hard-line Ministry of Education appears to be dragging its feet in adopting the new official view.

II. The Official State Activities

The unprecedented recognition and widespread official activities of the 1983 Luther celebration were in marked contrast to the state's treatment of the 450th anniversary of the Reformation in 1967. This was

[11] Based on Theologische Studienabteilung, "Martin Luther und die Reformation in der Schulbuchliteratur der DDR seit 1945" [Martin Luther and the Reformation in the educational literature of the GDR since 1945], *Information und Texte* No. 11 (March 1983), mimeo. (Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR); Bräuer (fn. 4), 17.

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most visible in the formation, on June 13, 1980, of the official "Martin Luther Committee of the G.D.R."[12] The committee included representatives from the highest levels of the G.D.R. state and society, including some Christians, and with no less a figure than S.E.D. chief Honecker as chairman. By contrast, the official committee for the 1967 anniversary had been chaired by Gerald Götting, head of the regime-conformist Christian Democratic Union Party (C.D.U. East).

Perhaps the most remarkable facet of the state activities was the veritable avalanche of media attention devoted to Luther.[13] The G.D.R. publishing houses produced, in acknowledgment of the anniversary, 120 works devoted to or relating to Luther, including the much-heralded official Marxist biography by Gerhard Brendler. *Neues Deutschland*, the S.E.D. organ, covered the preparations for the Luther celebration on an almost daily basis from 1980 onward. Among the more unusual approaches was a series devoted to the G.D.R. heirs of Luther, which appeared in the Christian Democratic Union organ, *Neue Zeit*. In addition, Radio G.D.R. broadcast a play about Luther in 1980 and East German television produced a mini-series in October 1983. Both of these dramatizations followed the new S.E.D. line, portraying Luther as a realist, Müntzer as a utopian.

Nineteen eighty-three also contrasted with 1967 with regard to the state's receptiveness toward tourism to Luther sites.[14] In 1967 the state had actively discouraged visitors, to the extent of denying even tourist visas during the church celebrations. As a result, Western tourists totaled a mere 30,000. In 1983, however, there was an aggressive tour promotion campaign by the state travel bureau, and an estimated 250,000 Western visitors, among them 12,500 Americans, took the travel bureau's advice to "follow in the steps of Luther."

Even more striking when contrasted with 1967 was the level of state support to the church celebrations in 1983.[15] In 1967, in an attempt to force the East German churches to break their organizational ties with the West German churches, the state actions left the Reformation celebration a shambles. The G.D.R. prohibited publication by the church, and forced the cancellation of church conventions. Visas for the church ceremony were granted to only 39 of 500 West Germans invited, and to

[12] *Neues Deutschland*, June 14-15, 1980.

[13] Gerhard Brendler, *Martin Luther. Theologie und Revolution* (Berlin/G.D.R.: Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1983); *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 31, 1983.

[14] "Das Wittenberg Jubiläum" [The Wittenberg anniversary], *Evangelischer Pressedienst* [hereafter cited as *epd*] *Grüner Dienst* (F.R.G.) No. 32 (December 2, 1967); *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 9, 1983; discussion with officials of the churches' Luther committee.

[15] *Ibid.*

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only 167 of 350 of the other invited Westerners. Those who did receive visas were clearly chosen for their support of the G.D.R. and their criticism of the F.R.G. Not surprisingly, the churches' representatives on the official state committee withdrew in protest.

In 1983, however, the state seemed to fall all over itself to support the churches' Luther Year activities. It facilitated numerous church publications and provided generous logistical support for the seven church conventions, which attracted 200,000 participants. Media access for the churches was increased (three extra television broadcasts, in addition to the churches' six annual broadcasts), and the state undertook massive renovations of Luther sites as well. Ecumenical participation in the church celebrations was solicited—participation on a scale that would have caused nightmares for security forces in other Eastern bloc countries. Perhaps, though, the most visible evidence of the state's shift was the participation of upper-level state figures in the churches' ceremonies—for example, the attendance of *Volkskammer* President Horst Sindermann at the opening ceremony of the Luther Year on May 4, 1983.

III. The Churches' Response to the State Activities

The East German churches reacted with ambivalence to the state's new enthusiasm for Luther and its grandiose jubilee plans. On the one hand, the problems in 1967 and the benefits from the growing rapprochement in the 1970s had taught them the value of state cooperation. On the other hand, they were fearful that the state's embrace of Luther might compromise the church's Luther and skeptical that the church stood to gain from the celebration.

The churches had good reason to play down the Luther anniversary. First, many in the church do not perceive the heritage of Luther to be uniformly positive. The undercurrent of anti-Semitism in Luther, which the Nazi regime had exploited, is a burden for the German churches in their efforts to come to terms with the Holocaust, and many are haunted by the specter of past Luther/Reformation celebrations, which had been state-dominated demonstrations of anti-Catholicism, German nationalism, or fascism.

Second, many feared that the Luther celebration might set back Lutheran-Catholic relations. Luther's often vitriolic attacks on the Catholic church and the papacy seem an embarrassment in the post-Vatican II ecumenical era. The S.E.D. theses, with their emphasis on the corruption in the Catholic church and Luther's "new concept of the church," seemed

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to confirm the impression that the Catholic church would be slighted in the state's rush to canonize Luther.[16]

Third, some feared that the Luther celebration would distract from the real needs of the churches. Long-term problems, such as declining membership, secularization, the need for church modernization, and so forth, might be ignored in the short-term euphoria surrounding a large, highly visible state celebration of Luther.

And fourth, many were cynical about the state's motives in the Luther celebration. They viewed the state's induction of Luther into "socialist tradition" as illegitimate, and felt, moreover, that the political environment for Christians in the G.D.R., and issues of contention such as discrimination in education and career, the militarization of society, arms control, and censorship of church publications were more relevant than the staged celebration of a remote historical figure. As one parishioner put it, paraphrasing Luther, "Here we stand in the G.D.R. And we can do nothing else. God help us, Amen."[17]

Yet, certain factors favored church cooperation with the state. The primary one was negative: the East German church, located in the heartland of Lutheranism, simply could not avoid participating in the celebration. The thousands of visitors on the state's tours would naturally inquire about the church's activities in the Luther year. In addition, the concrete institutional benefits promised by the state and the increasing contacts between Marxists and church historians encouraged the church to be receptive toward cooperation with the state.[18]

Many church leaders viewed cooperation with the state in quite positive terms. Defining itself as a "church within socialism," the Lutheran church has sought dialogue with the state, with Marxist historians, and with East German society. The church felt challenged to respond to the state's Luther celebration. Its leaders spoke of the Luther Year as a "test case of [church-state] cooperation."[19]

Although the churches coordinated their plans with those of the state, they took great pains to demonstrate their organizational independence.[20]

[16] "Thesen über Luther" (fn. 9), 890.

[17] Friedrich Weigand, "Lutherwort gegen Lutherwesen" [Luther's word versus Luther's substance], *Stuttgarter Zeitung* October 14, 1981.

[18] Siegfried Bräuer, "Die Bedeutung Luthers für die evangelische Kirche in der DDR" [Luther's significance to the Evangelical church in the GDR], *Die Christenlehre* Nos. 8-9 (August-September 1983); *epd Zentralausgabe* No. 42 (March 2, 1982).

[19] Interview with Dr. Helmut Zeddies (head of the church Luther committee) and Siegfried Rakotz (head of the bureau of the state Luther committee) with Gerhard Rein, April 1983, in archive, Evangelical Publicity Center, West Berlin; *epd Dokumentation* No. 22 (May 16, 1983), 5.

[20] Helmut Zeddies, *Herder Korrespondenz* No. 8 (August 1981).

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They maintained a separate church Luther committee, and, although considerable informal consultation occurred between church and state, church leaders participated in the state committee as observers only. Invitations were exchanged to church and state celebrations, but the ceremonies were held separately, in Eisleben and East Berlin, respectively.

The churches also underscored the distinctiveness of their interpretation of Luther. For example, in their formal declaration opening the Luther Year, the churches criticized Luther's attacks on the peasants, the Jews, and the opponents of infant baptism.[21] Church leaders also sought to work against the impression that the Luther celebration represented collaboration between Lutherans and the state at the expense of the Catholic church. Official statements at church ceremonies invariably criticized Luther's harsh attacks on the Catholic church and praised ecumenism.[22]

The Catholic church responded in kind. In a rare public proclamation, the Catholic bishops in the G.D.R. expressed confidence that the Luther Year would not be a "sign of division," but rather "serve the possibility of unity," and Pope John Paul II sent his ecumenical spokesman, Cardinal Willenbrands, to speak at the church ceremony on November 10.[23] This cooperation with the Lutheran churches reflected not only the initiative of the pope, but also the increased cooperation and improved climate between the Lutheran and Catholic hierarchies within the G.D.R. since the leadership of the East German Catholic Bishops' Conference passed from the late Cardinal Bengsch to Cardinal Meisner in 1979.

Some in the churches also sought to work against the traditional Lutheran deference to political authority, a deference encouraged by the S.E.D. theses on Luther, with their emphasis on the separation of heavenly and worldly kingdoms. Thus the churches, in their Luther Year declaration, noted Luther's criticism of the princes of his day—and emulated him in theirs through such protests as those of Bishops Leich and Hempel against the escalation of the nuclear arms race.[24]

Seeking to counteract the state's emphasis on Luther's role as an initiator of the "early bourgeois revolution," the churches repeatedly stated their view of Luther as "primarily a reformer of the church, as

[21] *epd Dokumentation* No. 22 (May 16, 1983), 2; F. W. Rabe, "War der Reformator Anti-Semit?" [Was the Reformer an anti-Semite?] *Mecklenburgische Kirchenzeitung*, February 8, 1981.

[22] *epd Dokumentation* No. 22 (May 16, 1983), 2, 5.

[23] *Ibid.*, 24. Another example is the pope's visit to the Lutheran Lateran church in Rome for a celebration of the Luther anniversary.

[24] *Ibid.*, 2; *epd Dokumentation* No. 43 (October 10, 1983), 54-56.

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a servant of God and preacher of the good news of Jesus Christ." In a scathing criticism of the S.E.D. theses on Luther, one prominent church historian rejected the concept of "early bourgeois revolution" as simplistic, arguing that the S.E.D. concept of "reformistic ideology" denigrated theological motives.[25]

The churches also denied the G.D.R.'s exclusive claim to Luther. At the second meeting of the state committee, the churches' observer implicitly rebuked the state when he declared that "Luther does not belong to the G.D.R., but rather he really belongs . . . to the worldwide community of churches."[26] The churches' slogan for the Luther Year—"Fear, love, and trust God more than anything"—must be interpreted as an indirect challenge to the all-encompassing demands for loyalty by the Marxist-Leninist state.

IV. The Impact of the Church-State Relationship

The pattern that resulted from the state celebration and the churches' response to it—a mixture of pragmatic cooperation and assertions of independence—has been characteristic of church-state relations under Honecker. Unlike the shift in official Marxist historiography regarding Luther, which represents a long-term change in ideology, the actual Luther Year celebration was subject to short-term crosscurrents of the broader church-state relationship. Despite the partial rapprochement between church and state, the relationship has been hampered by divergent voices within the church and within the S.E.D., and by the state's continued attempts to use the church for its domestic and foreign policy goals. In some sectors of the S.E.D., Luther continued to be compared unfavorably to Müntzer. For example, URANIA, the state organization for popular study of science, declared that "it cannot be overlooked that he [Luther] condemned the revolutionary struggle of the peasants under Müntzer."[27]

This divergence within the S.E.D. led it to discount the Luther celebration after mid-1982, and, in a move that took many G.D.R. citizens by surprise, in November 1982 the G.D.R. proclaimed 1983 as Karl Marx Year.[28] Whereas the S.E.D. had earlier described Luther as "*one* of the greatest sons of the German people," it now described Marx as "*the* greatest son of the German people." Until this point the 100th

[25] *Neues Deutschland*, June 14-15, 1980, p. 4; *Mecklenburgische Kirchenzeitung*, March 14 and 21, 1982.
[26] *Evangelische Nachrichtenagentur* (G.D.R.), January 21, 1982, p. 2.
[27] *Neues Deutschland*, May 5, 1982.
[28] *Neues Deutschland*, November 26, 1983.

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anniversary of Marx's death had gone almost unnoticed. Of course, the ordinary East German remained indifferent, feeling that every year is Karl Marx Year in the G.D.R. However, the declaration of 1983 as Karl Marx Year (at the same time that the regime was seeking to have UNESCO declare 1983 as Martin Luther Year) was a signal to the ranks of the S.E.D. that the party still had its priorities straight. The second official meeting of the state Luther committee was postponed numerous times throughout 1982 as the state sought to decrease its visibility in the Luther celebration.[29] Furthermore, hard-liner Paul Verner, the politburo member responsible for security and the churches, was added to the state Luther committee in 1982, and state representation at the church functions was unusually modest in terms of protocol: Honecker assumed a low profile as the state was represented by Deputy Chairman of the State Council Ernst Mecklenburg of the Peasant Party at the churches' November 10 festivities, and the main address at the state ceremony on November 9 was delivered not by Honecker, but by the deputy chairman of the state Luther committee, Gerald Götting.

The state also gave indications of seeking to play the regional churches off against each other. This strategy, which took the form of a privileged role for the Thuringian church, had characterized the state's hard-line policy in the 1950s and 1960s but had given way, since 1971, to focus on the umbrella organization, the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the G.D.R. In recent years, however, the state has hearkened back to the "Thuringian Way." The fact that many of the Luther sites are in Thuringia and that the chairman of the churches' Luther committee was Thuringian Bishop Werner Leich facilitated this development. At the ceremony reopening the Wartburg on April 21, 1983, a meeting between Honecker and Leich took place. Even though Leich attended in his role as head of the church committee, the parallel with a meeting in 1964 between S.E.D. chief Ulbricht and the accommodationist bishop Moritz Mitzenheim of Thuringia was not lost on some.[30] Honecker reinforced this association by praising Leich for "decisively and successfully continuing the good tradition of Thuringia of bringing constructive elements into the development of church-state relations."[31] Moreover, the state violated the confidentiality of the discussion between Honecker and Leich, which dealt especially with questions of equal

[29] *epd Berlin* No. 108 (June 18, 1982); *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 8, 1983 and November 11, 1983; Ronald Asmus, "Luther Year Ends in GDR," *Radio Free Europe RAD* BR/22 (December 16, 1983), 3.

[30] Reinhard Henkys, *Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR* [Federation of Evangelical churches in the GDR] (Witten/F.R.G.: Eckart Verlag, 1970), 69-83.

[31] *Neues Deutschland*, April 22, 1983.

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rights for Christians and the arrest of peace activists in Jena, when it published Leich's comments praising the state's commitment to and actions for peace. The church federation issued a denial that could hardly compensate for the damage done to the churches' credibility. The state's actions were particularly directed at, among others, Bishop Forck (Berlin-Brandenburg), who was prevented from submitting peace petitions to the United States and Soviet embassies as part of a peace initiative sponsored by West Germany's Greens Party in early November 1983.[32]

Just as the process of the Luther celebration was subject to the pressures of general state policy, so, too, the substance was affected. The state (especially the C.D.U.) sought to use Luther for its own purposes. This can be seen on three issues. First, the state used the celebration to promote its peace program, reiterating, for example, official G.D.R. policy forswearing a nuclear first strike and endorsing a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.[33] During the Luther Year the state sought to use Western attention focused on the celebration to persuade NATO, and especially West Germany, to rescind its decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. Yet, at the same time, the regime attempted to discourage the rising tide of pacifism in the G.D.R. by citing Luther's support of defense against the Turks.[34]

Second, in an attempt to stimulate work productivity, which is apparently on the wane in developed socialism, official spokesmen, especially from the C.D.U., underscored the importance of the work ethic for Luther and linked it to the "socialist work morality."[35]

Finally, Luther's controversial doctrine of the two kingdoms—the spiritual ruled by God and the worldly ruled by the state and reason, was underscored and exploited by the state. Luther's contention that the state was given by God to maintain order in the worldly kingdom has contributed to a tradition of Lutheran subservience to authority, a tradition that the churches have sought to shed since the Nazi era. The state has been ambivalent about the churches' treatment of the issue, but generally feels more comfortable with a position of deference to worldly authority. Thus it is not surprising that the regime should use Luther to encourage subservience to the socialist state.[36]

[32] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 11, 1983; *epd Dokumentation* No. 43 (October 10, 1983), 54-56; *epd Dokumentation* No. 35 (August 10, 1981); Ronald D. Asmus, "Is there a Peace Movement in the GDR?" *Orbis* 27 (Summer 1983), 301-42.

[33] *Neue Zeit*, October 30-31, 1982; *Neues Deutschland*, April 22, 1983; *epd Dokumentation* No. 22 (May 16, 1983), 23-24.

[34] Radio DDR, November 8, 1981; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 11, 1983.

[35] *Neue Zeit*, October 30-31 and November 5, 1982.

[36] *Neue Zeit*, October 31, 1981.

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The churches themselves were not averse to politicizing the Luther anniversary and brought up, at the well-attended Luther conventions, issues ranging from nuclear weapons deployment to increased state pressure on conscientious objectors to educational and career discrimination by the state against Christians.[37]

Thus Luther was subjected to the broader, often cool political winds in the general church-state relationship. As the anniversary year came to a close, however, both church and state sent signals that they did not wish to return to the chill that had obtained prior to 1971. The churches praised the state's attitude, and Honecker hailed the cooperation in the Luther Year as proof of the correctness of the post-1978 rapprochement, and promised a continued "understanding view toward the legitimate interests of the church."[38] Clearly, though, the balance sheet on the Luther Year revealed more debits than either side had projected when planning for it began.

V. The Impact of the Inter-German Relationship

In 1967 the G.D.R. had clearly sought to outflank West Germany with its interpretation and celebration of the Reformation. As Steinmetz put it:

> The 450th anniversary of the Reformation is a matter of a basic confrontation ... with the view of Luther and the Reformation of imperialist historians. The official West German historiography—with few exceptions—stands in the imperialist tradition. ... But the historical lessons of the Reformation are only relevant in the G.D.R.: for they cannot be appreciated in the West German state.[39]

These attacks were part of Ulbricht's policy of delimitation (*Abgrenzung*), designed to prevent any détente between the two Germanys and, indirectly, between the superpowers. The 1983 celebration was not entirely free of such *Abgrenzung* efforts. The G.D.R. could not, for example, avoid the temptation to claim that Luther's mantle "rests in good hands with us," as the state that "realizes the ideals of the best sons of the German people. ..."[40] The 1983 celebration was, however, influenced

[37] *epd Dokumentation* No. 22 (May 16, 1983), 6-7, 38-39; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 31, 1983. Observation of the Dresden church convention and reports from participants at church conventions at Magdeburg, Stralsund, and Frankfurt/Oder.

[38] *epd Dokumentation* No. 43 (October 10, 1983), 5-6; *Neues Deutschland*, October 6, 1983.

[39] Max Steinmetz, "Schlusswort" [Epilog], in Max Steinmetz and Gerhard Brendler, eds., *Weltwirkung der Reformation* [Worldwide impact of the Reformation] (Berlin/G.D.R.: Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1969), 496; see also Melvin Croan, "After Ulbricht: The End of an Era?" *Survey* 17 (1971), 74-92.

[40] *Neues Deutschland*, June 14-15, 1980.

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primarily by the afterglow of *Ostpolitik* and inter-German détente of the post-Ulbricht era.

Some inter-German asymmetry in the Luther celebration was unavoidable. The G.D.R.'s near-monopoly of Luther sites, the interest of the world's Lutherans, and the shift in Marxist historiography, all focused attention on the G.D.R. celebration—attention that the status-conscious G.D.R. was happy to have.

Several factors in West Germany also encouraged asymmetry with regard to the celebrations. The greater secularization of intellectuals in West Germany, the sensitivities of the sizable Catholic population, the relative absence of Luther sites, and the fact that the government gave the churches primary responsibility for the celebration, all contributed to the low key of the Luther celebration in West Germany. The West German churches, seeking to avoid political embarrassment for the churches in the G.D.R., deferred early on to their East German counterparts in planning the church activities—though, in an effort to counteract this asymmetry, they did underscore Luther as "a strong tie for the community of Evangelical Christianity in Germany."[41] The West German government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Karl Carstens, by contrast, responded to the G.D.R.'s plans by attacking its embrace of Luther. Kohl criticized the East German celebration as a "subtle attempt by the S.E.D. to use Luther to bind the concept of nation with that of socialism, as if there were a direct line of continuity from Frederick the Great to Erich Honecker," and Carstens claimed Luther as "a symbol of unity in today's divided Germany."[42]

Despite the asymmetry in the Luther celebrations, the events of the year served to keep special inter-German ties alive in the face of a worsening climate in East-West relations. The contrast between 1967 and 1983 could not have been greater: whereas in 1967 the G.D.R. had sought to *brake* Western initiatives at détente, in 1983 the G.D.R. sought to prevent the deployment of new NATO missiles, allegedly in order to *save* détente. West Germany, on the other hand, sought in both 1967 and 1983 to promote a special inter-German relationship. The context, however, was quite different: in 1967 West German *Ostpolitik* was still controversial; by 1983 West German public opinion was relatively supportive of *Ostpolitik*, and the government sought to reassure its citizens that the benefits of *Ostpolitik* would not be endangered by heightened

[41] *Frankfurter Rundschau*, November 3, 1982; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 3, 1983.

[42] *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* No. 69, June 28, 1983, pp. 637-41; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 31, 1983.

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world tensions and the accession to power of a conservative government in Bonn.[43]

This convergence of interest in continued ties became evident in inter-German church exchanges for the year, which, in marked contrast to the 1967 events, went practically unimpeded at all levels.[44] In addition, at the May 4 ceremony G.D.R. television carried, for the first time, a "live" broadcast of a worship service and allowed a simultaneous telecast on West German television. The regime also sent forth a wave of Marxist historians to evangelize the West with the good news of the new official Luther interpretation in the G.D.R.

Political contacts relating to the Luther celebration also proliferated. Seeking to demonstrate its good relations with the G.D.R., the Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.) sent its 1983 candidate for chancellor, Hans-Jochen Vogel, as well as ex-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and a *Bundestag* delegation, to the G.D.R. "to inform themselves about the Luther celebration in the G.D.R." in meetings with leaders of church and state.[45] The S.P.D. sought to gain domestic political capital through its inter-German ties, which the G.D.R. in turn hoped to use to influence West German politics.

The opposition party hardly had a monopoly on these contacts, however: the banner of Luther accommodated even official contacts, although these tended to be much less visible and at a lower level than the S.P.D. contacts.[46] For example, West German Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg also took the opportunity "to inform himself about the Luther celebration in the G.D.R." Receiving greater attention was the visit of Richard von Weizsäcker (C.D.U.), then mayor of West Berlin, to the Wartburg ceremony on May 4. Traveling in his capacity as a leader in the West German churches rather than as mayor, von Weizsäcker laid the groundwork for his September meeting with Honecker and carried a political message stating the mutual interest of the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. in continued communication. The conclusion of several inter-German agreements in 1983 (for example, new bank credits, a

[43] Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "Foreign Policy Issues in the West German Federal Election of 1969," *Comparative Politics* 2 (July 1970), 606-28; Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertman, "Is NATO in Trouble?" *Public Opinion* 4 (August-September 1981), 12.

[44] Over 400 foreign guests attended the November 10 ceremony; they included, significantly, the Protestant bishop of communist China on his first visit to the G.D.R. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 11, 1983.

[45] *epd Zentralausgabe* No. 233 (December 9, 1982), No. 169 (September 1, 1983), No. 176 (September 15, 1983).

[46] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 31, 1983; *epd Zentralausgabe* No. 185 (September 26, 1983); *epd Dokumentation* No. 22 (May 16, 1983), 42.

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postal agreement) confirmed this mutual interest, despite Euromissile deployment.

The banner of Luther was not wide enough, however, to encompass official contacts at the highest levels. The major sideshow of 1983 seemed to be the drama surrounding the possible visit of President Carstens to the G.D.R. Luther celebration.[47] Carstens opened the speculation in late 1982 by revealing his desire to join his fellow Lutherans in following "the steps of Luther." The East German churches, to avoid embarrassment, struck an agreement with the state, which provided that the state would invite official guests and the churches would be responsible for the private religious guests. This provided the church with a loophole for von Weizsäcker, but, alas, none for Carstens, who did not occupy a church office. The state invited Carstens to its state ceremony on November 9 and sought to make this the quid pro quo for Carstens' participation at the church events of November 10. Fearing that this precedent-setting act would confer official recognition on the G.D.R., especially with regard to its claim to East Berlin, Carstens refused the invitation. The Carstens affair revealed the limits on the role that the Luther celebration could play in inter-German relations.

The churches themselves realized these limits in their assertions of inter-German church ties.[48] They made no joint inter-German declaration for the Luther Year, as they had done on other occasions (for example, the 40th anniversary of the beginning of World War II in 1979), and the "Luther Year Declaration" of the East German church made no reference to the "special community of Evangelical Christianity in Germany" that it had affirmed in its founding charter. In their greetings to the East German church ceremonies, the West Germans paid scant notice to these ties, describing them in narrow religious terms rather than in terms of historical and organizational tradition.

Thus the Luther celebration in 1983 revealed both the effect of *Ostpolitik* in promoting more intensive inter-German relations and the fact that a seemingly apolitical aspect of inter-German relations can be, and, indeed, is apt to be, politicized as an instrument in *Deutschlandpolitik*. For the G.D.R. the celebration was a means of promoting its image in West Germany, and especially its peace campaign; for the F.R.G. it was a means of reassuring its population that *Ostpolitik* would continue.

[47] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 19, 1983; Asmus (fn. 4), 21-22.

[48] *Die Welt*, April 6, 1983; *epd Dokumentation* No. 22 (May 16, 1983), 32; *Frankfurter Rundschau*, November 3, 1982.

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VI. Explaining the State's Luther Celebration

Various explanations can be offered for the heightened interest in Luther and the shift in the G.D.R.'s official interpretation of him. According to one view propounded by official spokesmen, the "position of strength" view—the maturation of the G.D.R. as a socialist state—has enabled the state to revise its view of history. Thus, officials will admit publicly that the earlier view of Luther was distorted or incomplete, colored by the historical experience of the German working class with Luther and Lutheranism. With the formation and consolidation of the G.D.R., the "working class now exercises power and has a wider view of the past than a working class that was in the midst of the struggle for power."[49] Interestingly, numerous officials in the G.D.R. churches echo this explanation.[50] Implicit in it is the role of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent economic growth in stabilizing the regime.

Other observers emphasize, instead, the continuing problems of political legitimacy of the regime. According to this "legitimacy deficit" view, the G.D.R., alone among the Soviet bloc states, lacks the national identity necessary to build a minimum of popular legitimacy. It must share its history and nationality with the F.R.G. The G.D.R. seeks, therefore, to create a new G.D.R. history and identity. It now distinguishes between "nationality" (all ethnic ties, that is, German) and "nation" (a unit derived from working-class-based economic and political relations, that is, the socialist nation).[51] Although admitting the continued existence of German nationality, the G.D.R. claims to be building a socialist German nation. The G.D.R. seeks to accomplish this through an expanded view of history that incorporates aspects of general "heritage" into the socialist "tradition," a process that entails reevaluating history and social classes for evidence of progressiveness. This explains the rediscovery of Frederick the Great and of Bismarck.

On the other hand, this resurgence of interest in history in the G.D.R. may also be an indication of social malaise in the postrevolutionary period. Many observers relate the intense cultural interest in foreign revolutionary struggles and heroes in the German romantic vein to disenchantment with the G.D.R.'s bureaucratized revolution.[52] A leading

[49] Adolf Laube, "Kunst und Reformation" [Art and Reformation] Radio DDR II, March 20, 1983; Laube, quoted in *Der Spiegel*, March 7, 1983, p. 2.

[50] *epd Dokumentation* No. 8 (February 9, 1981), 1-11.

[51] See Asmus (fn. 4), 24ff., for a discussion of the new emphasis on history in the G.D.R. and its relation to the national question in S.E.D. policy.

[52] For example, Christa Wolf, *Kein Ort. Nirgends* [No place. Nowhere] (Weimar: Aufbau Verlag, 1979); Bonnie Beckett, "The Reception of Pablo Neruda's Works in the German Democratic Republic," in Margy Gerber, ed., *Studies in GDR Culture and Society* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 205-22.

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Marxist historian explains, "In terms of the revolutionary theory, we are dealing with the aging Luther in the context of a declining revolutionary curve, namely the institutionalization and rehabilitation of society on a partially reconstructed basis."[53] This seems to suggest that the G.D.R. may find Luther's experience in the Reformation useful in coming to terms with its own postrevolutionary malaise.

All of these arguments suffer from two weaknesses. First, they seem to indicate more about the *effect* of the Luther jubilee on thoughtful intellectuals than about the regime's *motives*. Although the state certainly seeks to mobilize greater support among intellectuals, it is aware that intellectuals in the G.D.R. have shown little proclivity for dissidence, of either the active or passive variety. The regime is much more concerned with support from the churches and the population as a whole.

Second, and related to the first, these arguments focus primarily on only one aspect of particular interest to intellectuals—that is, the shift in Marxist historiography. Yet the experience of the Luther Year reveals that other factors—the general church-state relationship and the inter-German relationship—were more important in the state's motivations than the shift in official historiography. These broad explanations overestimate the regime's capacity for long-term planning as well as for retrospection.

One needs, therefore, to look at the short-range explanations to understand the regime's motivations in the Luther celebration. For example, the policy under Honecker of limited rapprochement with the churches provided the context for the state's activities during the Luther Year. The state's nuanced, yet unmistakable distancing from Luther after mid-1982, and its attempt to differentiate among regional churches, is best explained, not by reference to "position-of-strength" or "post-revolutionary malaise" arguments, but rather by sources of tension inherent in the church-state relationship.

Another reason for the regime's celebration of Luther is its pragmatic interest in hard currency. Like several Soviet-bloc states, the G.D.R. has recently suffered hard-currency shortfalls and has had to seek further Western bank credits (for example, the one billion DM credit negotiated by Franz Josef Strauss in July 1983). The intensive campaign to promote Luther Year tourism resulted in an additional two to three hundred thousand foreign tourists to the G.D.R., yielding a hard-currency infusion of 140 to 200 million DM.[54] Although the level pales when compared to the G.D.R.'s total indebtedness, or even to the new bank credits,

[53] Brendler (fn. 10), 37.

[54] Based on informal estimates of the church Luther committee and an average tour price of 700 DM.

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one should not underestimate the importance of the addition in terms of the decision making of a command economy as dependent on Western imports as is that of the G.D.R.

Finally, the foreign policy interests of the G.D.R. help explain its interest in Luther. Although the *Abgrenzung* policy vis-à-vis the F.R.G. has softened since 1971, the G.D.R. still craves international recognition and status. It sought—successfully—to use the Luther celebration to focus international attention on itself. It sought—unsuccessfully—through the abortive Carstens visit, to gain official West German recognition of the incorporation of East Berlin into the G.D.R. Most importantly, it sought—with mixed success—to use the celebration to promote its peace campaign in West Germany and to enhance the "special inter-German relationship" that was in jeopardy as a result of the erosion in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Thus, the main reasons for the scope and tenor of the 1983 Luther celebration of the G.D.R. are not to be found in the grand abstractions of strategic planners in the politburo, but in the constraints set by the G.D.R.'s foreign economic and political situation and the regime's attempt to maintain a tenuous domestic peace with the churches.

VII. Conclusion

Several conclusions, with long-term implications for the G.D.R.'s political system, can be drawn from a study of the Luther Year. First, the shift toward a more positive view of Luther in official Marxist historiography suggests that the postrevolutionary G.D.R. has moved toward greater emphasis on adapting to, rather than on transforming, its political culture. And, although the new view of Luther met with some opposition within the regime, it is not a short-term or isolated phenomenon. The Luther revision dates from 1960 and, in addition, has been augmented by the "rehabilitation" of, for example, Frederick the Great and Bismarck. Thus the G.D.R. follows a pattern seen in other Eastern European states, in which the Soviets have tolerated greater adaptation to national culture during the post-Stalin era in order to promote more viable regimes. This shift from transformation to inclusion, however, primarily affects the intellectuals. Moreover, because the G.D.R. is sensitive to the unresolved German question, the historical revisionism is likely to be limited to "safe" subjects—that is, the period prior to the schism in the S.P.D. during World War I, and topics involving the legacy of Prussia rather than those of a unified Germany.

More important than this new Marxist historiography during the Luther Year was the limited rapprochement between the Lutheran

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church and the state. The level of church-state cooperation in the G.D.R. was unprecedented. However, the limitations of the relationship were also obvious. Dissent within the party and fears of co-optation within the church produced cooperation at arm's length. The Luther celebration did not mean an end to the regime's ideological atheism and in fact revealed anew its attempts to manipulate the institutional church. Yet in the long term, the mutual interest of church and state in pragmatic cooperation is likely to continue, and mixed cooperation and conflict is likely to characterize their relationship in the future.

The Luther celebration also revealed the importance of the special inter-German relationship—both its resilience and its limitations. The G.D.R. did seek to use Luther to gain international prestige, but the relative absence of anti-West German polemics in the G.D.R.'s treatment of Luther as a German cultural figure contrasted greatly with earlier attempts to deny West Germany any claim to Luther's heritage. Even in the face of international challenges (for example, the I.N.F. deadlock, the failure of SALT, the Polish upheaval and sanctions), as well as domestic challenges (the rising peace movement and unrest in the churches), the regime was willing to tolerate considerable informal cooperation between the churches in East and West Germany. Despite their formal division, the churches demonstrated again in the Luther Year that they represent one of the strongest bonds between the two Germanys. To be sure, the Carstens affair and the regime's use of Luther for its peace campaign indicated the problems of inter-German détente. However, the experience of the Luther Year leads to the conclusion that the special inter-German relationship is likely to continue.

The regime's new-found interest in historical figures such as Luther, in the context of the increased cooperation between church and state, raises questions of convergence with other Soviet bloc states. In the Soviet Union, in Romania, and in Bulgaria, for example, one finds churches (in these cases, Orthodox) that, because of their historical identifications with the dominant nationalities, have been co-opted by the regimes in question in their efforts to build political legitimacy in the postrevolutionary phase.[55] Although the party in each case retains its atheistic ideology and the churches are subject to strict state control, the regimes place some value on receiving an imprimatur of national legitimacy from the church.

[55] Beeson (fn. 2), 23-88, 329-79; Albert Boiter, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, Washington Papers 8, No. 78 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977); Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and John W. Strong, eds., *Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1975); Irwin T. Sanders, "Church-State Relations in Southeastern Europe," *East European Quarterly* 16 (March 1982), 63-69.

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The Lutheran church in the G.D.R. could potentially play this role. It has been historically, and is today, the dominant church in the G.D.R., and it is an autonomous national church rather than a branch of a transnational religious actor, such as the Roman Catholic church. Moreover, the Catholic church, especially under Pope John Paul II, represents a potential threat to the regime. The election of Pope John Paul II has rekindled nationalist dissent among Lithuanian Catholics, Ukrainian and Romanian Uniates, and, to a lesser extent, Slovak Catholics, in addition to Polish Catholics.[56] Although the national minority dimension is missing in the case of the G.D.R., the rise of new leadership in the G.D.R. episcopate and pressure from the Pope and grass-roots Catholics have caused the G.D.R. Catholic hierarchy to become more critical of the regime.[57]

The analogy with the church-state relationship in the U.S.S.R., Romania, and Bulgaria is incomplete for a variety of reasons. The Lutheran churches in the G.D.R. retain much more institutional strength (finances, clergy, etc.) than do the weak churches in those countries, and their relatively democratic organizations and international contacts (West Germany, the World Council of Churches) preclude their co-optation by the state. Unlike the Orthodox theology, the Lutheran theology is inconsistent with a church limited to ritual, and, in contrast to the Orthodox churches, the G.D.R. churches have successfully fought the regime's efforts to prevent their modernization. In addition, the burden of German history makes the Lutheran church less willing than the aforementioned churches to be the defender of nationalism—although it is not clear that the state itself wishes to follow this model. German nationalism, even under state aegis, raises the German question, and it leaves many in the S.E.D., as well as in the Soviet Union, uncomfortable. Whereas Romanian nationalism reinforces the regime's independent stance vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R., German nationalism runs counter to the S.E.D.'s internationalism and superloyalty to the Soviet Union.[58]

Analogies with Poland can also be offered.[59] The Polish Catholic church, too, is coincident with the nationality of the society, and the East German and Polish churches undoubtedly enjoy the greatest freedom of any in the Soviet bloc. However, in the case of Poland, the

[56] John M. Kramer, "The Vatican's Ostpolitik," *Review of Politics* 42 (July 1980), 283-308.

[57] Klemens Richter, "Veränderte Haltung der DDR-Katholiken" [Changed attitude of GDR Catholics], *Deutschland Archiv* No. 5 (May 1983), 454-59.

[58] Melvin Croan, *East Germany: The Soviet Connection*, Washington Papers 4, No. 36 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976), 38-52.

[59] Suzanne Hruby, "The Church in Poland and Its Political Influence," *Journal of International Affairs* 36 (Fall/Winter 1982-1983), 317-28.

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historical role of the church in defending the Polish cultural nation while under foreign occupation has provided the church with roots in Polish society strong enough to challenge the regime. The modus vivendi that has been reached occasionally since 1956 has occurred in the context of state weakness. The strength of the church is indicated in its key role in the rise of Solidarity and in its claim, since the imposition of martial law, to be the representative of Polish society.

Thus, analogies with the Polish case are also incomplete. The East German church has never played as prominent or as positive a historical role as the Polish Catholic church. G.D.R. society is also much more secularized than Polish society. Moreover, the G.D.R. regime has never been as weak as that in Poland: worker protest is almost nonexistent; human rights dissidents are readily deported; the economy is relatively strong; the Communist Party is more unified. Thus the G.D.R. church has never been in the position to challenge the state on behalf of the nation.

Czechoslovakia contrasts markedly with the G.D.R.[60] No single church can claim to represent all of Czechoslovakia, and the weak institutional churches have been the target of a continuous *Kirchenkampf* since 1948, relieved only briefly during the liberalization of the Prague Spring.

Hungary presents the most appropriate analogy to the G.D.R.[61] Although predominantly Catholic, Hungary has pursued a relatively moderate policy toward the church since the Vatican's removal of Cardinal Mindszenty in 1974. The Catholic church has played a large national role historically; yet, because of the high level of secularization and the relatively strong economy, the church is not in a position to challenge the state. Thus, as in the G.D.R., a relationship of pragmatic cooperation between church and state has developed.

The study of the Luther Year in the G.D.R. reveals that, with the possible exception of Hungary, the church-state relationship in the G.D.R. is unique. The Lutheran church is too powerful to be co-opted by the state, as the churches have been in the U.S.S.R., Romania, and Bulgaria, or to be repressed, as in Czechoslovakia; yet it is too weak to pose a challenge to the regime, as in Poland. The church-state relationship in the G.D.R. is, and can be expected to continue to be, a relationship that, as demonstrated by the Luther Year, is characterized by a mixture of cooperation and conflict.

[60] Beeson (fn. 2), 219-55.
[61] *Ibid.*, 256-87.

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Review Article
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
West-South Perspective

By KAZIMIERZ Z. POZNANSKI*

Franklin Long and Alexandra Oleson, *Appropriate Technology and Social Values: A Critical Appraisal*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1980, 215 pp.

Lynn K. Mytelka, *Regional Development in a Global Economy: The Multinational Corporation, Technology, and Andean Integration*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, 233 pp.

Samuel M. Rosenblatt, ed., *Technology and Economic Development: A Realistic Perspective*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979, 191 pp.

Francisco R. Sagasti, *Technology, Planning, and Self-Reliant Development: A Latin American View*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, 176 pp.

Introduction: Conflicting Hypotheses

TECHNOLOGY transfer is becoming an increasingly controversial issue in world politics. After many years of enthusiasm among both importers and exporters of technology, views have started to diversify, and the parties involved have found themselves in conflict. The most visible element of the current controversy is the disillusionment among the countries of the South regarding the ease with which they expected to become industrialized through the importation of Western technology. There are also some signs of disappointment in the West, especially in the United States, where the fear has arisen that the exported technology may be underpriced and that the competitive position of the United States may be eroding relative to that of the importing countries.[1] In this article, I will deal with only one dimension of the current debate—namely, the experience of developing countries as importers of technology from the West.

I shall confront several major hypotheses with a special focus on

* This article reflects the results of research that the author initiated during his stay at the Woodrow Wilson School of Princeton University in 1981 as a visiting scholar sponsored by the American Council for Learned Societies, and continued during his affiliation with the Center for International Studies at Cornell University.

[1] See Robert G. Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporations* (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

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dependency theory, which has recently emerged as the most critical reaction to the traditional enthusiastic view.[2] Advocates of this theory describe the relationship between the Western exporters of technology and the Southern countries as being fundamentally unequal and exploitative or distortive in nature. They blame the Western exporters of technology for most of the failures in technology transfers to the developing South, for overpricing, and for selling inappropriate systems (i.e., bias toward capital-intensive technologies), and therefore recommend a separation from, or strict control of, these imports.

The dependency school should not be confused with a theory that Rosenblatt, in *Technology and Economic Development*, calls "realistic." Its advocates are also critical of the actual benefits the South derives from imports of Western technology; but, contrary to the dependency theorists, they hold that all the major limitations stem from internal factors (in the sense that they are in no direct way determined by forces outside of the developing countries). Consequently, they do not expect improvements from unilateral concessions made by the Western exporters of technology, but rather from an effort on the part of the South to create more appropriate internal conditions for importation of Western technology.

Contrary to many theoretical speculations put forward by the dependency school, there is not much quantitative evidence that the transfer of Western technology has had an adverse effect on the modernization of Southern industries. There are no good grounds for arguing that developing countries could cure their problems by shielding their economies from Western influences or by placing all their economic relations with the Western world under strong governmental control. I shall argue that the dependency theory does not provide an adequate analytical tool for studying the actual trends in the technological development of the South, nor of the South's relations with the West.

Dimensions of West-South Technology Gaps

The debate on West-South technological relations begins with the magnitude and dynamics of the technology gap that divides these two parts of the world. This is the point of real controversy between various theoretical approaches. Thus, both the dependency and realistic theories see this gap as wide and long-lasting. By contrast, some authors—without

[2] See Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 172-84, as well as the volumes by Mytelka and by Sagasti, under review. Also see Lynn K. Mytelka, "Licensing and Technology Dependence in the Andean Group," *World Development* (1979), 447-59.

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ignoring the existence of deep differences in technology between the two regions—offer elaborate arguments to the effect that there is nothing inevitable about developing countries being unable to improve their technological abilities over time.[3] So far, none of the arguments have been supported by comprehensive statistical verification. The following remarks are intended to examine the validity of these conflicting standpoints.

INPUTS IN THE RESEARCH SECTOR

One way of looking at the West-South technology gap is to measure differences in the efforts made by various countries in generating new technology. The dependency argument holds that developing countries spend few physical resources on the domestic production of technology, and that, as a result, their share of the total resources devoted to research activity in the world remains extremely low. Moreover, this disproportional distribution of research resources is expected to continue in the future. Sagasti, in *Technology, Planning, and Self-Reliant Development: A Latin American View*, maintains that the developing countries' share in the total cost of research amounted to only 2 percent in 1963; it increased to 4 percent in 1972—still a very small portion of the world's research (p. 8).

If we look at employment figures instead of the research cost indicator, the gap in technology appears to be narrower, although still quite significant. In 1973, about 12.6 percent of the world's research manpower was active in developing countries. The reason for this greater share in the global cost of research is that manpower is generally cheaper in the South than in the developed West; salary costs represent, as a rule, the largest part of the entire cost of research.[4]

When we turn to more disaggregated data, the current disproportion in technology also appears less dramatic than Sagasti's figures suggest. There are regional differences in research efforts, both within the West and within the South. For instance, the average number of researchers per million of the economically active population in developing countries is one-twelfth that of developed ones.[5] This difference is significantly less in the Arab states and Latin America. In 1973, Latin American

[3] *North-South Technology Transfer: The Adjustment Ahead* (Paris: OECD, 1981). Also see *Technology Transfer to Developing Countries*, Analytical Study No. 7, Tentative Identification of Main Feedback Effects (Paris: OECD, 1979).

[4] From Johan Annerstedt, "Global Resources of Research and Experience: Some Basic Indicators in a Changing International Scientific-Technological Order," conference paper (Algiers, September, 1978), 16.

[5] *Ibid.*, 18.

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countries had only three times fewer researchers per million of the economically active population than Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa, and five times fewer than the average Western European country.

Further disaggregation shows that even now some developing countries put as much effort into the production of technology as do some of the less research-oriented countries in the West that spend less than 1 percent of their national incomes on research. Examples of the latter are Canada (.9 percent) and Italy (.8 percent).[6] One of the developing countries that spends comparable amounts of its national income on domestic research is South Korea. Its research budget amounted to .9 percent of national income in 1980, and was expected to increase to 1.6 percent in 1982 and to 2 percent in 1986.[7]

The weight of the research budget is considerably greater not only in some of the so-called newly industrialized developing countries such as South Korea, but also in some of the larger, more slowly growing ones. For instance, in China the share of research amounted to 1 percent of the national income by the end of 1981, and, according to the budget outlines for the coming years, it will increase further.[8] Although India spent only .65 percent of its national income on the research sector in 1977, its level of research expenditure ranks tenth or twelfth in the world.[9]

TECHNOLOGY OUTPUTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Another argument made by the dependency theorists is that developing countries not only spend a smaller proportion on research, but that the volume of technology produced by their research sectors is far below that of the developed countries. That seems to be a logical conclusion from the claim of most of the dependency theorists that, in developing countries, inputs into research activity are marginal. There is yet another factor which they consider to be responsible for this low technology output—namely, poor productivity of research.

Advocates of the dependency school use patent data as one set of

[6] "Science Resources," *Newsletter OECD* (No. 2, Spring 1977), and *Science and Technology Policy Outlook* (Paris: OECD 1978).

[7] See "Forum for Korean Brains," *Korea News Review*, April 18, 1981, p. 18; and "In Development You Can't Beg, Borrow or Steal," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 14, 1982, p. 69.

[8] Wang Binggian, "Reports on Financial Work," *Beijing Review*, No. 39 (September 29, 1980), 18. Also, Richard P. Suttmeier, "Moon-Ghetto Problems in China's Alternative Scientific Futures," conference on "China: The 1980 Era: An Exercise in Retrospective Futurology," University of Chicago (November 13-15, 1981), 12.

[9] Franklin A. Long, "Science and Technology in India: Their Role in National Development," in John W. Mellor, ed., *India: A Rising Middle Power* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), 234.

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indicators to prove this point. Vaitsos points out that the developing countries' share in the total number of patents granted in the world amounted to only about 1 percent in the late 1960s. He also shows that only a small fraction of the patents granted by developing countries belong to their citizens: most of them were taken out by foreigners. In 1966, for instance, the patents granted to nationals amounted to only 10.62 percent in India, 8.27 percent in Turkey, and 5.5 percent in Chile.[10]

These data, although correct, produce a rather exaggerated picture of the existing gaps in the production of technology. Patent data alone do not reflect the total supply of technology in developing countries; applied in this kind of comparison, they tend to understate the real output. One reason lies in the nature of many technological novelties produced by developing countries: they are often improvements over technologies imported from other countries and cannot be patented. Or they may have only limited commercial value outside the importing country—e.g., they strictly fit the local needs and conditions, and there is therefore no reason to obtain a patent.

Moreover, patent data do not measure theoretical advances since the latter are not patentable. We must therefore utilize some quantitative indicators, such as the number of articles published or a citation index. These supportive indicators show that some of the developing countries generate a substantial amount of theoretical knowledge. For instance, India ranks eighth in the world in the total number of papers published in all areas of science and technology.[11]

The indicator used by Vaitsos also has all the limitations of an aggregate yardstick. More disaggregated indicators show that, although the developing countries are way behind developed countries in the production of technology, the former have been able to expand in some technological fields in which their achievements are considerable by any standard. Some of these strong areas of technology in the South are both complex and advanced.

For instance, although technologically lagging in petro-chemicals and transport equipment, China seems to have caught up with the Soviet Union in computer technology,[12] though not yet with the United States.[13] Maciotti assesses China as being fairly backward in many areas of medical science, but as a world leader in several fields of modern biochemistry—

[10] Constantin Vaitsos, "Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries," *Journal of Development Studies* 10 (October 1973), 378.

[11] Long (fn. 9), 237.

[12] Bohdan O. Szuprowicz, "Electronics," in Leo A. Orleans, ed., *Science in Contemporary China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1980), 435-62.

[13] Nicolaas Bloembergen, "Physics," in Orleans (fn. 12), 98-99.

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for example, in the production of insulin and the synthesis of a transfer RNA.[14]

A similar situation exists in India, which is still quite weak in many fields, such as computer technology and medical science. In several traditional fields of technology, however, India exhibits a high technological capability—for example, in steel making, solar energy devices, formulation of pesticides, fungicides, and herbicides for tropical use, and in tropical marine biology fisheries.[15] India has also achieved marked technological advances in the fields of pharmaceuticals and conventional weaponry—the latter including the development of rocket propellants and detonators.[16]

The more advanced developing countries have also demonstrated their ability to produce high technology, such as nuclear devices for civilian uses. Although India may be the only developing country with full domestic potential to produce nuclear-power technology and to use it commercially, other countries—including China[17] and Argentina[18]—have acquired most of the knowledge necessary to design their own commercial reactors. China and India are also advanced in terms of nuclear weapons.[19] The former conducted its first nuclear experiments as early as the mid-1960s. Most of the experts in the field expect several other developing countries to join the "nuclear club" within a few years—for instance, Pakistan, Taiwan, and South Korea.[20]

TECHNOLOGICAL LEVEL OF PRODUCTION

The limited scale and low productivity of inputs into technology ascribed to the developing countries by some dependency advocates should in theory be reflected in the technological level of Southern industries. The types of products manufactured and the processes used in these countries should indicate whether they have developed industrial sectors that require substantial technological expertise.

Contrary to what might be expected from the figures presented by some dependency theorists, there is evidence that developing countries

[14] Manfredo Maciotti, "The P.R. China: A Technological Power in the Making," *Asia Quarterly* (No. 4, 1979), 333.

[15] Long (fn. 9), 253.

[16] M. B. Bhagavan, "Innovations in Industry," *Seminar*, No. 258 (February 1981), 29-30.

[17] Bohdan and Maria Szuprowicz, *Doing Business with the People's Republic of China* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978).

[18] John R. Redick, "The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferation in Latin America," *International Organization* 35 (Winter 1981), 103-34.

[19] George H. Quester, "Enlisting Post-1974 India to the Cause of Nonproliferation," in Mellor (fn. 9), 189-212.

[20] *World Armaments and Disarmaments*, SIPRI Yearbook 1979 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1980).

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have successfully penetrated technologically demanding areas of production, including the manufacture of various capital goods. Southern countries are increasingly able to meet the domestic demand for such goods. For instance, Mexico and Brazil are currently reported to provide 70 to 80 percent of the capital goods demanded by their economies,[21] and China's national industry is able to supply about 99 percent of domestic needs for machine tools.[22]

The expansion of many capital goods industries has even enabled some developing countries to enter the world market by exporting these products. So far, these exports have been concentrated on the traditional sectors of manufacturing, such as steel, in which South Korea and Brazil are the leaders.[23] In shipbuilding, South Korea and Taiwan are among the world's top exporters.[24] Taiwan is also a leader in the sales of textile machines.[25] Exports from technologically more complex sectors have expanded as well—for instance, machine tools from China and Taiwan[26] and computers from Brazil.[27]

Some developing countries have begun to transfer a large range of technologies abroad—through, among other channels, direct investment. Although these investments are still limited in scale, they are expanding.[28] At present, most of them involve technology from traditional sectors of industry. Thus, foreign direct investment by Latin American countries—with Argentina as the leader—is focused on consumer products requiring standard technology, such as food products, metal goods, and consumer electronics. Asian countries specialize in direct investment in textiles, in which Hong Kong is the leader.[29]

The sale of turnkey projects—involving extensive technological expertise—has expanded as well, with Argentina, Brazil, and India taking

[21] *Technology Transfer to Developing Countries*, Analytical Study No. 2 (Paris: OECD, 1979), 38.

[22] Liang Xunxian, "China's Machine Tool Industry," *China Business Review* (November/December 1981).

[23] United Nations, *Statistics of World Trade in Steel* (New York: United Nations, 1981). See also "Prospects for the Steel Industry in Developing Countries" (Vienna: UNIDO 1979).

[24] See Andrew J. Cornford and Raymond B. Glasgow, "The Process of Structural Change in the World Economy: Some Aspects of the Rise of the Shipbuilding Industry in Developing Countries," *Trade and Development* (No. 3, 1982).

[25] *Bulletin of Statistics of World Trade in Engineering Products* (New York: United Nations, 1981).

[26] Xunxian (fn. 22).

[27] *Trade by Commodities. Market Summaries: Imports, 1980*, Statistics of Foreign Trade (Paris: OECD, 1981).

[28] See Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, "Foreign Direct Investment by Latin America," in Tamir Agmon and Charles P. Kindleberger, eds., *Multinationals from Small Countries* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979).

[29] Sanjaya Lall, "Developing Countries as Exporters of Industrial Technology," *Research Policy* (No. 9, 1980), 4-24.

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the lead.[30] Some of these projects represent complex technology—for instance, automatic telephone exchanges, large-scale electric generators, and pharmaceutical products (India); shipbuilding technology (Argentina); and steelmaking (Brazil and Mexico). So far, the majority of these turnkey projects are located in developing countries. In any case, the technological requirements are high in view of the strong competition by firms from developed countries.

The Interrelation of Foreign and Domestic Technology

DEPENDENCY-THEORY ARGUMENTS

One of the criticisms of technology transfer by dependency-oriented economists and political scientists is based on the suspicion that the inflow of imported goods does not necessarily lead to the growth of the internal technological capacity of developing countries. The most extreme version of this opinion is the idea that transfers of Western technology may even have negative implications for these countries' abilities to produce technology for themselves. In *Regional Development in a Global Economy*, Lynn Mytelka calls this neutral, or negative, feed-back mechanism "the dependency syndrome" (p. 122).

Several specific hypotheses are formulated in the dependency literature. First, it is argued that legally binding provisions included in technology agreements—through which technology is supplied—reduce the will of the importing industries to produce the technology themselves; second, that licensing contracts create a psychological environment of continuous dependence on external sources of technology; and third, that licensing agreements limit the opportunity of learning by doing, and therefore lead to the underdevelopment of internal capabilities to produce technology in the borrowing countries (Mytelka, 129-35).

Mytelka cites evidence from the Andean Pact countries to the effect that firms relying upon foreign technology are less often working (or willing to work) on their own new products than firms that have not been dependent upon Western technology.[31] She considers this to be connected with a psychological environment of dependence (pp. 134-35). Her survey of a few Latin American industries also seems to suggest that firms (including national firms) that use technology licensed by Western companies tend to let the Western partners take care of supplying all the needed imported machinery. Consequently, she perceives

[30] Denis J. Encarnation, "The Political Economy of Indian Joint Industrial Ventures Abroad," *International Organization* 36 (Winter 1982), 32.

[31] See also Evans (fn. 2).

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a lost opportunity for domestic industries to learn directly about the technologies they import (pp. 129-30).

EXAMPLES OF POSITIVE INTERACTIONS

The dependency literature's predominately negative picture of the impact of technology tranfers from developed countries contradicts the experience of a number of industries or entire economies in which imports of technology have brought positive results for domestic research activities in developing countries. One area of industry where there are positive interactions between foreign and domestic technology is the production of conventional weaponry, which is generally firmly controlled by the governments of the developing countries. A recent study shows that many of them have been able to move from almost total dependence on foreign sources (e.g., simple co-assembling) to independent production. Ross states that by 1980, eighteen developing countries had advanced to this stage in the production of aircraft, armored vehicles, or naval vessels.[32] It is important to note that these producers were able to reach this stage in a relatively short time—namely, within ten or fifteen years.[33]

Some successful cases—consistent with the more positive approach—can also be found in the civilian sector. The electronics industry in South Korea began production in the mid-1960s with the manufacture of black-and-white television sets, as well as stereos, radios, and radio communication equipment. Initially, the technology was imported in "package" form. Production at that stage was merely an assembly operation of foreign components and parts, but within a few years technology was supplied by local establishments, thus creating many new plants. Now this industry is able to improve on existing technology; it may soon reach a technological level close to that of well-established producers of electronics in the developed world.[34]

A case of particular importance is that of the Brazilian aircraft industry—not only because of its unquestionable progress in developing an indigenous technological capability on the basis of foreign imports,

[32] Andrew Ross, "Arms Production in Developing Countries: The Continuing Proliferation of Conventional Weapons," mimeo, Center of International Studies, Princeton University (August 1980), 8.

[33] *Ibid.*, 15-16.

[34] Linsu Kim, "Stages of Development of Industrial Technology in a Developing Country: A Model," *Research Policy* (No. 9, 1980), 254-77, shows that other South Korean industries—electrical appliances, agricultural machinery, and automobiles—have gone through a similar process. For an opposite opinion, see S. Chul Suh, "Development of a New Industry through Exports: The Electronics Industry in Korea," in Wu Hong and Ann O. Krueger, eds., *Trade and Development in Korea* (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1975), 119.

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but also because the dependency school backs up its theoretical arguments largely with evidence from Latin America, and to a lesser extent from Africa. After years of relatively slow progress, the aircraft industry in Brazil grew to substantial size in the early 1970s. By 1977, Brazil had increased its production from 71 military and civilian planes in 1972 to more than 600—mostly civilian. Originally, all the civilian models had been of Western origin (i.e., licensed by Piper and others). But now many models—most of them commuters—are of domestic design. The technological level of the Brazilian aircraft industry is very high, a fact reflected in the recent decision of several Western air transportation authorities to permit Brazilian planes to compete in their markets.

INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE BUILD-UP OF DOMESTIC CAPACITIES

In some versions of dependency theory, the presence of Western forces is pictured as being so overwhelming that no distinction is made between external and internal factors in the developing countries. The dependency school seems not to recognize the fact that domestic technological capacities in the South appear to be adversely affected by forces internal to them. There is considerable evidence that insufficient or misguided growth of technological potential in many developing economies is to some extent the result of weaknesses toward technology in their domestic policies. These weaknesses are not necessarily caused by indirect pressures exerted by Western interest groups such as multinational corporations or governments that perceive the developing country as being of strategic importance to their economies.

First, there is still a lack of long-term commitment by a large number of governments in the South to support domestic research and to incorporate such research into wider economic programs. Even when a government provides support, it often does not last long. For example, Mexico made an attempt to strengthen the research sector between 1973 and 1976, but this idea was not fully accepted by the bureaucracy. From the very beginning it was sabotaged by the middle-rank bureaucrats, and finally simply forgotten under the new political regime of Lopez Portillo.[35]

Second, research activities, especially in university communities, become in many cases the object of political repression on the part of the state's administration. Argentina provides an example of political intervention in public universities and scientific institutes. From 1946—when the populist military government of Juan Perón pursued a strongly anti-

[35] Miguel S. Wionczek, "On the Visibility of a Policy for Science and Technology in Mexico," *Latin American Research Review* 16 (No. 1, 1981).

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intellectual line—until recently, Argentina's universities and scientific institutes were subject to almost continuous political intervention, including purges of scientific personnel and interference in academic policy and faculty appointments.[36]

The People's Republic of China is another case in point. The country started to make a vast investment in the research sector in 1949, mostly with the help of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These efforts continued—even after withdrawal of the Soviet Union's assistance in 1960—until 1966, when the research sector and education system came under great political stress. Initially the damage was done by the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969); it was continued under the predominance of the Gang of Four (1974-1976).[37] Suttmeier estimates that as many as a million individuals may have missed opportunities for higher education as a result of political repression, and that this repression is the cause of today's shortage of highly skilled research manpower in the country.[38]

Third, in many developing countries—especially those that are fairly generous in supporting research activity—a significant portion of the expenditure is devoted to military goals or advanced "prestigious" civilian technologies. In India, for instance, the government is the major sponsor of research. It customarily budgets almost 60 percent of its research money for atomic energy, defense, technology, and space exploration technologies.[39] The defense sector alone employs more than 20 percent of all research scientists.[40] A large portion of China's research spending also is devoted to the development of military and advanced civilian technologies: approximately 30 to 40 percent of total expenditure. China's military sector, which employs the best qualified scientists who operate the finest equipment, reportedly receives 15 percent of the research budget.[41]

The Question of Appropriate Technology

THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS BY THE DEPENDENCY SCHOOL

One of the criticisms made by the dependency school is that Western technology is generally inappropriate for developing countries, and that

[36] James H. Street, "Political Intervention in Science in Latin America," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 37 (February 1981), 14-23. Also see Joel Primack, "Human Rights in the Southern Cone," *ibid.*, 24-28.

[37] See Zhou Xun, "Research and Politics in the People's Republic of China," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 35 (October 1979).

[38] Richard P. Suttmeier, "Politics, Modernization, and Science in China," *Problems of Communism* (January/February 1981), 29.

[39] Aqueil Ahmad, "Science and Technology in India," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 36 (November 1980), 39.

[40] Government of India, Ministry of Defence, *Report 1979-1980* (New Delhi, 1980), 49.

[41] Suttmeier (fn. 38), 31-32.

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alternative sources of technology should be created by the South itself, preferably through intraregional cooperation in research.[42] The term "inappropriate technology" means, among other things, that technology provided by the developed nations of the West is too capital-intensive, thus creating unemployment in the South.[43]

Another frequent argument is that imported technology brings with it many unwelcome elements of Western culture,[44] such as social inequality, centralization of political and economic power, different perceptions of relations between man and nature, and so forth. These elements are unwelcome not only because they make it less possible to create alternative—more just—societies, but also because a "taste transfer" is seen as bearing negative economic costs (Mytelka, 140). Among the latter are the diversion of economic resources from agricultural production and emphasis on imports of luxury goods.

According to the dependency school, there are two major reasons for this unfavorable situation. First, the majority of technologies developed in advanced industrial countries is said to be aimed at meeting only those countries' economic and cultural needs. Second, even if appropriate technologies are available, Western multinationals express little interest in supplying them to developing countries, and even less interest in making adaptations to fit the developing countries' conditions and desires.[45]

Advocates of the realistic theory—unlike those of the dependency school—argue that, because of domestic factors, the technology imported by developing countries "appears to be substantially inappropriate by any known quantitative or judgmental standards" (Gustav Ranis in Rosenblatt, 27). They maintain that there is a sufficient supply of potentially useful (and appropriate) technology, due to the existence of alternative sources of various vintages of technology (Nathaniel Leff in Rosenblatt, 88; Rosenblatt in Rosenblatt, 11),[46] and to the fact that almost all technologies offer some degree of flexibility of mixing labor and capital as major factors of production (Howard Pack in Rosenblatt, 60).

[42] See critical review by Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979), 247-88.

[43] Francis Stewart, *Technology and Underdevelopment* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977; Ronald Muller, "The Multinational Corporations and Underdevelopment of the Third World," in Charles Wilber, ed., *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment* (New York: Random House, 1973), 132-33. Also see Sagasti, Mytelka.

[44] Johan Galtung, "Toward a New International Technological Order," *Alternatives* 4 (1978-79), 277-300.

[45] Constantin Vaitsos, "Government Policies for Bargaining with Transnational Enterprises in the Acquisition of Technology," in Jairam Ramesh and Charles Weiss, eds., *Mobilizing Technology for World Development* (New York: Praeger, 1979), 105.

[46] See also Witold Rybczynski, *Paper Heroes: A Review of Appropriate Technology* (New York: Anchor Books, 1980), 45.

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These opportunities are not commonly utilized, however, because—as the realistic school maintains—developing countries operate with poorly formulated domestic policies toward industrial growth.

For example, the realistic school puts the blame for the tendency to invest in more capital-intensive technology on the frequent overvaluation of exchange rates, which makes the imports of capital goods cheaper relative to other production factors. In addition, minimum-wage legislation, protection of workers against dismissal, the encouragement of unionization, and so forth, are said to raise the price of unskilled labor artificially. Moreover, low-interest loans and accelerated depreciation allowances bias firms in favor of the use of capital (Ranis in Rosenblatt, 31).[47]

IS AN ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY TRACK POSSIBLE?

There is no easy way of discussing the merit of the dependency argument on inappropriateness of Western technology transferred to the South—mostly through Western international firms—since the analysis by the dependency school is not well structured. It may be of value, however, to determine whether an alternative track of technology could meet all the specific requirements made by the dependency school.

The question whether it is feasible to develop an alternative (or appropriate) technology has been asked by several dependency theorists. Their studies have focused mainly on historical evidence, including Japan's successful effort at industrialization. Arguments that this success would not have been possible without the Japanese government's consciously favoring labor-intensive technologies in emerging industries have been questioned in Blumenthal's detailed quantitative analysis.[48]

Dependency advocates have also tried to portray postwar China's development policy as an example of the feasibility of creating a workable alternative to the pattern offered by advanced industrial countries: the focus here is on rural development and the preservation of traditional local communities in the countryside. Kapp has argued that China is

[47] See quantitative evidence in Byung Soo Chung and Chung H. Lee, "The Production Techniques by Foreign and Local Firms in Korea," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 29 (October 1980), 135-40. This analysis shows that there are no significant differences between production technologies chosen by foreign companies and local companies. The authors argue that, if the foreign companies have chosen inappropriate technologies, they did so because of a permissive environment that affected local companies in the same way. A similar conclusion is drawn for Brazil by Samuel A. Morel and Gordon W. Smith, "The Choice of Technology: Multinational Firms in Brazil," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 25 (January 1977) 239-64.

[48] Tuvia Blumenthal, "Factor Proportions and Choice of Technology: The Japanese Experience," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 28 (April 1980), 547-59.

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more successful than Western countries in conserving the natural environment because the Chinese government gives priority to the development of rural (versus urban) areas, and in general because of the high value the Chinese attach to nature.[49] These arguments, however, have not withstood empirical proof. Smil's analysis shows that China's actual commitment to conservation is weak. The country suffers from severe pollution: noise and water pollution, for example, exceeds the worst cases in Western industrial countries.[50]

The fact that China has so many times gone through periods of enforced isolation from foreign sources of advanced technology is also seen as an alternative element by some dependency authors.[51] Nayar, for instance, argues that isolation has enabled the country to benefit from technology imports during the short periods of intensive borrowing and from the comfort of gradual absorption of foreign technology and its adaptation to local conditions during times of a more isolationist policy.[52] (See also Dwight H. Perkins in Long and Oleson, 177-92.) This unstable policy has been rejected by the new Chinese leadership, however, as hampering economic development rather than helping it; the rejection raises doubts concerning the validity of this particular argument by the dependency school.

The most favored element of the Chinese alternative model is the longstanding promotion of small-scale firms even in the key industrial sectors. One example of this policy is the program of massive revival and expansion of the native steel technology which was announced in 1958. For a while this program appeared to be a great success, at least in terms of providing training opportunities for masses of people in the countryside. More than 700,000 iron-smelting furnaces were built by traditional methods, supplying about 3 million tons of steel in 1958. In purely economic terms, however, the policy turned out to be a disaster. The program was completely abandoned by the government in 1960 because of heavy losses resulting from the low quality of the steel, serious transportation difficulties, and the shortage of labor in agriculture.[53]

[49] William Kapp, *Environmental Policies and Development Planning in China, and Other Essays* (Paris: Mouton, 1974), 28-50.

[50] Vaclav Smil, "Environmental Degradation in China," *Asia Survey* 20 (August 1980); see also Joanna Gorecka-Poznanski, "Public Administration of Environmental Controls in Developing Countries," mimeo, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University (July 1981).

[51] Shannon Brown, "Foreign Technology and Economic Growth," *Problems of Communism* 4 (July-August 1977), 30-40, defines the periods.

[52] Baldev R. Nayar, "Independence, Development and Technology: Third World Quest for Technological Independencies," mimeo (undated), 39.

[53] Mill G. Clark, "Development of China's Steel Industry and Soviet Technical Aid," SILR, Cornell University (1973).

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Governmental Control of Technology

Advocates of the dependency school do not merely offer a critical appraisal of the transfer of Western technology to the South; they also present some remedies. These range from de-linking the Southern "periphery" from the Western "core"[54] to the concept of changing the legal rules for technology transfers. The latter idea includes the revision of existing patent law[55] and the suggestion that Southern governments exert strong controls on technology transfers in order to protect the interests of the periphery.

RECENT RESTRICTIVE MOVES BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Some restrictive moves on technology transfers were undertaken by several developing countries in the late 1940s. More recent and more significant steps include the 1970 rulings of the Andean Pact. In 1972 the Mexican government introduced tough legislation (which was subsequently relaxed under the Lopez Portillo administration). Over the next few years, some other countries followed suit, among them Nigeria, Argentina, and Brazil; the latter adopted what may be the toughest legislation in the South.[56] Among Asian countries, India's legislation is perhaps the most restrictive; it includes the 1970 patent regulations (limiting legal protection to seven years instead of the usual fifteen) and the new rules for foreign investment that became effective in 1974 (putting a ceiling on royalty payments and restricting equity to 40 percent).[57]

Underlying the call for state regulation of technology imports is the assumption that it can be undertaken without any significant risk: it is not expected to diminish the inflow of foreign technology or to make the most advanced items less available. The rationale of this assumption is analyzed by Mytelka, using the example of a regional control scheme implemented by the Andean Pact countries some years ago. She states that the above assumption was well-founded and that all the member

[54] Lynn K. Mytelka argues for selective de-linking in her study of African economies, "The Limits of Export-Led Development: The Ivory Coast's Experience with Multinationals," in John G. Ruggie, ed., *The Antinomies of Interdependence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

[55] For critical comments on the idea of changing the current patent law, see Sanjaya Lall, "The Patent System and the Transfer of Technology to Less Developed Countries," *Journal of World Trade Law* (No. 7, 1975), 1-16.

[56] "Latin America Gives Ground on Technology Issue," *Latin American Economic Report* 7 (March 30, 1979), 102-3.

[57] See "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1974," *IIC Economic News Digest* 1 (August 10, 1981), 19-20. The impact of these regulations on foreign investment may be judged by United States private investment, which is the second-largest source of direct foreign investment in India. In 1981, it was estimated to be about 350 million dollars. See "Indo-US Joint Ventures—An Appraisal," *ibid.*, 17-18.

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countries have gained more than they lost. As two pieces of empirical evidence, Mytelka cites the sharp acceleration of foreign direct investment in these countries since 1970 and the considerable diversification of investors, who have increasingly come from outside the United States (pp. 106-7).

Although these trends seem to confirm the positive balance suggested by Mytelka, some questionable points must be clarified. First, the acceleration of direct investment in the Andean Pact countries may only be interpreted as a good sign if we can prove that these increases have not been smaller than those in developing countries that have not applied such restrictions on transfers. Countries with weaker (or no) control of technology imports may have been more successful in attracting foreign investors. If so, the progress in the Andean Pact countries is illusory.

Second, it is likely that United States investors became less involved in the Andean Pact market because they were reluctant to submit themselves to the divestment regulations of 1970 (Mytelka, 111). Changes in the structure of investment in this region may reflect other factors, however. One is the general decline in the rate of overseas expansion (not the absolute magnitude of direct investment) by U.S. multinational corporations in the early seventies, which some observers relate to the decline of the U.S. dollar.[58]

Mytelka also maintains that the Andean Pact countries have been able to attract additional foreign capital even while they were reducing their annual royalty payments for Western technology (p. 58).[59] In order to establish the effectiveness of the control policy of the Andean Pact group—or of Latin America in general—one has to know something about channels of transferring resources. Screening procedures may at the time have decreased the utility of technology payments as a means of transferring profits and/or capital from the region, but that does not necessarily mean that these profits were not transferred more aggressively through other channels. As evidence that the shift to other channels has probably taken place, there is the fact that, since 1970, United States receipts for technology from Latin America have remained relatively stagnant, while the total repatriated profits going to the United States increased by 100 percent for all activities except the petroleum industry.[60] If this reasoning is correct, then Mytelka's argument is questionable.

Another interesting case is that of India. Some authors consider the

[58] Raymond Vernon and William H. Davidson, "Foreign Production of Technology-Intensive Products by U.S.-Based Multinational Enterprises," mimeo (Harvard University, January 15, 1979), 10.

[59] Also see *Legislation and Regulation on Technology Transfers: Empirical Analysis of Their Effect in Selected Countries* (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1980).

[60] *Technology Transfer to Developing Countries* (fn. 21), 42.

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Indian policy—which has one of the longest traditions of state control of technology transfer, starting in 1946—to be a success. Grieco, for instance, maintains that the tough restrictions have helped India to establish relative independence in conducting a national industrial strategy and to achieve quite a remarkable improvement in the technological level of its production.[61] Citing the Indian electronic industry as a case in point, Grieco argues that these restrictions (which forced IMB to close its subsidiary firm a few years ago) have enabled the industry to switch to more sophisticated imports than those previously offered by the leading foreign firms operating in the country. Moreover, he states that the restrictions have helped India to build up domestic capacities to the point where they can satisfy most of the internal market: between 1960 and 1966, almost 95 percent of the market was supplied by foreign producers, compared to only 10 percent between 1978 and 1980.[62] Grieco sees this and other factors as a clear indication that stiffer control (or even delinkage) is a reasonable policy.

His assessment raises some questions, however. First, he applies an entirely domestic perspective to the evaluation of technological performance, although an international comparison seems to be more appropriate here. Thus, although Grieco is correct in saying that the Indian industry has been growing fast, its expansion has been slower than that of Brazil and Mexico, where multinational firms enjoy better legal conditions and invest more money. For example, one can judge success from the scale of the computer industries in these three countries and from data on imports of parts and components. In 1980, India's imports from the United States—the major world supplier—of parts and components amounted to only $6.9 million, while Brazil's were valued at $38.1 million, and Mexico's at $63.5 million.[63]

Although Grieco regards the ability of a particular country to meet its domestic needs as an indicator of technological success, expansion of foreign markets may be an even better measure of performance. In those terms, India still remains uncompetitive, but some of the more permissive countries have gradually increased their sales abroad. In 1980, India's export of equipment to OECD countries was almost negligible, but Mexico's foreign sales of data-processing machines reached $21.0 million,

[61] Joseph M. Grieco, "Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's Experience with the International Computer Industry," *International Organization* 36 (Summer 1982), 631.

[62] *Ibid.*, 615-16.

[63] *U.S. Exports: Basic Products by World Areas*, U.S. Department of Commerce (Washington, D.C., 1981).

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Argentina's $26.1 million, and Brazil's $126.1 million. Mexico was especially active in selling parts and peripheral equipment.[64]

India's ability to supply its domestic market is hardly an indicator of the success of governmental policy, since that market is very shallow, even by the standards of developing countries. The estimated inventory of general-purpose computers in India (excluding minicomputers) amounted to 350 units in 1976 and to around 900 units in 1980.[65] This stock was much smaller than that of many other developing countries. For example, in Mexico the number of computers of all sizes increased from 3,510 in 1977 to an officially recorded 10,000 units in 1981.[66] (Another 5,100 systems were smuggled in beyond the governmental licensing procedure.)[67] In 1977, Venezuela had 3,380 computer systems, and it was estimated to have close to 7,400 units by the end of 1983.[68] Taiwan's total inventory of computers was 445 in 1977, but it reached 2,071 units by the end of 1982.[69] South Korea's stock was smaller than that of India in 1977 (269), but it is expected to have 2,110 in 1983.[70]

The Indian government itself has recently come to the conclusion that its strict policy toward technology transfers and multinational corporations in general does not work properly. It has relaxed several requirements in order to attract Western multinationals, especially in the technologically most advanced sectors and those with good export opportunities. These changes indicate that Grieco's point has to be viewed with strong reservations, and that the case of the electronic industry in India may prove the opposite of his thesis.

Conclusion

The dependency school—at least in its more naive manifestation—appears not to recognize that the South is steadily increasing its economic competitiveness, due not only to lower labor costs, but also to growing technological sophistication. This phenomenon—inconsistent with the

[64] From *Trade by Commodities—Market Summaries: Imports, 1980*, Statistics of Foreign Trade (Paris: OECD, 1981).

[65] Grieco (fn. 61), 617.

[66] *Mexico, Computers and Peripheral Equipment*, Country Market Survey, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, CMS 81-308 (February 1981), 6.

[67] "Computer Companies Slip Through the Back Door in Mexico," *Latin American Weekly Report* (June 11, 1982), 8.

[68] *Venezuela, Computers and Peripheral Equipment*, Country Market Survey, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, CMS-312 (March 1981), 4.

[69] *Taiwan, Computors and Peripheral Equipment*, Country Market Survey, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, CSM 81-310 (March 1981), 3.

[70] *South Korea, Computers and Peripheral Equipment*, Country Market Survey, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, CMS 81-311 (March 1981), 3.

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dependency theory—is the result not only of the gradually easing access to the modern technology of the developed countries, but also to the expansion of the domestic technology sectors in the developing countries. Several of the latter are already technological powers-in-the-making (e.g., China, India, and, to a lesser extent, Mexico).

The notion that the developing countries are being exploited by the developed countries through the export of technology leads to the assumption that the industrialization of the developing countries is possible without the inflow of Western technology, or that such imports are beneficial only when under stiff control by the bureaucracies in the South. By such arguments, the dependency school may divert the attention of the developing countries from their own failure to build on their indigenous potential for producing technology and to make a valid assessment of alternative foreign technologies. These shortcomings include excessive bureaucratization of research work, repressive policies toward intellectuals, and a focus on "prestigious" technologies (such as space technology).

There is little evidence that the inflow of Western technology ultimately damages the emerging technological capacity of developing countries. It appears that the importation of technology under the existing "rules of the game" is more likely to help developing countries in upgrading their technological levels than to cause harm. Many examples from military production and civilian industry show that, with the support of Western technology, developing countries can successfully move to the stage where they are able to generate their own technology and can steadily reduce (but not eliminate) the role of foreign supplies. Clearly, the foreign monopoly of modern technology seems to be less permanent than is suggested in the dependency literature.

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

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

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